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Summary 
This thesis emerges from and responds to certain recent philosophical writings on 
conceptual art, in particular from the British analytic tradition. Having identified a 
recent tendency implicit within this tradition towards an increasingly phenomenological 
reading of the ontology of the conceptual artwork, I aim to develop such ideas through 
an analysis of Heidegger’s theory of art, and through a subsequent enquiry into its 
applicability to conceptual art. This will involve a lengthy analysis of several conceptual 
artworks on the basis of this theory. 
The thesis consists of three substantive chapters. The first is a critical examination of 
certain recent philosophical texts on conceptual art. This chapter takes a series of 
philosophical texts representing a range of positions with regards to both the specific 
role and, by virtue, the significance accorded to the material in the constitution of the 
conceptual artwork. The second chapter looks at Heidegger’s phenomenological enquiry 
into the ontology of the artwork, and specifically at the role of the concepts of Earth and 
World in this ontology. On the basis of this study of Heidegger, the third chapter 
engages with a range of conceptual artworks. Each artwork is shown to exemplify a 
general tendency of conceptual artworks to explore of the bounds of the artwork as such 
and its relation to its context. 
 
 
 
 
1 
Contents 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................i 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................ii 
A Methodological Problem: Theoretical Writing...................................................vi 
Chapter Breakdown ................................................................................................ix 
Chapter One: Recent Philosophical Responses to Conceptual Art...................................1 
Introduction..............................................................................................................1 
Part One: Art as Aesthetic Idea ...............................................................................3 
1. Orienting Conceptual Art in an Aesthetic Framework...............................5 
2. Art as Idea ..................................................................................................9 
3. The Fate of the Material ...........................................................................17 
Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................29 
Part Two: The Subservience of the Perceptual......................................................31 
1. Comparing Conceptual Art to Literature .................................................33 
2. Experiencing Art as Art ...........................................................................37 
3. Perceptual Transfiguration of the Commonplace....................................42 
4. The Character and Role of Materiality.....................................................43 
Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................46 
Part Three: Embodiment........................................................................................47 
Introduction ..................................................................................................47 
1. The Question of Conceptual Art ..............................................................50 
2. The Centralisation of Artistic Labour ......................................................52 
Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................67 
Summary of Chapter One ......................................................................................68 
Chapter Two: Heidegger’s Artwork................................................................................71 
Introduction............................................................................................................71 
A Note on Heidegger’s Relation to Contemporary Art .........................................75 
Part One: Heideggerian Phenomenology and the Phenomenological Method......78 
 
2 
1. Heidegger’s Methodology of destructive retrieve ...................................80 
2. Heideggerian Phenomenology .................................................................82 
3. Phainomenon............................................................................................83 
4. The ‘Phenomenon’ as the Demand of Being ...........................................87 
5. Logos ........................................................................................................89 
6. Truth as Aletheia ......................................................................................90 
Part Two: ‘Thingliness’ in the Symbolic Notion of the Artwork..........................92 
Part Three: The Relation of World and Earth in Heidegger’s Artwork ................95 
1. The World in Being and Time ..................................................................96 
2. World and Earth in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ ....................................104 
Part Four: A Phenomenological Rethinking of Materiality.................................111 
1. Earth and Physis .....................................................................................112 
2. Earth as Support and Shelter ..................................................................113 
3. Earth as the Self-concealing...................................................................117 
4. The Earth as Ontic Materiality ...............................................................120 
Concluding Remarks ...........................................................................................123 
Chapter 3: A Phenomenological-Ontological Rethinking of Conceptual Art ..............125 
Introduction..........................................................................................................125 
A Note on Methodology ......................................................................................127 
Chapter Breakdown .............................................................................................129 
Part One: Marcel Duchamp .................................................................................130 
Potential Objections ...................................................................................140 
Part Two: Lawrence Weiner................................................................................142 
Part Three: Michael Asher...................................................................................153 
Part Four: Dennis Oppenheim .............................................................................159 
Concluding Remarks ...........................................................................................168 
A Possible ‘Weak Conceptualist’ Response ..............................................169 
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................171 
Bibliography..................................................................................................................177 
 
i 
Acknowledgements 
The task of researching and writing this thesis often felt as though it was 
insurmountable. Without immense levels of support, advice, critical engagement and 
encouragement from my friends, family and colleagues, I have no doubt that it would 
have been. I would like to thank my supervisors, Kathleen Stock and Tanja Stäehler, 
who have both given me very thoughtful guidance and encouragement over the past 
years. Due to the hybrid character of this thesis, both have found themselves having to 
step out of their areas of specialism and advise me on unfamiliar intellectual ground. I 
am very aware of the effort this has involved and am appreciative of their commitment 
throughout. I am also very thankful to Mike Lewis for providing additional guidance in 
the area of phenomenology, and for the refreshing clarity that he brings to these issues. I 
am also thankful to Elisabeth Schellekens, whose thoughtful seminars on conceptual art 
during my Masters at King’s College inspired me to write this thesis. During the course 
of my research at the University of Sussex, I have had the honour of developing several 
close friendships which have been absolutely crucial in my development both 
philosophically and on a more general intellectual level, in addition to providing 
incredible levels of support. These friendships have been central in dissolving the sense 
of isolation that can often accompany such a lonesome project. I am especially thankful 
to Chris O’Kane, Phil Homburg, Chris Allsobrook, Christos Hadjioannou, Jana Elsen, 
Simon Mussell, Tim Carter and Dylan Trigg, all of whom have offered both critical 
input and encouragement whenever I have needed it. During this final year, my 
relationship with Louise Hanson has played a considerable role in motivating the 
writing process. Needless to say, any flaws apparent in this thesis are to be considered 
solely mine. In addition to this, there are of course certain people who have been 
fundamental to my attaining this goal. I would like to give special thanks to my brother 
Keston Sutherland, whose intellectual enthusiasm and energy is largely responsible for 
where I am today. I owe immeasurable debt of gratitude to both of my parents, George 
Sutherland and Suzanne Sutherland, as without their constant and unconditional love 
and support, a career in higher education would not even have been possible. Finally, I 
would like to thank Rob Lucas for being my interlocutor, my inspiration and my best 
friend. 
  
ii 
Introduction 
Much of the philosophical interest of conceptual art lies in the particular manner in 
which it declares itself to be an ontological limit case. Avant-garde art has strived to 
transcend and to dissolve the limitations and boundaries of art itself, and to 
subsequently make forays into other cultural realms. However, never before in the 
history of art have ontological assumptions as to what an artwork is, can, or should be, 
been probed with such radical, imaginative and broad ranging scope as in conceptual 
art. Lucy Lippard, a theorist contemporaneous with the conceptual art movement, has 
described the era of conceptual art practice as ‘a real free-for-all’, a description that 
renders it continuous with the notion of a fully liberated ‘anything goes’ hedonism, 
often associated with the 1960s.1 However, whilst it is indeed true that this ontological 
investigation had a wide range of motivations and took various artistic forms, it is my 
contention that a general locus of orientation can be identified. From the inception of 
conceptual art in the mid-1960s,2 conceptual artists sought to overturn particular 
characteristics that they considered inherent within a habitually accepted understanding 
and experience of what artworks are. Conceptual art theory and practice exhibited an 
antagonism towards the centrality of the conventional art-object of painting or 
sculpture. In particular, conceptual art set out to question and to problematise the 
accepted notion that a visual artwork is essentially a discrete object with a spatial 
extension, with which one engages predominantly by way of a perceptual or aesthetic 
experience.3  
Philosophical aesthetics—of the British analytic tradition in particular—has until 
recently paid relatively little attention to the topic of conceptual art in comparison to 
more traditional art forms. When we consider the extent to which conceptual art—its 
logic, its presentational style, its subject matter and its theoretical tendencies—has 
continued to dominate and to cast a looming shadow over the art world since the 1960s, 
                                                
1 Lucy Lippard, Six Years: the dematerialisation of the art object, (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1973) vii 
2 The strictly historical periodisation of conceptual art is typically seen to be between 1965-1973.  
3 Benjamin Buchloh, ‘Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the Critique of 
Institutions’ in October, Vol. 55. (Winter, 1990), P107 
  
iii 
or, as some might even claim in retrospect, since Duchamp’s urinal in 19174, this 
relative lack of attention is striking. However, in recent years, there has been a surge of 
philosophical interest in conceptual art from the British analytic tradition. The 2003 
AHRC-funded research project entitled ‘Perception, Narrative Discourse and 
Conceptual Art’, which culminated in a two-day international conference at King’s 
College, London in June 2004, brought analytic philosophers together to consider and 
respond to conceptual art explicitly for the first time. The book of essays that resulted 
from this project in 2007, Philosophy and Conceptual Art,5 and the 2008 publication by 
the organisers of this conference, Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art?6 were amongst the 
first major published philosophical efforts on the subject. This thesis is indebted to the 
collective energy of everybody involved in these debates, for it is this specific 
intellectual context which provided the initial inspiration for both my philosophical and 
my general interest in conceptual art.  
The starting point of this thesis is a questioning of the general adequacy of the approach 
of philosophical aesthetics to discussing what conceptual art is. What it would mean for 
a philosophical approach to be adequate—to my mind at least—would be that it 
facilitate an interpretation of the complexities of conceptual art in a manner that would 
be both philosophically rigorous, yet simultaneously satisfying and convincing to those 
involved in art practice and in the art world more generally. It is my contention that 
conceptual art is most comprehensively understood as an experimental artistic 
investigation into the character and the conditions of its own ontology. Whilst it is the 
case that most philosophers do in fact seem to identify that conceptual art had set itself 
from the beginning such a programme of ontological investigation,7 philosophical 
discussions around this topic nevertheless typically seem to assume a very particular 
line of inquiry. Most recent philosophical literature on conceptual art takes as its central 
                                                
4 As John Roberts notes, the real impact of Duchamp’s gesture did not gain prominence straight away. 
Instead, it was specifically the conceptual art movement of the 1960s to 1970s, which provided the 
historically transformative moment of recovery and continuity for Duchamp, and which proved to be the 
context that brought to light the real disclosive and critical potentials of his work. John Roberts, The 
Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art After the Readymade, (Verso Books Ltd, London, 
2007). P22  
5 Goldie and Schellekens (ed.), Philosophy and Conceptual Art, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007)  
6 Goldie and Schellekens, Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009)  
7 See Goldie & Schellekens, (2009) P20-21. See Schellekens, (2007) P72. See Lamarque, (2007) P4 
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problematic a reassessment of the relationship between the idea, concept or intention, 
on the one hand, and the material object or entity, on the other. What is considered to be 
unique about conceptual art by most philosophers is that through the process of a so-
called ‘dematerialisation’ of the artwork8—i.e. by using forms of presentation which are 
minimal, lightweight, ephemeral or commonplace, so as to decentralise the material 
prominence of the art-object—conceptual art enforces a kind of reversal of priority 
between its material or perceptual components, and its ideational or conceptual 
components. What is unique about conceptual art, such literature implies, is 
predominantly that the material object or entity is marginalised, made subservient to, or 
even rendered arbitrary, and that the ‘idea is king’.9  
The reason why this would present itself as the most obvious response to such art is 
clear. First of all, this is precisely what a small, yet very influential, group of conceptual 
artists claimed to be their objective in their theoretical writings. For Sol LeWitt, in the 
case of the artwork, “the idea or concept is the most important thing”10 and even “ideas 
alone can be works of art”.11 For Adrian Piper, “good ideas are necessary and sufficient 
for good art”.12 The artist Joseph Kosuth even declared art to be an “analytic 
proposition”.13 In addition to such notorious examples, the theoretical writings of a wide 
range of conceptual artists also make reference to the centrality of ideas. Whilst I do not 
wish to deny that these formulations are significant to an understanding of the 
conceptual art project, I believe that they should not be isolated from a much broader 
context of conceptual theory and practice. In my interpretation, the ‘art as idea’ 
                                                
8 The term ‘dematerialisation’ was first used by Lucy Lippard and John Chandler in ‘The 
Dematerialisation of the Art’ (1968) in (ed.) Alberro and Stimson, Conceptual Art, (2000)  
9 Paul Wood, Movements in Modern Art: Conceptual Art, (Tate Publishing, London, 2002)  
10 Sol LeWitt, ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ Artforum, 5:10 (Summer 1967), reprinted in (ed.) Charles 
Harrison and Paul Wood, Art Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, (Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford, 1992)  
11 Sol LeWitt, ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art’, first published in 0-9, New York, 1969, and Art-Language, 
England, May 1969. Reprinted in (ed.) Alberro & Stimson, Conceptual Art: a Critical Anthology, (MIT 
Press, Massachusetts, 2000) 
12 Adrian Piper, Idea, Form, Context, (1969). Reprinted in (ed.) Peter Osborne Conceptual Art, (Phaiden, 
London, 2002) P222 
13 Joseph Kosuth, Art after Philosophy, (1969) in (ed.) Osborne. (2002) P232 
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formulation represents only one moment within the wider conceptual art movement.14 
What is clearly at stake in conceptual art once we look beyond the formulations of this 
small group of artists is a questioning of the status of the art object as such. This 
questioning often does not involve any positive claims whatsoever with regards to 
putative ideational aspects of an artwork’s ontology. Rather, it seems to me, when such 
positive claims about the ideational are made by conceptual artists, they are best 
understood as examples of this more general probing of the ontology of the artwork. 
That ‘conceptual art’ is employed as a general term to identify works which are often 
not actually concerned with notions of the ideational in art practice testifies only to the 
preponderant influence of these few artists on the critical reception of such art: like 
many such genre-names, it is in large part the product of historical contingency. 
The prominence of ontological issues in conceptual art poses an interesting problem for 
its philosophical interpretation. While philosophical aesthetics has traditionally been 
oriented around questions of beauty and the judgement of aesthetic value, in the case of 
conceptual art such questions have a largely marginal interest. In its fundamental 
exploration of questions about the status of the art object, conceptual art demands a 
different philosophical focus—one in which the question of the ontology of the artwork 
takes centre stage. Unavoidable in any philosophical treatment of conceptual art, 
ontological questions about the status of the conceptual artwork will appear in all the 
philosophical positions that we will discuss. However, it is in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological account of the artwork that I find the most compelling approach for 
thinking about conceptual art, precisely because this account foregrounds the question 
of the ontological status of the artwork. Indeed, it may even be plausible to read 
conceptual art as the Heideggerian art form par excellence in its complex probing of its 
own legitimate ground. 
Despite the claims of some conceptual artists, the material aspect of conceptual art was 
never done away with entirely, nor was it relegated to a merely passive role in relation 
to the ideational. In its ontological self-investigation, conceptual art has remained 
                                                
14 In this sense, I position my thesis within a more inclusive notion of conceptual art, alongside thinkers 
such as Peter Osborne and Peter Wollen.  
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oriented around materialised ‘objects’ or entities presented in art galleries, even if these 
‘objects’ or entities are typically of a precarious status. Whilst it would be of little 
philosophical interest to offer an emphasis on the materiality of conceptual art as a 
simple rejoinder to overblown claims about the ideational character of such art, it is 
important to recognise that the materiality of the art object is a constitutive aspect of 
conceptual art’s ontological questionings, and not only in a negative sense. When a 
conceptual artist uses a gallery wall to report his releasing of some inert gases into the 
atmosphere he does not do away with the materiality of the art object, but rather 
foregrounds it as what is most at stake in conceptual art practice.15 
As we shall see, the question of the role of the material in the ontology of the 
conceptual artwork persistently rears its head in philosophical analyses of conceptual 
art, even when these attempt to take the strongest claims of conceptual artists about the 
ideality of the artwork seriously. To go further, it is actually in philosophical accounts 
of the ontology of the artwork that take as a central concern the very recalcitrance of its 
material to interpretation, that we find the most plausible approaches for the 
philosophical analysis of conceptual art. This is a virtue of Diarmuid Costello’s 
‘corrective’ to Arthur Danto’s work,16 but it is in Heidegger’s analysis of the artwork 
that we find the most sophisticated elaboration of a theory of the role of the material in 
the ontology of the artwork. As we shall see, the centrality of the material in 
Heidegger’s account makes this account surprisingly appropriate for the analysis of a 
form of art that is often said to involve a dematerialisation as one of its primary aspects. 
A Methodological Problem: Theoretical Writings 
An obvious challenge presents itself when setting out to write any philosophical thesis 
on conceptual art, especially one which is phenomenological in method. This is the 
problem of how to relate to the self-presentation of conceptual artists by way of their 
theoretical writings and manifestos. There are two distinct problems here: the first has 
                                                
15 This is a reference to Robert Barry’s Inert Gas Series, (1969)  
16 Diarmuid Costello, ‘Whatever Happened to “Embodiment”? The eclipse of materiality in Danto’s 
ontology of art’ in Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities, Volume 12, No. 2. August 2007. The 
virtues of Costello’s account, together with the problems that arise from it will be discussed in part three 
of chapter one.  
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to do with the centrality that theoretical writings are often assumed to have in 
conceptual art; the second is to do with the content of such writings. I will now briefly 
examine these problems. First of all, whilst it is the case that theoretical defences of art 
practice have a long history,17 and that such defences played a prominent role in 
supplementing avant-garde art practices throughout the twentieth century, in the early 
1960s there was a considerable shift in the perceived relationship between the 
production of such texts and art practices more broadly.18 Conceptual artists 
reconceived their theoretical writings, manifestos and journals as an integral part of 
their art practice. Some conceptual artists even consider their theory to be not simply an 
accompaniment to some art object, entity or event, but part of the ontology of the 
artwork itself.19 Even if this claim were found to be unconvincing, it is nevertheless 
commonly acknowledged that in the case of conceptual art, theoretical texts have a 
greater bearing upon the meaning of the work than in traditional forms of art. It is very 
easy to see why people think that this is the case. The theoretical statements of certain 
texts can have an emphatically programmatic tone. For example, key texts such as Sol 
LeWitt’s Paragraphs on Conceptual Art and Sentences on Conceptual Art (1967)20 and 
Joseph Kosuth’s Art after Philosophy (1967)21 seem to propose with varying strength, 
the formulaic laws for, and the absolute definition of, conceptual art respectively.22 This 
has led some thinkers to relate to such texts as though they simply describe what the 
conceptual artwork actually is or to interpret them as determinant in its meaning. With 
conceptual art, theory is rendered prominent and declared to be the proper ‘frame’ of 
art, so to speak. Second of all is the content. Conceptual art theory often tends to use 
philosophical terminology to make ostensibly philosophical claims, the most notorious 
                                                
17 ‘Poetics’ have of course existed since Ancient Greece but became considerably important during the 
Romantic era.  
18 Peter Osborne, ‘Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy’ in (ed.) Michael Newman and Jon Bird, Rewriting 
Conceptual Art, (Reaktion Books Ltd, London, 1999) P49 
19 Alexander Alberro, in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.) Conceptual art: a critical 
anthology, (MIT Press, Massachusetts 2000) xvii 
20 LeWitt, Sol, ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ Artforum, 5:10 (Summer 1967), reprinted in (ed.) Charles 
Harrison and Paul Wood, Art Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, (Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford, 1992)  
21 Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art after Philosophy’ Studio International, 178: 915-917 (1969). Reprinted in (eds.) 
Alberro & Stimson, Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1988). P164-177 
22 See Peter Osborne, ‘Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy’ in (ed.) Michael Newman and Jon Bird, 
Rewriting Conceptual Art, (Reaktion Books Ltd, London, 1999) 
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example being when Kosuth declared conceptual art to be an “analytic proposition”. 
This might tempt philosophers to turn their attention disproportionately towards the 
claims made by such artists, rather than considering the whole relational context of art 
theory and practice.     
Whilst I think the statements of conceptual artists should be taken seriously, it is 
important that they are not taken too literally. This is for three main reasons. Firstly, 
despite their often more directly programmatic or prescriptive forms, their centrality and 
their appeal to philosophical claims, I believe that it is important to retain an emphasis 
upon their specifically artistic character. It is not at all clear that the manifestos of 
conceptual artists should be considered to transparently state precisely what the artist 
intends. This might be considered true even in those cases where such manifestos do in 
fact appear to state an intention rather clearly. As artistic manifestos, these texts can 
often be inconsistent, perhaps knowingly so, as well as employing various forms of 
strategic artistic devices such as irony, metaphor and sarcasm, for example. Artistic 
texts are often performative or programmatic, rather than analytic or theoretical in 
character; statements of intent, gestures carried out or postures assumed for the sake of 
an effect.  
To my mind, artistic manifestos are not simply a second order entity or the theoretical 
accompaniment to the artwork. However, neither are they simply exchangeable with the 
work, as though art has merely been collapsed into theory. One might argue then, that 
such texts are better understood as one element within an artistic whole, as opposed to 
the determinate frame of the work. Secondly, even if it were true that certain conceptual 
artists were in fact using their manifestos to transparently state what they intend, it is 
certainly not the case that artists are necessarily the best judges of their own intentions. 
What this means is that it would not suffice to simply isolate particular sentences or 
phrases from these texts and to take them as self-contained expressions of intent. 
Rather, an in-depth analysis would be required of the contextual whole of each 
manifesto, or range of manifestos, to get a more inclusive and accurate understanding of 
such intentions. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, it is not at all clear that the 
theoretical writings of conceptual artists should be assumed as literal theoretical 
statements about artistic practice and thus do not necessarily correspond either to such 
artistic practices, or to the actual artworks or entities that were made. In fact, it is my 
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contention that there exists in some cases a significant disjuncture between theory and 
practice in conceptual art. In my opinion, rather than simply taking certain statements of 
conceptual theory to define what conceptual art is, a philosophical analysis should aim 
to understand the relation between the claims made in such theory on the one hand, and 
the practical use of theory as a kind of critical artistic material, which is part of a wider, 
more radical and polemical artistic agenda. For the sake of completeness, an extended 
version of the present project would incorporate an analysis of conceptual art theory as 
such, but the limited space permitted for a DPhil thesis cannot accommodate such an 
analysis. However, these texts will not remain absent from our investigation. Rather, 
they will often prove relevant as we look at the works themselves. 
Chapter Breakdown 
This thesis is composed of three main chapters. Chapter one will be a critical analysis of 
some recent philosophical responses to conceptual art. Chapter two will examine the 
ways in which a Heideggerian account of the artwork might be useful in developing and 
responding to recent literature on conceptual art. Chapter three will be dedicated to an 
exploration of several conceptual artworks. I will now give an outline of these chapters 
in turn. 
The central aim of chapter one is to critically analyse the distinct ways in which 
philosophers have characterised the ontological investigation of conceptual art, 
specifically by virtue of a reassessment of the relation between on the one hand, the 
idea, concept or intention and on the other hand, the material object or entity. Chapter 
one is divided into three parts which each represent a distinct position with regards to 
the role of the material in the ontology of the conceptual work. Whilst the chapter 
begins from the claim that the conceptual artwork can be understood predominantly to 
be constituted by an idea, it finishes with the claim that in so far as conceptual artworks 
are produced and exhibited, even the conceptual work might display a real material 
recalcitrance to the cognitive and ideational. Part one begins with an analysis of ‘The 
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Aesthetic Value of Ideas’ by Elisabeth Schellekens.23 Due to the fact that Schellekens 
attempts to take as seriously as possible the claim that in the case of conceptual works 
the art is an idea and any material aspect is rendered marginal, this text is given 
extensive critical attention. As we shall see, whilst attempting to hold on to what I 
consider to be an overly literal reading of certain selective and isolated statements of 
conceptual artists, Schellekens’ argument implicitly betrays their implausibility. What 
Part One demonstrates is that in so far as conceptual artists continue to produce and to 
exhibit artworks that are materialised in some way, the material must be afforded a 
more significant role in the ontology of the artwork than a mere ‘prompt’ or point of 
access. Part Two examines ‘On Perceiving Conceptual Art’ by Peter Lamarque.24 In this 
text Lamarque argues that whilst there is a significant role for the material in conceptual 
art, it is ultimately “subservient to the conceptual”.25 In part, what Lamarque means by 
this is that the title must ‘inform’ a perceptual encounter with the material aspect of the 
work.26 As we shall see, whilst Lamarque’s account manages to retain the significance 
of conceptual art as a visual and perceptual form of art which largely continues to 
exhibit materialised works in a gallery, his account overemphasises the capacity of the 
title to simply direct or ‘transfigure’ the material object. What we learn from Part Two 
is that a more adequate account is required of how those two elements interact. This 
requires an account of the positive role played by the material in both substantiating and 
providing recalcitrance to the concept or idea of the work. Part Three of this chapter 
examines Diarmuid Costello’s article, ‘Whatever Happened to “Embodiment”? The 
Eclipse of Materiality in Danto’s Ontology of Art’.27 Costello argues that to take 
seriously the fact that artworks exist in some materialised form requires an account of 
how the materiality of the work can both ‘enrich’ and ‘constrain’ the cognitive 
components of intention and interpretation.28 On Costello’s account, there is always 
                                                
23 Schellekens, Elisabeth, ‘The Aesthetic Value of Ideas’ in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007) 
24 Lamarque, Peter, ‘On Perceiving Conceptual Art’ in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007) 
25 Lamarque. (2007) P9 
26 Lamarque. (2007) P13 
27 Costello, Diarmuid, ‘Whatever Happened to “Embodiment”? The eclipse of materiality in Danto’s 
ontology of art’ in Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities, Volume 12, No. 2. August 2007 
28 Costello. (2007) P89 
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material excess in the work which resists being directed by an idea, concept or 
intention. However, as we shall see, by associating recalcitrance too closely with ‘the 
sensuous, affective and intuitive’ response to the process of making itself—to how the 
resulting work ‘looks, sounds or reads as it is being made’29—Costello’s approach 
relates somewhat awkwardly to the particular case of conceptual art. 
Chapter two of this thesis examines the manner in which Heidegger’s 
phenomenological account of the artwork foregrounds the question of ontology in a way 
which can help to develop the discussion of conceptual art set out in chapter one. 
Particular attention will be paid to the priority that Heidegger gives to the material in the 
ontological determination of the artwork. Part one of this chapter will consist of a 
careful articulation of the key notions set out by Heidegger in Being and Time30 in his 
explication of the ‘Phenomenological Method of Investigation’ and where relevant, an 
explanation of how such notions appear altered or developed in ‘Origin of the Work of 
Art’.31 The main objective of part one is to develop a clear account of what Heidegger 
means by ‘phenomenology’ and the way he delineates his unique notion of the 
‘phenomenon’. This is central for understanding Heidegger’s account of material 
recalcitrance, or what he calls Earth in his later work. Part two will set out how 
Heidegger attempts to overcome what he calls the ‘symbolic’ notion of the artwork, i.e. 
that the artwork is a material substructure or base X, to which we add meaning, form, 
concept or idea Y. In the case of the artwork, Heidegger identifies the specific 
formulation of this notion to be the ‘hylomorphic structure’, i.e. the relation between 
form and matter. The main objective of part two is to explicate the problems that 
Heidegger identifies with the dichotomising of the artwork into its material and 
ideational components, in a way that prepares the ground for Heidegger’s positive 
account of the artwork. Part three of this chapter will discuss Heidegger’s notion of an 
artwork as something ontologically prior to the art-object. For Heidegger, I will argue, 
the artwork is a self-contained site in which the ‘double play’ of phenomenological 
                                                
29 Costello. (2007) P89 
30 Martin Heidegger, (Trans.) Macquarrie & Robinson Being and Time, (Blackwell Publishing, London, 
1999) 
31 Martin Heidegger, ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ in (trans) Farrell Krell, Basic Writings, (Routledge, 
London, 1978, 1994) 
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disclosure takes place. This ‘double play’ finds its articulation in the concepts of 
‘World’ and Earth. The artwork ‘sets up’ an intelligible World and ‘sets forth’ the 
Earth. As we shall see, these terms provide enriched notions of the schema through 
which artworks are typically understood, i.e. the material and the idea. Part four of this 
chapter will examine further the way in which Heidegger develops the notion of artistic 
materiality through the introduction of the concept Earth. As we shall see, for Heidegger 
‘material’ does not simply mean the ‘matter’ of an art-object—it is not just the canvas, 
pigment or stone from which artworks are made—but instead has a phenomenological 
significance. Heidegger’s specifically phenomenological materiality—or Earth—is that 
which both substantiates all aspects of the intelligible context the work sets up, yet 
simultaneously provides recalcitrance to the intelligible through the phenomenological 
process of unfolding. Through its disassociation from matter, Heidegger’s notion of 
material might be of use in thinking about conceptual art. 
Finally, chapter three of this thesis will be dedicated to an analysis of several works of 
conceptual art. The aim of this chapter is explore the ontological issues at stake in 
various conceptual artworks. In order to move beyond a restricted notion of 
conceptualism as ‘art as idea’, I have chosen works from various points on the 
conceptual art spectrum which are nonetheless largely uncontentious as examples of 
conceptual art, and many of which are discussed by thinkers that we look at in chapter 
one. These works are Duchamp’s Fountain (1917)—a significant precursor to 
conceptual art proper, and the archetypical readymade; two works by one of the major 
advocates of conceptual art in its 1960s ‘heroic phase’—Lawrence Weiner’s A 36” 
Square Removal to the Lathing or Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, 
1969, (1969) and An Accumulation of Sufficient Abrasion to Remove Enough of an 
Opaque Surface to Let Light Through with More Intensity, (1981), which have the 
virtue of enabling us to discuss textual works; two works by Michael Asher which 
exemplify a particularly ‘institutional critique’ aspect of conceptual art—Untitled 
(1973) and Untitled (1974); and Dennis Oppenheim’s Oakland Wedge (1967)—a piece 
which sits at the juncture between conceptual art and land art. Whilst my reading of 
these works will be informed by Heidegger’s account of the artwork, I have decided to 
use Heidegger’s categories sparingly in order to avoid an overly schematic mapping of 
philosophical terms onto particular artworks. Through examining the particularities of 
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each of these works it will become apparent that conceptual artworks are often a great 
deal more complex than many theories allow. What is more, it will emerge that, far 
from being a superfluous or marginalised aspect, the material is a key aspect of such 
artworks.
  
1 
Chapter One: Recent Philosophical Responses to 
Conceptual Art 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse in depth some recent philosophical responses to 
conceptual art. Using selected texts from the analytic tradition, this chapter will 
examine the attempts of philosophers both to take seriously and to make clearer 
philosophical sense of the theoretical claims of certain conceptual artists to have been 
shifting the artwork onto a “different ontological platform”1. The general focus of the 
examination will be the distinct ways in which these responses characterise this 
ontological shift, specifically through reassessing the relation between the ideational 
and the material elements of the conceptual work. In the first instance, these 
philosophical texts attempt to take seriously the claim that in the case of the conceptual 
artwork, the conceptual or ideational element is heavily, if not exclusively centralised, 
and that any material or perceptual element is rendered marginal, if not completely 
arbitrary. In the second instance, they attempt to moderate such claims by arguing for a 
more inclusive role for the material or the perceptual element.  
I have selected three main texts which I consider to offer quite distinct positions. The 
first text, ‘The Aesthetic Value of Ideas’2 by Elisabeth Schellekens attempts to take as 
seriously as possible an ontological formulation whereby the artwork just is the idea and 
the material is not a significant or constitutive element of the work itself. For 
Schellekens, any material object or entity presented is little more than a “prompt” or a 
“trigger” which, after having directed us to the idea, can effectively be kicked away. 
Section one will be an analysis of this formulation and a demonstration of the particular 
problems that emerge from it. In distinction from Schellekens, the second text, 
‘Perceiving Conceptual Art’3 by Peter Lamarque argues not that the conceptual artwork 
                                                
1 Elisabeth Schellekens, ‘The Aesthetic Value of Ideas’ in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007). P72 
2 Schellekens. (2007). 
3 Peter Lamarque, ‘On Perceiving Conceptual Art’ in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007) 
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is the idea, but that within the ontology of the conceptual work the perceptual and 
material element is “subservient” to the conceptual. The specific way in which the 
material or perceptual element is subservient for Lamarque is that the conceptual directs 
our perceptual experience by making salient certain properties of the work. For 
Lamarque, whilst the conceptual is dominant and directs the perceptual, the perceptual 
experience in some way constitutes the goal of the art experience. However, as we shall 
see, such a formulation presents an account of the relation between the ideational and 
material, which is ultimately unilateral. Lamarque does not give an adequate enough 
role to the material but renders it overly passive. The third text, ‘Whatever Happened to 
“Embodiment”? The Eclipse of Materiality in Danto’s Ontology of Art’4 by Diarmuid 
Costello offers precisely this account of how the material, even in more cognitive forms 
of art, plays a more positive and active role in the constitution of the work’s ontology. 
However, despite bringing us closer to a convincing account, I will argue that Costello’s 
account is ultimately inadequate for an ontology of conceptual art specifically, as it 
relies too fundamentally upon the centrality of a notion of artistic labour, which 
Costello does not qualify sufficiently for the unique case of conceptual art.   
I have chosen to present and to analyse these texts in this particular order because they 
demonstrate a trajectory from a philosophical position in which the material element of 
the conceptual artwork is strongly marginalised and rendered merely instrumental—i.e. 
a position often expounded, albeit inconsistently, by the artists themselves—to a 
position in which the material is seen to have a central and positive role in formulating 
the work’s ontology. It is my contention that following such a trajectory might help 
rectify or offer a corrective to what I have identified to be the disproportionate influence 
on philosophical thinking about conceptual art of such strong theoretical claims. It is the 
aim of this thesis to move away from the philosophical assumptions of such theoretical 
claims towards a more phenomenological understanding of the conceptual artworks 
themselves. As conceptual artists continued to exhibit their work through materialised 
modes of presentation, it is my contention that an adequate ontology of conceptual art 
thus needs to take seriously this material element as central and significant. Whilst 
                                                
4 Diarmuid Costello, ‘Whatever Happened to “Embodiment”? the Eclipse of Materiality in Danto’s 
Ontology of Art’ in Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities, Volume 12, No. 2. August 2007  
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Schellekens uses the adjective “phenomenological”5 to describe the character of the 
conceptual artwork as an idea, by this she seems to mean little more than that an 
engagement with the idea of the work makes us “undergo”,6 feel and understand its 
conceptual message. In contrast, Lamarque and Costello both move towards what might 
be considered to be a more phenomenological account of the conceptual artwork, 
wherein the perceptual and material elements are given more centrality.  
Although this chapter is composed schematically of three distinct sections, each 
presenting a different perspective with regards to the role of the material in the 
conceptual artwork, my objective is to keep the examination as open as possible. Each 
text will be analysed in as much detail as possible for both the logical formulations that 
are adhered to and the presuppositions about conceptual art that are relied upon. 
Through engaging in a critique of both the distinct revelations and problems that emerge 
from the various responses, I hope to establish which aspects of the ontological 
formulations we should keep and which we should dispose of, in order that we might 
move towards the construction of a more convincing account of conceptual art, i.e. an 
account which does not remain buried under the weight of the self-understanding of 
certain individual conceptual artists. 
Part One: Art as Aesthetic Idea 
‘The Aesthetic Value of Ideas’ is an attempt to reconcile the conceptual art theory of a 
small group of artists with philosophical aesthetics by bringing together three claims. 
Firstly, Schellekens attempts to take seriously what she considers to be the central claim 
of conceptual art theory, i.e. that the work of conceptual art just is the idea. Secondly, 
Schellekens argues that despite the insistence of conceptual artists to the contrary, 
conceptual art can still be characterised as aesthetic. These first two claims would seem 
to reconcile conceptual art with aesthetics because they propose that it is specifically 
that aspect typically thought to bring about and secure the radical, revisionary non-
aesthetic dimension of the conceptual project—i.e. the emphasis upon art as idea—
which turns out to be the very site of aesthetic value in the conceptual work. In what 
                                                
5 Schellekens. (2007) P83 
6 Schellekens. (2007) P86 
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might be considered a corrective to any too narrowly cognitivist readings of conceptual 
art, Schellekens characterises an engagement with a conceptual work (as idea) as a 
“phenomenological” experience: to experience conceptual art is to “undergo” its idea, 
which for Schellekens means simply to have a more “experiential”—as opposed to 
merely propositional—engagement with its ramifications. The third claim, which is 
announced a little later in the text, is that despite the fact that an engagement with 
conceptual art can be said to have an aesthetic and “phenomenological” dimension to its 
experience after all, the material object or instantiation—and by virtue, it seems, the 
role of perception—does not have a significant operation in the work. Conceptual art 
is—just as theorists such as Lippard and John Chandler claim—“dematerialised”,7 in 
that its material is not properly constitutive of the work.  
In this section I will argue that in taking this rather strong claim of conceptual art theory 
too literally—i.e. the claim that the artwork just is the idea—to seemingly justify a 
(albeit, more ‘experiential’) cognitivist theory of conceptual art,8 Schellekens renders 
herself incapable of giving an adequate account of the role of materiality in the ontology 
of those conceptual works, which continue to be constituted in significant ways by their 
material mode of presentation. Schellekens wants to hold that no material object, entity 
or event, is to be considered as constitutive of the work itself, but rather, is there as a 
mere “prompt”, or “trigger”,9 which is utilised and then discarded in the process of 
accessing the work. If it is part of the definition of the artwork that it distinguishes itself 
on some level from its material base or object, in the unique case of conceptual art, for 
Schellekens, this separation is ultimate. Marginalising and instrumentalising the 
material element in this manner, I will argue, results ultimately in an ontology of the 
conceptual work that remains inadequate, both in terms of a description of what it is to 
experience such artworks—thus resulting in a disjuncture between theory and 
phenomenological experience, in a similar manner to that assumed by the artists 
                                                
7 This term was first coined by Lippard and Chandler in ‘The Dematerialisation of the Art Object’, which 
first appeared in Art International: 12:2, February 1968; reprinted in Lucy Lippard, Changing: Essays in 
Art Criticism, (Dutton, New York, 1971)   
8 It seems clear that despite the lack of references in this direction, Schellekens’ cognitivist theory is very 
much indebted to Arthur Danto. In particular, it appears to be an attempt to reconcile a Danto-style 
cognitivism with aesthetics—thus bridging the gap that Danto himself delineated—and, in addition, an 
elaboration of what a more experiential account of this cognitive-aesthetic theory might amount to.   
9 Schellekens. (2007) P83 
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themselves10—and in terms of the overall coherence and logic of Schellekens’ own 
specific argument. I will demonstrate that by attempting to hold on to these positions 
simultaneously, Schellekens’ argument renders itself increasingly unstable, especially 
with regards to the marginality of the material. What is more, in failing to take seriously 
the question of precisely why conceptual artists would continue to exhibit materialised 
objects, entities and events, and instead positing them as mere points of access to the 
work, Schellekens fails to formulate an adequate and convincing account of conceptual 
art.  
1. Orienting Conceptual Art in an Aesthetic Framework 
Before I begin with the central analysis, I would like to briefly comment upon the 
broader framework through which Schellekens is responding to conceptual art: the 
framework of philosophical aesthetics. At the opening of her text ‘The Aesthetic Value 
of Ideas’, Schellekens points to the radical and revisionary agenda of the conceptual art 
project as to questions of ontology. “Conceptual art”, she notes, “set itself from its very 
beginning an analytic agenda by setting out to qualify what kind of thing an artwork can 
be, to qualify as such.”11 This recognition of the ostensible radicalism of conceptual art 
is echoed in her later, co-written publication, Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art?12 in 
which Schellekens and Goldie describe the attempt of conceptual art to provide a 
genuine ontological challenge to the boundaries of what art could be, by way of 
investigating “where a conceptual artwork begins and ends”.13 With the conceptual art 
movement, claim Schellekens and Goldie, comes the end of any reliable, morphological 
definition of art, in which the “physical bounds of the work were obvious for all to 
see.”14 However, on the second page of ‘The Aesthetic Value of Ideas’, Schellekens 
reduces this radical ontological investigation to ‘anti-aestheticism’: conceptual art, 
                                                
10 James Collins sums up this disjuncture the most succinctly when he claims that “Conceptual artists in 
their enthusiasm to reinvigorate the flagging intellectual bases of visual arts, to give precedence to 
concept over object, have merely confused theory with practice. The enthusiasm climaxed recently in the 
stance of artists who not only declared visual practices like painting to be redundant, but also claim theory 
as its meaningful replacement.” Collins, ‘Things and Theories’ Artforum, May 1973. P32 
11 Schellekens. (2007) P72 
12 Elisabeth Schellekens and Peter Goldie, Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art? (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007) 
13 Schellekens and Goldie. (2009) P20-21 
14 Schellekens and Goldie. (2009) P21 
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Schellekens states, backed up by a quote from Joseph Kosuth, announces aesthetics to 
be “conceptually irrelevant to art”.15 This almost immediate reduction of the ontological 
project of conceptual to ‘anti-aestheticism’ is surprising. It becomes clear that what is 
most centrally at stake for Schellekens in this text is not a truly open investigation into 
the manner in which conceptual art radicalised the “bounds” of what art could be per se. 
Instead, this text is primarily an investigation into philosophical aesthetics, and only 
secondarily an investigation into conceptual art itself. Or, as Schellekens herself 
explains, it is a “philosophical examination of the challenge posed by conceptual art to 
the notion of the aesthetic”.16 
There is, of course, much at stake for traditional philosophical aesthetics in the claim of 
certain conceptual artists to be making non-aesthetic art. If conceptual art has managed 
to entirely sever itself from aesthetics then it would imply, firstly, that aesthetics has 
been rendered redundant by conceptual art,17 at the very least in its application to 
conceptual works, but also secondly, that the capacity of aesthetics to tell us anything 
universal about art as a category would be substantially thrown into question. It would 
seem at first glance that the discipline of aesthetics would then have two main options 
of response open to it, if it were to maintain its position. Firstly, it could claim that 
conceptual art is not in fact art at all,18 thus securing traditional aesthetics against the 
ostensible challenges posed to it by the case of conceptual art, by way of its basic 
exclusion. To hold this position would be, effectively, for philosophers to claim that it is 
they who hold the capacity to formulate the true definition of art, over and against the 
definitional inadequacy of what is actually produced and proclaimed art by artists and 
the art world more generally. Secondly, it could attempt to argue that, despite the 
philosophically naïve ambitions of the conceptual artists to produce non-aesthetic art, 
conceptual art is in fact aesthetic after all and thus philosophical aesthetics, whilst 
potentially altered in its focus, can still be considered relevant as a discipline. 
                                                
15 Schellekens. (2007) P72. 
16 My italics. 
17 See Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art, (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1981). 
18 A surprising range of philosophers have seriously considered this possibility. See Nick Zangwill, ‘Are 
There Counter-examples to Aesthetic Theories of Art?’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 60, 
no. 2, Spring 2002, pp.111-118; Monroe Beardsley, ‘An Aesthetic Definition of Art’ in Curler, Hugh 
(ed). What is Art? (Haven Publications, New York, 1983).  
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Schellekens opts for the more plausible second claim by arguing that despite its 
philosophically misguided non-aesthetic desires and pretensions, conceptual art can in 
fact be said to have “non-trivial” aesthetic value—aesthetic value that is central and 
significant (as opposed to contingent) to a “proper” experience of a conceptual artwork 
qua conceptual artwork—and it is this aesthetic value that rescues conceptual art from 
the redundancy with which its theory endangers it. 
However, the aesthetic framework is in fact assumed from the beginning. At the very 
opening of the text, Schellekens takes the specifically philosophical category of the 
‘aesthetic’ as a viable presupposition, against which the conceptual artists project can, at 
large, be said to have set itself. The attempt to render aesthetics conceptually irrelevant 
to art,19 Schellekens claims, is the “least controversial aspect”20 of conceptual art. 
Despite this—or perhaps facilitated and secured by it—Schellekens fails to identify and 
to distinguish between both the range of motivations, and the varying ways in which 
this seemingly ubiquitous aspect is understood and played out in different conceptual 
artworks. Schellekens focuses purely upon a narrow notion of what it meant for 
conceptual art to be anti-aesthetic—i.e. to be against the “aesthetic value” of a 
traditional philosophical aesthetics. However, this rather questionably assumes that 
conceptual artists in general had a grasp of and were responding directly to this 
philosophical notion. In fact, Schellekens makes clear that what she understands to be 
the sole motivation behind the anti-aesthetic ambitions of conceptual art is a particular 
ambition against what theorists often refer to as the “purely optical” character of High 
Modernism. 21 In doing so, Schellekens flattens out what appear, to my mind, to be a 
range of rich and varied—as well as often inconsistent and confused—responses to 
aesthetic considerations in conceptual art. For example, it could just as easily be argued 
that the anti-aesthetic ambitions of some conceptual art are in fact relatively oblivious to 
philosophical aesthetics and instead derive from an array of other aims: the desire not to 
                                                
19 Schellekens. (2007) P72  
20 Schellekens refers to this specifically as the “wholesale rejection of the modernist paradigm”, i.e., a 
rejection of “beauty”, “aesthetic sensation” and “pleasing form”. (2007) P71-72 
21 Schellekens. (2007) P72 
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embellish space with more objects,22 or the desire not to produce anything that people 
would want to buy, thus achieving a (perhaps merely symbolic) challenge to the 
commodification of art.23  
Despite this initial assumption, later in the text Schellekens clarifies that she does not in 
fact consider the anti-aesthetic aspect of conceptual art to have actually constituted a 
fundamental component of the conceptual project. Instead, she claims, conceptual art 
theory uses anti-aestheticism as a strategy, which it mistakenly thinks will aid it in 
achieving its main objective—“cognitive value”.24 Schellekens’ central aim in this text 
is to argue against what she identifies to be the main, yet misguided assumption of 
conceptual art: the assumption that prioritising the cognitive element of conceptual art 
requires downgrading the aesthetic.25 To exhibit the philosophical naivety of conceptual  
art theory in making this assumption, Schellekens refers us to what she calls the 
‘traditional model of value’.26 Traditional art offers examples of how aesthetic and 
cognitive value can not merely co-exist, but sometimes interact, strengthen or “benefit” 
from one another.27 Despite the protests of more extreme conceptual art theory to the 
contrary, Schellekens thinks that this model can also apply to conceptual art. 
Schellekens has two main points in relation to what she has identified as the ‘anti-
aestheticism’ of conceptual art. The first is that, whilst we may have to suspend 
                                                
22 Dennis Oppenheim describes objects as “embellishment of external space”, in ‘Michael Heizer, Dennis 
Oppenheim, Robert Smithson—Discussion, (1968-69)’ Avalanche Magazine, no.1. Michael Heizer 
claimed, “The museums and collections are stuffed, the floors are sagging”. Cited in (ed.) Selz. (1996) 
P502. Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden, thought the result of conceptual art in the late 60s was to “clear the air 
of objects” in ‘Notes on Analysis’ 1970. Reprinted in Lucy Lippard, Six Years: the dematerialisation of 
the art object, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973). P136. Douglas Huebler stated in a 
catalogue: “the world is full of objects more or less interesting. I do not wish to add any more.” Reprinted 
in Lippard, (1973) P74   
23 In 1969, Lucy Lippard told Ursula Meyer “Some artists now think it’s absurd to fill up their studios 
with objects that won’t be sold.” Lippard. (1973) xvii. Lawrence Weiner stated, “Once you know about a 
work of mine you own it.” Interview with the artist, Avalanche Magazine, Spring 1972, P72. Oppenheim 
claimed, “This work cannot be sold”. Selz. (1996) P24. It is generally accepted however, that conceptual 
art was ultimately very profitable. For example, Isabelle Graw notes that “the symbolic capital 
accumulated over the course of years by conceptual art” at some point became “transformed into cultural 
and economic capital.” See ‘Conceptual Expression: On Conceptual Gestures in Allegedly Expressive 
Painting, Traces of Expression in Prot-Conceptual Works, and the Significance of Artistic Procedures’ in 
Art after Conceptual Art, (MIT, Massachusetts, 2006)   
24 Schellekens. (2007) P72 
25 Schellekens. (2007) P73 
26 Schellekens. (2007) P73 
27 Schellekens. (2007) P74 
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judgement on whether art could ever alienate the aesthetic entirely, conceptual art does 
not succeed in doing so.28 The second is that, contrary to its beliefs, conceptual art does 
not need to alienate its aesthetic element to achieve its true aim of emphasising 
cognitive value. Both of these presuppose that the conceptual project is best understood 
as a rejection of traditional philosophical aesthetics, which, as I have pointed out, is 
questionable. Starting from a traditional model of value however, permits Schellekens 
to focus upon a specific understanding of the character and role of ideas in conceptual 
art: as the facilitators of cognitive value.  
2. Art as Idea 
Schellekens claims that the central objective of the conceptual art project—that “which 
leads it to alienate the aesthetic in the first place”29—is the insistence upon the 
definition of art as idea. The construction of this relation is curious. Firstly, if a broadly 
detected antagonism towards the aesthetic is the most basic and “least controversial” 
aspect of conceptual art, why must we posit a second, presumably more controversial or 
complicated element as its reason or motivation? Schellekens does not explain this and 
provides no argument for her ordering of this relation. Even if we provisionally accept 
this ordering, it must be established what exactly is meant by the statement that 
conceptual art has as its central and governing objective the ambition to define art as 
idea. Schellekens refers to three main quotes by conceptual artists. The first is by the 
early conceptual artist, later turned philosopher, Adrian Piper, who claims that an idea 
“is necessary and sufficient for art”,30 the second is by Sol LeWitt, who claims, “ideas 
alone can be works of art”,31 and the third is by the art historian Paul Wood, who claims 
that in conceptual art “the idea is king”.32 Now, these statements—taken in isolation as 
simple assertions—are of noticeably varying strength. The first two quotes display what 
                                                
28 Schellekens. (2007) P74. She says: “although I do not hereby wish to suggest that such an effective 
separation between the aesthetic and the cognitive could not be drawn in art, I shall hold that such a 
principled division is not realised in conceptual art.” Schellekens. (2007) P74 
29 Schellekens. (2007) P72 
30 Adrian Piper, ‘Idea, Form, Context’1969. Quoted in Schellekens. (2007) P72 
31 LeWitt, ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art’1969. Quoted in Schellekens. (2007) P74 
32 Paul Wood, 2002, P33. Quoted in Schellekens. (2007) P72 
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I will call a ‘strong’ or ‘exclusive’ conceptualism,33 suggesting not merely that ideas are 
a required component of art, but that they are in fact fully adequate for art: that there be 
an idea, is sufficient for a conceptual artwork to exist. This is an extreme claim, which, 
it must be noted, is made by only the theories of a small group of conceptual artists 
working in Manhattan during a short period in the late 60s.34 If conceptual art in general 
had adhered strictly to this principle in artistic practice, then it probably would not have 
produced any material objects or artefacts at all, or, if it did still decide to produce such 
things, they would not count as part of the artwork, but would instead merely stand as 
additional supports to the work. The third quote, on the other hand, is quite unclear, but 
seems to be suggesting that the ideational aspect of conceptual artworks rules over their 
other aspects, such that it has central importance or authority, perhaps. This claim seems 
potentially plausible as a definition of conceptual art and I will call this the claim of a 
‘weak’ or ‘inclusive’ conceptualism. 
Whilst Schellekens does not register the fact that these claims are of varying strength, it 
is significant. This is because it becomes increasingly apparent that they correspond to 
the existence of two distinct positions as to the ontological character of conceptual art at 
work in Schellekens’ text. The first position is a strong claim: (1) the idea just is the 
artwork. This ontology corresponds to the quotes that Schellekens gives by Adrian 
Piper and Sol LeWitt, i.e., that a conceptual work can be an idea and thus an idea is both 
necessary and sufficient for an artwork to exist. The logical consequence of this position 
is that any material element or object presented cannot be said to be constitutive of the 
work, but can instead only be a kind of excess, which has no positive role in the 
artwork’s working. For philosophical aesthetics, the strong claim is potentially 
frightening. It would mean the “loss of any crucial aspect of appreciation that is 
immediately tangible or perceptible”35, the loss of a recognisable “focus of 
                                                
33 I take the terms ‘strong’ or ‘exclusive’ conceptualism and ‘weak’ or ‘inclusive’ conceptualism to 
describe the role of the ideational in the ontology of the conceptual work from Peter Osborne. See 
‘Conceptual Art and / as Philosophy’ in (ed.) Michael Newman and Jon Bird, Rewriting Conceptual Art, 
(Reaktion Books Ltd, London, 1999) 
34 For an interesting historical account of the disproportionate effect of the theoretical proclamations of 
this small group of conceptual artists on subsequent readings of conceptual art, see Peter Wollen, ‘‘Global 
Conceptualism and North American Conceptual Art’ in Paris Manhattan, (Verso Books Ltd, London, 
2004)   
35 Schellekens. (2007) P76 
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appreciation” to which we could attach “aesthetic value”.36 The second position is a 
weak claim: (2) the idea is central to the artwork, but is only one aspect of it. This could 
be seen to refer to the quote that Schellekens gives by Paul Wood, i.e., that the “idea is 
king”. This claim leaves room for the possibility that any material element or object can 
be included as a constitutive aspect of the artwork, but also allows that the idea is more 
prominent or central. Whilst Schellekens tries to keep hold of the first claim to a 
stronger conceptualism—that the artwork just is the idea—and to simultaneously say 
that the idea itself can be considered the new ‘focus of appreciation’ and thus of 
aesthetic value, her inability as the argument unfolds to maintain that the material 
element is not constitutive of the work renders this claim increasingly unstable and 
forces her to lapse into the second, weaker claim.  
What is striking is that none of these three quotes taken in isolation in this way provide 
an instructive account of what precisely we are to understand by the claim that the work 
character of a conceptual artwork is an idea. None offer any illumination as to what 
conceptual artists understand an “idea” to be, nor how it operates in an artwork. It is 
curious then that Schellekens interprets them, without discussion, using the terminology 
of analytic aesthetics. The new objective of conceptual art, she concludes from the 
above quotes, is “the representation of ideas and the bearing of cognitive value”.37 
Cognitive value conveyed by ideas, claims Schellekens, is the raison d’être of most 
conceptual art.38 In fact, she goes even further than this, to claim that “of all the kinds of 
value that art in general seems capable of affording (including historical, financial and 
sentimental), cognitive value is the only39 one that conceptual art directly aspires to 
possess. That is to say, for most conceptual artists, artistic value is only to be gained 
from the knowledge, insights, or understanding that the artworks generate.”40 By 
locating conceptual art within the framework of philosophical aesthetics, Schellekens is 
able to interpret the emphasis upon ideas prevalent in conceptual art theory as the 
opposite pole to the aesthetic, i.e. the cognitive. However, contrary to what conceptual 
                                                
36 Schellekens. (2007) P76 
37 Schellekens. (2007) P72 
38 Schellekens. (2007) P79 
39 My italics. 
40 Schellekens. (2007) P80 
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art theory wants to claim, Schellekens suggests, the artistic value of the work cannot be 
entirely exhausted by cognitive value, otherwise conceptual art renders itself redundant: 
there would be no distinction between an artwork and a statement, for example. 
A number of points should be made here. Firstly, by isolating the theoretical statements 
of a few conceptual artists and then taking the strongest claims at their most literal face 
value—i.e. that an idea is necessary and sufficient for an artwork—Schellekens fails to 
acknowledge both the striking ambiguities within individual theoretical texts and the 
wide range of attitudes towards the role of the idea amongst conceptual artists. For 
example, in their text ‘Notes on Analysis’, Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden see the outcome 
of conceptual art in the late 60s to have been, not merely to “clear the air of objects”, 
but a lack of pressure to replace them with ideas.41 In doing so, Schellekens’ account 
gives no consideration to the character of such proclamations and to the way in which 
they function, either in relation to the overall ontology of the actual artworks that they 
are supposed to represent, or within the conceptual project as a whole. Within 
Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, for example, LeWitt can in no way be seen to hold the 
strong position that Schellekens seems to associate him with but instead displays an 
explicit ambiguity towards the role of the material in the artwork. For LeWitt, in 
addition to “conception”, it is also the process of “realisation” with which the artist is 
concerned42 and, as a result, “all intervening steps”—by which LeWitt means the 
specifically materialised working out of ideas in the form of notes and sketches—are 
often of central importance.43 As Peter Osborne has pointed out, “despite his gestures in 
the direction of a purely ideational interpretation of the artwork”, LeWitt’s statements 
actually express an internal ambivalence towards the work’s physical reality, at times 
denouncing it and at times treating it as a condition of the artwork’s existence.44 The 
fact that even those artists who consistently promoted an idea of ‘strong’ conceptualism 
                                                
41 Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden, ‘Notes on Analysis’, 1970. Reprinted in L. Lippard. (1973) P136 
42 Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art (1967), in (ed.) Peter Osborne, Conceptual Art, (Phaidon 
Press, London, 2002). P214  
43 LeWitt. (1967) P214 
44 In Osborne’s interpretation, “what looks like an exclusively ideational redefinition of the object, in 
conflict with the recognition that it requires some physical presence, is actually, more restrictively (and 
also, perhaps, more materialistically), a psychological one.” This, for Osborne ends up forbidding the ‘art 
as idea’ claim that Paragraphs tries to present. Peter Osborne, ‘Philosophy and/as Conceptual Art’ in 
Rewriting Conceptual Art, (Reaktion Books Ltd, London, 1999), P53-P54 
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in their theory, particularly Joseph Kosuth,45 continued nevertheless to produce and 
exhibit materialised artworks of some form or another suggests that such proclamations 
were meant to be themselves artistic, provocative and, I think, rather ironic thought 
experiments with regards to the potential vanishing point of visual art.46 By taking the 
claim of an ideational redefinition of art at face value, Schellekens sidesteps the 
possibility that conceptual art theory might be better related to as a strategic artistic 
doctrine and not simply a literal theoretical statement of an artistic practice. Whilst the 
stronger claims of conceptual art theories should be taken seriously and are, of course, 
significant to an understanding of the conceptual project as a whole, they should not be 
taken in isolation and too literally.47 
However, it is this particular claim which appears to provide Schellekens with the 
foundation upon which her ability to keep the aesthetic and the cognitive in relation to 
one other, whilst declaring—at least ostensibly—the material aspect of the work to be 
almost irrelevant rests. It is directly because of this claim that Schellekens concludes 
that if we are to discover an aesthetic dimension to the conceptual artwork, that 
dimension must be located purely within the idea.48 The idea alone can constitute the 
proper focus of aesthetic appreciation of the work. Whilst I recognise that at certain 
times, Schellekens is in fact assuming the position of the artists, only to demonstrate 
that it is in fact inflated or misguided—an example being, as already discussed, the 
claim to anti-aesthetic intentions—she does not seem to be doing so in this case. What 
is artistic about a conceptual work can, thinks Schellekens, be purely attributable to its 
idea. In her aim to correct what she considers to be the philosophically naïve theory of 
                                                
45 Joseph Kosuth made various strong statements such as, “art only exists conceptually” and “works of art 
are analytic propositions.” See Joseph Kosuth ‘Art after Philosophy, 1968 in (ed.) Peter Osborne, 
Conceptual Art, (Phaidon Press, London, 2002). P214 
46 As Luis Camnitzer has noted, the target against which manifesto’s set themselves are very often “straw 
men”, through which an identity can be affirmed “at the expense of the target”. Conceptualism in Latin 
American Art: Didactics of Liberation, (University of Texas Press, China, 2007). P30  
47 Nick Zangwill argues “people take too seriously artist’s “manifestos”, which should be taken no more 
seriously than any other piece of advertising” in ‘Are There Counterexamples to Aesthetic Theories of 
Art’ in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2002. Eric Hobsbawm has said of the avant-garde after 
1950, “almost any of the numerous manifestos by means of which avant-garde artists have announced 
their intentions in the course of the past hundred years demonstrate the lack of coherence between means 
and ends, the object and the methods of achieving it.” P518   
48 Schellekens says, “if conceptual artworks can have some kind of aesthetic value, there is only one 
element that can be the bearer of such value, and that is the idea at the heart of the artwork.” (2007) P75 
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some conceptual artists then, Schellekens demonstrates a naïve understanding of the 
artistic intentions within the statements of conceptual artists and is instead concerned 
entirely with what would need to be true philosophically, were we to take them literally. 
There is of course some sense in which this method could be justified, in that it acts to 
deflate the overstated claims of conceptual artists, by revealing them to be 
philosophically flawed. However, ultimately, it seems to me that relying upon such an 
approach creates the danger of rendering the investigation into the ontology of 
conceptual art detached from the actual artworks, assuming that what we aim for in 
pursuing such an investigation is an account that somehow rings true of our actual 
experience of such artworks, and not merely an analysis of theory. 
Secondly, this strict adherence to a literal reading of the stronger claim concerning the 
adequacy of the idea also strikes one as curious in the face of Schellekens’ ostensible 
flippancy with regards to the intentionality in the other “least controversial” aspect of 
conceptual art, i.e., its anti-aestheticism. Schellekens offers no justification for why she 
questions one and not the other, merely stating that one is fundamental whilst the other 
is not. Thirdly, Schellekens interprets the claim that art is idea to mean that the 
conceptual project is solely concerned with the “value” gained through the “knowledge, 
insight and understanding” that the work can “yield”. This surely requires further 
evidence—further quotes, a contextual analysis of a more substantial chunk of the quote 
used, an analysis of the artworks even—yet there is none offered. Finally, even if we 
grant Schellekens this interpretation, we might argue that it is difficult to see how even 
this description in any adequate way distinguishes conceptual art definitively from 
many other forms of art. It would be possible to say of almost any artwork that it 
“represents” ideas or “bears” some form of cognitive value, if that is what one wanted 
to claim. More analysis would be needed therefore to draw out what precisely is distinct 
about the role of ideas in the ontology of the conceptual artwork.  
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Schellekens tells us that the cognitive intentions of conceptual art are given a “focus” 
and a “context” by its anti-aesthetic ambitions.49 What this presumably means is that 
conceptual art is unique in its manner of “bearing” in that it attempts to arrive at the 
sufficiency of the idea through its anti-aesthetic tendencies and practices: its 
‘dematerialisation’. Before I move on to analyse the technicalities of precisely how this 
ontology is supposed to operate, we need to look a little closer at the specific 
characterisation of the “idea” in conceptual art that Schellekens puts forward and to see 
how it might be possible that an idea—for Schellekens, cognitive value—can be 
considered sufficient, through a dematerialised ontology. Schellekens identifies, non-
exhaustively, three main kinds of ideas prevalent in conceptual art: self-reflexive ideas, 
socio-political ideas and philosophical ideas. She then gives six examples of conceptual 
artworks and the ideas that are supposed to lie at their heart, five of which are clearly 
propositions and one that is oddly and without explanation a notion (transubstantiation).  
For example, Robert Barry’s Inert Gas Series (1969)—a text on a wall telling us that 
inert gas has been released into the Californian desert, accompanied by a photograph of 
a canister in the desert—tells us that art does not need a perceivable object or event.50 
Q: And Babies? A: And Babies (1970), by the Art Workers Coalition—a media 
photograph of dead bodies in South East Asia with the title text printed across it—tells 
us that United States’ policy on Vietnam was indefensible.51 Whilst Michael Craig-
Martin’s Oak Tree (1973)—a glass of water on a clear glass shelf, accompanied by a 
substantial text convincing us that the artist has in fact turned the glass of water into an 
oak tree—is about transubstantiation.52 To single out one main idea in this way, which 
the artwork is supposed to encapsulate, seems reductive. Even Adrian Piper, the artist 
whom Schellekens cites as a strong conceptualist has stated: “if we have to be 
concerned with one particular concept to be a conceptualist, something’s gone badly 
wrong.”53 
                                                
49 Schellekens. (2007) P72 
50 Schellekens. (2007) P78 
51 Schellekens. (2007) P78 
52 Schellekens. (2007) P79 
53 Adrian Piper, in interview with Peter Osborne, March 1998, New York. Cited in Osborne, ‘Conceptual 
Art and/as Philosophy’, (1999) P56 
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In what feels like a response to a potential charge of the banality and redundancy of 
conceptual art, Schellekens claims that the cognitive potential of such art is not 
reducible to its capacity to give us an “orderly proposition,”54 otherwise there would be 
nothing to distinguish art from ordinary statements or propositions.55 It is difficult to see 
exactly whom Schellekens might have in mind in offering this ostensible corrective. 
Nevertheless, it feels right that the claim that the conceptual artwork is an idea should 
not be understood reductively to mean that its operation as an artwork is to present a 
proposition. Instead, what distinguishes art for Schellekens is that it can afford a more 
complex and experiential kind of cognitive yield, which we access, not merely through 
‘getting’ the proposition, but by undergoing it and thus experiencing a more personal 
engagement with it.56  But what precisely does it mean to have a more “experiential” 
engagement with an idea for Schellekens? This appears to be the most vague part of the 
text. To undergo an idea is, says Schellekens, to experience its “true ramifications” and 
to “experience” ramifications is to gain some kind of knowledge about ‘what it [the 
ramification] is like’.57 According to Schellekens, Q: And Babies, A: And Babies invites 
“a significant degree of contemplation of the horror of political injustice”.58 The work 
thus, “brings the idea of injustice to us” to the extent that we are able to “appreciate the 
situation’s true callousness and horror”59. The claim that a photograph, particularly one 
accompanied with a provocative message, might give us a deeper grasp of the specific 
character of the idea it presents seems plausible. The claim that it can make us undergo 
the extent of its “true ramifications” does not.  
However, even the claim that the work can provoke a deeper understanding of an idea 
becomes less tenable with the other examples of “ideas” that Schellekens selects. 
                                                
54 Schellekens. (2007) P81 
55 Schellekens. (2007) P80 
56 Schellekens has various formulations of this point. In the space of a single page she claims conceptual 
art invites us to engage with ideas “in a seemingly more involved fashion”, “enter into a thought-
provoking relationship with ideas” and “engage in an emphatic and imaginative manner with the idea”. 
These all feel like distinct articulations of the broad point that “the cognitive value conceptual art is rather 
more experiential than propositional.” (2007) P83  
57 In footnote ten of the text, Schellekens tells us that she has chosen the word “experiential” as a less 
subjective or perspectival version of ‘what it is like’ knowledge. However, the general meaning remains: 
‘experiential’ knowledge for Schellekens means to gain some understanding into the ramifications of 
something. (2007) P83 
58 Schellekens. (2007) P83 
59 Schellekens. (2007) P82 
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Following Schellekens’ logic, an experience of Oak Tree would result in our coming to 
truly understand and appreciate the ramifications of the theological concept of 
transubstantiation. However, it seems to me that such a concept is, by definition, 
inherently resistant to such phenomenological grasping. I would like to look at the 
technicalities of these claims in more detail in the following section, but what becomes 
immediately clear is that it is at this precise point that Schellekens finds it necessary to 
give some account of the role of the material element of the conceptual artwork. If the 
material aspect of the artwork allows us to “experience” and “grasp” 
“phenomenologically” an idea that would otherwise remain a banal proposition, thus 
constituting the specifically artistic character of the idea, then Schellekens must admit 
that the material is in fact central and constitutive. In fact, Schellekens’ position with 
regards to the material element is not clear and is subject to oscillations. She will 
ultimately claim that material has some importance—it must, after all, be chosen 
carefully and be “fitting” for the idea—and so will conclude that it is not quite as 
contingent after all. However, what Schellekens seems to want to have as her most 
central and consistent argument is that whilst the material object, entity or event might 
be important as a “prompt” or “trigger” to that experience, it cannot be said to be 
properly constitutive of it. The material acts as a kind of bridge to the experience with 
the idea and is cut away as soon as we cross it. As I will now demonstrate, this idea 
displays itself to be increasingly tenuous. 
3. The Fate of the Material 
Schellekens, by insisting upon holding on to both the notion of the aesthetic and the 
cognitive, and, through her commitment to locating the proper “focus of appreciation”, 
which, she tells us, philosophical aesthetics needs to alleviate its anxieties, ends up 
constructing a kind of new ideational art object for conceptual art. There are two main 
consequences, which I identify as emerging from this position. Firstly, it produces, to 
my mind, a too conventional account of what conceptual art is—one that fails to 
recognise the more radical tendency in the ontological investigation of such art, by way 
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of its attempt to disallow a single, easily identifiable site of value60. Secondly, it results 
in the emergence of a philosophical problem with regards to the materialised object or 
medium of the work in that Schellekens is forced to disallow it any significant or 
centralised role in the value-producing aspect of the work’s operation. In response to 
this latter charge, Schellekens might claim that this is precisely what makes conceptual 
art ontologically distinct—i.e. its unique form can be said to reside in the fact that the 
idea alone is the work and that the material is arbitrary and instrumental. However, the 
necessity with which she is forced to extricate the material aspect of the work becomes 
increasingly unconvincing and strained as the argument unfolds. I would now like to 
trace more closely what happens to the material through the unfolding of the logic of 
Schellekens’ essay, in order to demonstrate the extent to which it reveals itself to be the 
weakest aspect of her argument. 
I identify discussions of two distinct kinds of materiality in Schellekens’ essay; the first 
is a kind of materiality of the idea and the second is the material object or thing, the 
medium, which “represents” or “instantiates” the idea. Whilst the former seems to be 
implicitly smuggled into the ‘focus of appreciation’ of the work at certain points, it is 
not really ever taken up and extended explicitly as a point of argumentation by 
Schellekens, being mentioned once or twice at the beginning and then being allowed to 
drop away. The latter—the material object—is dealt with more explicitly. The 
unsatisfactory treatment of both forms results in an overall lack of adequate attention to 
the role of the material in the conceptual artwork, one which results in the account as a 
whole feeling increasingly tenuous.  
(i) The Materiality of the Idea  
There are at least two points in the text at which Schellekens refers to the idea as the 
“material” of conceptual art.61 Whilst she doesn’t explain precisely what she means by 
this, or in what tone or manner she is using the reference, we can get a sense by 
analysing the relevant passages. First of all, Schellekens quotes Lucy Lippard’s 
                                                
60 For a similar argument see David Davies, in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007) 
61 Schellekens says, “not only is the representation of ideas taken to be central to art-making, but these 
ideas are themselves the proper ‘material’ of conceptual pieces.” (2007) P74 
  
19 
statement that in conceptual art, the art occurs “prior to materialisation”.62 This is, it 
seems, a distinct way of expressing the point that we have already identified as central 
to Schellekens’ argument, i.e. that it is the idea and not its materialised form of 
presentation, that is the artwork. However, Schellekens then declares that in fact, “ideas 
are themselves the proper ‘material’ of art.”63 This seems to instantly contradict what 
appeared for Lippard to be a much stronger claim, i.e., that in the case of the conceptual 
work, the art occurs prior to materialisation. If the art occurs prior to materialisation, 
and if one wants to insist, as Schellekens clearly does, that the artwork is to be equated 
solely with the idea, then the idea cannot be the ‘material’ of conceptual art. If, on the 
other hand, one wants to both hold on to the claim that the idea is the artwork and that 
the idea is the material, one must give up any literal stating of Lippard’s claim that art is 
prior to materialisation. What would emerge in this case then would be the claim to 
there being two distinct kinds of materiality; the first, ideational or the materiality of 
ideas and the second, materiality more traditionally conceived—the material object. 
This could well turn out to be a very interesting direction for a philosophical account of 
conceptual art, yet, unfortunately, Schellekens does not develop it any further. 
However, what is interesting is that by virtue of this contradiction, Schellekens ends up 
reasserting the necessity of the inclusion of a notion of materiality within an 
understanding of the ontology of the artwork. A page later, Schellekens suggests the 
necessity of a material aspect within the definition of an artwork even more explicitly. 
She claims “the view that the idea is the material and thereby the artwork itself”,64 is 
unsettling for philosophical aesthetics, which requires a firmly delineated focus of 
appreciation. This quote basically equates the artwork with the notion of artistic 
material, whether this is ideational or otherwise, and through suggesting that an artwork 
is such by virtue of its material, seems, I think, to stumble across the irony implicit 
within the theoretical proclamations that she herself chooses to pass over in any explicit 
terms. What these statements imply is not that the idea can just simply be the artwork, 
but that we can come to think of or relate to it as the artwork, either by allowing it to 
                                                
62 Lucy Lippard and John Chandler, “The Dematerialisation of the Art Object’, 1968. Quoted in 
Schellekens. (2007) P74 
63 Schellekens. (2007) P74 
64 Schellekens. (2007) P75  
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stand in as the material, or by virtue of our coming to relate to or engage with it, as we 
would typically relate to the material. If even the most extreme statements that art is 
idea must be interpreted and understood through recourse to a more traditional relation 
of ideational and material in the ontology of the artwork, this at least opens the 
possibility of there existing a real barrier to conceiving of an artwork in the sense that 
Lippard meant it, i.e. purely as an idea, which is perceived as wholly prior to 
materialisation. 
So, it seems to me that either the claim that the idea is the true material of conceptual art 
must be a mere metaphor or analogy—made either strategically, or else out of an 
anxious clinging to what is recognisable in the face of conceptual art’s truly radical and 
disorientating new ontological platform—or that the idea does come to take on the 
character of material, i.e. becomes somehow more heavily materialised, through a shift 
within the relational totality of this new ontology. If it is the latter, then this of course 
needs a serious amount of explanation and justification. What would it mean exactly to 
claim that an idea becomes the most prominent material of an artwork? Whilst there 
might be a neat philosophical theory here, if making the idea the ‘material’ of the 
artwork simply means that the traditional art object is swapped for a new materialised 
idea-object—as though the mere absence of the art object phenomenologically requires 
its replacement with a new ideal, yet materialised object—we would surely be in danger 
of losing any coherent definition of conceptual art. There is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that the conceptual art project was not in fact motivated by the objective of 
constructing for itself a new precise focus of appreciation, by way of an ideal art-object, 
but instead that it specifically didn’t want a replacement object at all. Instead, we might 
argue that conceptual art sought to decentralise from its artistic investigation any 
traditional notions of object-hood per se, in a radical investigation into the various and 
more peripheral phenomena that constitute the particularity and the significance of 
specific objecthood. Such motivations of this more radical kind can be found in the 
theoretical statements of artists such as Lawrence Weiner,65 and Dennis Oppenheim.66 
                                                
65 “I do not mind objects but I do not care to make them. The object—by virtue of being a unique 
commodity—becomes something that might make it impossible for people to see the art for the forest.” 
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Nevertheless, if Schellekens is to argue convincingly that the idea is the proper 
“material” of conceptual art, then the question essentially becomes what precisely 
makes it so? What is it that facilitates the conditions under which an idea can become 
“material” in the way Schellekens seems to suggest, and thus, opens up the possibility 
of it being an artistic idea? Schellekens’ gesture towards an answer to this question 
seems to be implied within her account of the way in which an abstract idea can become 
more “concrete” through its being engaged with in a certain way. An idea becomes 
substantial in Schellekens’ account when we experience or “undergo”67 its true 
“ramifications”68, as opposed to merely thinking it. This experience of ramifications 
then comes to speak to what is distinct about the art experience. Let us now consider a 
quote by Schellekens, which I believe throws light onto the particular character of her 
position, as well as on its particular difficulties. “By turning art theory into art practice”, 
Schellekens claims, “conceptual artists dealing with philosophical notions and 
distinctions, also turn the abstract into something concrete. They do so not by virtue of 
the perceivable thing or event that illustrates the idea, but by transforming the idea 
itself69 into something with a firm grounding in our ordinary lives (such as a glass of 
water on a shelf or a foldable chair)”.70 This is a perplexing claim. Schellekens seems to 
suggest that the conceptual artwork—to take one of her own examples, Craig-Martin’s 
Oak Tree—takes an abstract idea or proposition such as “transubstantiation” and turns it 
into a more concrete idea. However, the capacity for the abstract idea to become 
concrete, Schellekens insists, is specifically not attributable to the fact that Craig-Martin 
chooses to represent the notion of transubstantiation with the glass on a shelf, together 
with its corresponding text: the material can ultimately have no positive or fundamental 
role in the work’s working. Instead, claims Schellekens, that the abstract idea becomes 
concrete is attributable to the fact that Craig-Martin has transformed the idea of 
                                                
Lawrence Weiner, ‘Statements’ (1969), in Meyer (ed.), Conceptual Art, (Dutton, New York, 1972) PP 
217-18. 
66 Dennis Oppenheim has described his work as “an attempt to get away from the ‘preciousity of objects’ 
and the kind of thinking that’s controlled by an object-oriented idea”, see Dennis Oppenheim interview 
with Patricia Norvell, March 29, 1969 in (ed.) Norvell, Recording Conceptual Art, (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 2001). P22 
67 Schellekens. (2007) P86 
68 Schellekens. (2007) P81 
69 My italics. 
70 Schellekens. (2007) P82 
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transubstantiation itself into something with a “firm grounding in our ordinary lives”—a 
glass of water on a shelf.       
This curious claim appears to me to be an inversion of the arguments made by Arthur 
Danto in his ontologically based investigation into conceptual artworks, Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace.71 Rather than commonplace objects being perceptually 
‘transfigured’ into artworks—i.e., into entities of a more exalted or ontologically 
privileged status—in Schellekens’ account, the abstract theological notion of 
‘transubstantiation’ transforms itself into a commonplace, everyday object, and thus 
into a more concrete idea. But how exactly does an idea transform itself into a glass of 
water on a shelf? And how would such a potential transformation render the idea more 
concrete? Now, it seems that Schellekens could only be saying two possible things here, 
either (1) that the idea is transformed into a glass of water by virtue of the decision to 
represent the idea with a glass of water, in which case the claim would be relatively 
banal, or (2) that transubstantiation is a particularly apt concept in that it somehow 
encapsulates something about the operation of conceptual art. As Schellekens wants to 
argue that the object does not represent the idea, she must be arguing for the latter. This 
might explain why the Craig-Martin artwork appears to feature so centrally in her essay 
and perhaps why it is also the sole concept or notion, whilst the other ‘ideas’ that 
Schellekens identifies in the other works she refers to are all propositions.72 It does 
seem that Schellekens thinks that this notion captures something about or even 
encapsulates the peculiarities of the ontological workings of conceptual art.  
What would it mean for conceptual art to be, in some manner, analogous to 
transubstantiation? What would be at stake in the shifting of concepts from 
‘transfiguration’ to ‘transubstantiation’ in thinking about conceptual art? The term 
‘transubstantiation’ refers to the theological doctrine that the substance of the elements 
bread and wine transform into the substance of the body and blood of Christ when 
consecrated by the Eucharist. Whilst theological controversy exists as to the extent to 
                                                
71 Arthur Danto, Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art, (Harvard University Press, 
Massachusetts, 1981) 
72 The other ‘ideas’ Schellekens refers to are all propositions. For example, “that art need not be 
something unique” or “that gross injustices are being carried out in the name of democracy.” (2007) P77-
78  
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which this idea is to be considered as metaphorical or literally true, it is generally 
accepted by Catholicism that this change occurs without any perceptible alteration of 
the elements. The bread and wine change ‘substance’—they transform into the body and 
blood of Christ—yet they retain their ‘accidents’, i.e. their appearance as bread and 
wine. Although Craig-Martin does not explicitly use the term ‘transubstantiation’ 
himself, on the surface at least, this might seem relevant to an interpretation of Oak 
Tree. When Craig-Martin declares in his text that he has transformed a glass of water 
into an oak tree, he claims to mean it substantially, whilst simultaneously holding fast to 
the ostensible contradiction that it still looks like a glass of water. This can be seen in 
the following extract: 
Q. Do you mean that the glass of water is a symbol of an oak tree? 
A. No. It's not a symbol. I've changed the physical substance of the glass of 
water into that of an oak tree. 
Q. It looks like a glass of water. 
A. Of course it does. I didn't change its appearance. But it's not a glass of water; 
it's an oak tree. 73 
However, if Craig-Martin is invoking the notion of transubstantiation, to my mind, it is 
not because he considers it to genuinely encapsulate the ontological workings of 
conceptual art—such that conceptual art can achieve a transformation of X (the 
abstract) into Y (the concrete), whilst at the same time circumventing the constitutive 
necessity of the material. The point of Oak Tree is not to endorse transubstantiation but 
to criticise it as a viable concept, that is, to sarcastically draw to attention the 
pretensions implicit within the consistent presentation of any commonplace object as 
art. 
This aspect of Schellekens’ theory reveals the untenable exclusion of the material in her 
account. Schellekens wants to claim that the abstract idea can become a concrete idea, 
because the artist transforms an idea into a banal, commonplace material object, yet 
simultaneously wants to hold that the material object itself—the glass of water on the 
                                                
73 Tony Godfrey, Conceptual Art, (Phaidon Press, London, 1998) P248 
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shelf and the corresponding text (which Schellekens seems to forget about, following 
her initial description of the work)—in no way participates significantly in the idea 
becoming concrete. It seems clear that Schellekens’ earlier claim that the idea is 
necessary and sufficient for conceptual art has lead her to an untenable argument with 
regards to the material object in that she is forced to hold fast to the statement that the 
material object cannot in any way be important to a proper appreciation of the work, 
whilst her theory unconsciously testifies to the fact that it in fact must be. This problem 
repeats itself throughout the text. For example, Schellekens claims that her aim is to 
demonstrate the applicability of aesthetics to conceptual art whilst not betraying its two-
fold commitment to both “cognitive value” and “dematerialisation”.74 As we have 
already seen through the quote that Schellekens herself handpicks, “dematerialisation” 
here means that the ‘arthood’ can exist in the idea alone, prior to all materialisation. If 
the idea is (literally and not metaphorically) the material however, then there is no 
(literal) “dematerialisation”, a point already made quite convincingly by Art & 
Language as early as 1968.75 It seems at this point that Schellekens has temporarily 
abandoned her discussion of the materiality of the idea and is now referring simply to 
the more traditionally conceived material object, or means of representation. 
(ii) Material Object, Entity, Event 
If “material” now means the material object, how can Schellekens work back into the 
picture any significance for the material? Whilst it is only the idea which can be said to 
be the proper ‘focus of aesthetic appreciation’ of the work and thus the seat of aesthetic 
value, Schellekens concedes that the material object that ‘bears’ that idea might just turn 
out to have considerably more artistic value than first thought.76 This sudden 
concession that there might be a role for the material, made specifically through the 
introduction of the notion of “artistic value”, goes unexplained and Schellekens fails to 
ever provide a working definition, either of “aesthetic value” or “artistic value”, despite 
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John Chandler, 2nd November, 1968). This is part of an extract taken from (ed.) Peter Osborne, 
Conceptual Art, (Phaidon Press, London, 2002). P220-221  
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the fact that she sets them against each other hierarchically.77 Such an ordered and 
hierarchical construction of the different kinds of value and the various aspects of the 
work they are able to correspond to, is not merely left unjustified, but seems like an 
unconvincing account of how we actually experience artworks. Such an overly 
compartmentalised image of the artwork just does not, to my mind, ring true of an 
experience of art. When I am looking at Michael Craig-Martin’s Oak Tree, to take one 
of Schellekens’ own examples, I do not match up which aspect of the work has strictly 
aesthetic and which artistic value, to check if my experience is valid. To claim that the 
only value proper to an engagement with the material in a conceptual work is to 
experience it as an artistic means to an end, and hence a less central and more ‘trivial’ 
component of experience is to completely over-theorise and over-instrumentalise what 
actually happens in an experience with such a work. 
In her discussion of various conceptual artworks, Schellekens describes the role of the 
material more explicitly. She claims that the material ‘triggers’ or ‘prompts’ the 
imaginative exercise that leads to a kind of enriched ‘experiential knowledge’ of what 
would otherwise simply be a banal proposition. Effectively, the material operates as a 
medium between the idea in its banal and propositional form and the idea in its 
enriched, ‘undergone’ and ‘experiential’ form. Of course, this requires much explaining. 
First of all, how precisely does the material operate as that aspect which effectively 
facilitates this enriched experiential engagement with the idea, but then subsequently 
manages to dissolve itself from this experience, so that it might avoid any centrality 
within the work’s “proper” “focus of appreciation”? 
Discussing the process through which the various conceptual artworks operate, 
Schellekens says this of the material aspect of the work: by “instantiating” the idea they 
turn “what in the form of a proposition seems to be a rather prosaic comment into 
something more experiential”.78 Put another way, they “turn the abstract into the 
                                                
77 For Schellekens, whilst the material can have artistic value, in that a fitting choice of material can 
prompts an engagement with the work—an aesthetic and cognitive engagement—it seems that identify 
such artistic value is not equivalent with an engagement with the work. Instead it is a means to an end. 
78 Schellekens. (2007) P81 
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concrete”.79 What constitutes the experiential object of focus, Schellekens clarifies, is 
still nevertheless “the idea”. The role of the material has now been given more 
centrality, said to “instantiate” a proposition, so that through our experience of its 
ramifications, it might become something more than propositional. The material is thus 
now credited as being a medium, which somehow has the capacity to transform what is 
“prosaic” into something more enriched. As an example of this, Schellekens cites the 
conceptual work Q: And Babies, A: And Babies by the Art Workers Coalition. In her 
description of the work she claims, “The contextualised photograph of human corpses 
strewn over a small road in South-East Asia brings the idea of injustice to us in a way 
that a mere statement cannot.”80 The photograph is a “vehicle”, one that delivers the 
idea of injustice in a special manner so that it can be experienced as something more 
than propositional. Attempting to substantiate this claim Schellekens adds, “the image 
of the massacred women and children, together with the burning question and shocking 
answer painted over it enables us to appreciate the situation’s true callousness and 
horror.”81 
Now, aside from the fact that this appears as an inflated account of what this and 
perhaps even any artwork does or can do, the implicit account of how the material 
operates within this process is problematic for various reasons. First of all, the example 
of Q: And Babies, A: And Babies by the Art Workers Coalition is clearly chosen by 
Schellekens to ensure the optimal result for her claim that the proper engagement with a 
conceptual work is a deep undergoing of the ramifications of its central idea. It is an 
emotive and political piece of agitprop, which parades—on its surface at least—a clear 
message. When we try to apply this theory to other works however, such as Oak Tree, it 
immediately feels less convincing. To say that we undergo the true ramifications of 
transubstantiation when we experience this work is unlikely. In addition to the fact that 
every moment of the process described by Schellekens is unclear and elusive, we have 
learnt little about how Q: And Babies, A: And Babies works, either in its specificity, or 
in its entirety as an artwork. If it is just the image plus “burning question” plus 
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“shocking answer”82 that results in the “experiential knowledge” that affords aesthetic 
value—i.e., in the work—nothing is to distinguish this piece from a tabloid newspaper 
article, for example. If the material aspect of the work is taken to be the mere 
combination of material components, such as paper, image and written text, then it is 
impossible to explain exactly how the artwork could be distinct from the tabloid paper. 
It is the reflection upon this question which ultimately points us in the direction we need 
to be heading with regards to understanding the role of artistic materiality in conceptual 
art. If we decided to go along with Schellekens’ basic claim for now, the question that 
needs to be interrogated—one that Schellekens’ argument seems unable to answer 
adequately—is why exactly an artistically materialised “instantiation” might call for 
either a particular or an increased sensitivity towards an idea. To be able to answer this 
question adequately requires more than a nod towards a crudely emotive piece such as 
Q: And Babies? A: And Babies, whose rather simplistic emotive character, it must be 
added, is not at all characteristic of conceptual art more generally. It seems to me that 
the answer might be that an instantiation, by definition, relies upon a complex of pre-
existing significations and a set of conditions—both in terms of the relative and 
historical significance of the materials used, and in terms of the context in which it is 
shown. These significances and conditions are in part material. For some form of 
material to effectively represent certain ideas, there must be a shared understanding as 
to both the historical and current significance of that material and its representational 
capacities. This shared understanding need not only constitute something fully 
conscious and thought-out, but could be simply a subconscious awareness of the role 
that certain materials have played in particular contexts. Failing to adequately 
contextualise the artworks she discusses, Schellekens doesn’t engage with the question 
of precisely how these specific materials operate differently when contextualised within 
a tabloid newspaper and within an art gallery and how this artistic contextualisation 
affords its own specific historical significations to materials. It is my contention that 
whilst all art operates in such a way, conceptual art in particular—as an art form which, 
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as Schellekens rightly points out, centralises a self-reflexive investigation as to the 
ontology of the artwork—requires such an understanding.  
I would like to now test this idea out on Michael Craig-Martin’s Oak Tree. Schellekens 
takes this work to have a philosophical content by virtue of its seeming to intend a 
reference to the theological concept of transubstantiation,83 as if merely invoking a 
theological notion, and doing so through a sparse presentation of material, were enough 
to make something a conceptual artwork. This seems to me to be a weak reading of the 
work and one that, were it true, would show conceptual art to be a rather banal type of 
art. The reference to transubstantiation is itself merely one aspect of the work, and its 
character as a ‘conceptual’ artwork is not reducible to its ‘bearing’ this content. In this 
piece, as I interpret it, Craig-Martin plays very specifically upon what had become by 
this point a recognisable Duchampian act: a glass of water is turned into a work of art 
by being placed in a gallery by an artist, creating a kind of ‘readymade’. If it stopped at 
this, the work would just be a rather boring repetition of Duchamp’s original gestures. 
However, Craig-Martin adds some innovations to the Duchampian formula. Somewhat 
akin to Duchamp’s calling a urinal Fountain, Craig-Martin calls the glass of water an 
Oak Tree. Duchamp’s title, while obviously absurd, is surely meant to be a playful 
inversion of the real function of the object, corresponding perhaps to the fact that the 
object is to be exhibited flat, rather than on a wall. It seems reasonable to imagine a 
corresponding reversal of the flow of liquid from out of the urinal and straight up into 
the air—the fountain as a kind of backwards pissoir, which we can then imagine 
spraying urine into the art gallery. This is clearly meant as an irreverent gesture. Craig-
Martin’s ‘readymade’ here does no such thing; he chooses practically the blandest of 
conceivable objects,84 something utterly inoffensive, and places it in an art gallery. This 
has none of the obvious ‘punk’ of Duchamp’s gesture. In its complete banality what is 
conspicuous about this object is that it cannot have been chosen to signify anything 
specific in itself other than total neutrality. In taking Oak Tree as its title, Craig-Martin 
does not, like Duchamp, choose some provocative inversion, but rather another bland, 
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but apparently arbitrary object. This seems to be a distilling of a certain aspect of the 
readymade, or at least how it has been interpreted retrospectively: an arbitrary object is 
nominated arbitrarily by an artist and thereby becomes an artwork—the nominalist or 
institutional critique of the artwork embodied in a conceptual artwork. There are two 
parallel, related nominations: that of a glass of water as an oak tree, and that of the 
named object as a work of art. But a further departure from Duchamp comes in the form 
of the typed text exhibited next to the glass, which explains that it has literally been 
turned into an oak tree, not just nominated as one. The implication, if we follow the 
analogy between the naming of the object and the declaration of this as an artwork, 
would seem to be that an object in such a case is not just nominated as an artwork, but 
really becomes one. But it is significant that it needs a piece of absurdist art criticism to 
do the work for it. Since the glass of water can of course not really be an oak tree—
conceptual art is not transubstantiation—and since the piece of supporting text is so 
blatantly fatuous, we fall back on questioning the validity of anything about the claim of 
the whole thing to be a work of art. 
What becomes clear through an engagement with the work is that there are various 
contradictory interpretive movements summoned by the piece here, and in the process 
of these movements it implicates both art criticism and theory, and the gallery which 
has enabled such an object to be presented in the first place, in addition to a familiarity 
with the kinds of material, both of historical and current art. It appears to carry a critical 
element despite its blandness: it points to the absurdities of art institutions and the 
reception of contemporary art. To claim that conceptual art is idea and that a proper 
engagement with a conceptual work requires us to merely undergo an idea—as though a 
single idea could be isolated to encompass the work as a whole—and to then kick away 
the material feels like a reductive account of what is in fact a rich and complex process 
of engagements. 
Concluding Remarks 
Through her commitment to an overly literal reading of the writings of a small selection 
of extreme conceptual artists, Schellekens fails to question the apparent ontological 
assumption of such artists, i.e. that art can be essentially ideational. This text presents a 
picture of the ontology of the conceptual artwork in which it is overly epistemological 
  
30 
and materially instrumentalised, i.e. in which the idea becomes a new object of focus 
and appreciation, and which does so by first utilising as a “prompt” and then kicking 
away as arbitrary the material aspect of the work. However, this account does not work. 
Schellekens cannot have her cake and eat it too, so to speak. The logic of her argument 
indicates that she cannot both claim that the artwork just is the idea, whilst also 
awkwardly holding onto a role for the material, as her argument implicitly does. On the 
other hand, Schellekens cannot insist that the idea is the new focus of appreciation with 
which we engage experientially, without holding onto a role for the material. Her 
attempt to solve this problem through the casually made qualification that the material 
can have artistic value is inadequate. It becomes clear that in conceptual artworks which 
use some form of material presentation, the material must have a more central and 
sustained role in the ontology of the work, and thus any ideational aspect attributable to 
the work cannot be construed to be an isolatable ‘focus of appreciation’, which we can 
detach from the material object and engage with on its own terms. What emerges 
through attending more to the process of the engagement and the manner in which the 
artwork leads us through a complex range of associations, is a sense that, rather than 
being understood as an art form that merely inverts traditional art in swapping the 
material object for the idea as the proper focus of appreciation in the ontology of the 
artwork, the conceptual project might be better comprehended as being more 
fundamentally ontological, in that it breaks apart and disallows any easily identifiable 
central focus and instead explores the periphery of phenomena which constitutes the 
work as a whole. As I have attempted to demonstrate, this does not entail a shifting of 
the ontology of the conceptual work onto an ideal platform, but requires a more 
attentive analysis of the role of the material in the ontology of the artwork; one which is 
capable of identifying the manner in which conceptual art, through its self-reflexive 
tendencies, relies upon the historical meaning of its material. 
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Part Two: The Subservience of the Perceptual 
In ‘On Perceiving Conceptual Art’,85 Lamarque presents an alternative to accounts, such 
as that of Schellekens, which attempt to construct for conceptual art a unique ontology 
through denying that the material—and importantly for Lamarque, by association the 
perceptual—has a necessary role within the operation of the artwork proper. Whilst 
Lamarque identifies that some conceptual art both aspires to be and is understood as 
non-perceptual, due both to a general emphasis upon ideas and to assigning a “low 
priority to material, to what is perceptible”,86 he thinks that such aspirations render 
conceptual art diminished. Since conceptual artists predominantly produce material 
objects or present their ideas in a materialised form of presentation, “rather than trying 
to make conceptual art non-perceptual, it might be better to admit a perceptual level, but 
make it subservient to the conceptual.”87 Lamarque achieves this by arguing that, whilst 
it is the idea—for Lamarque, the title—that directs the experience of the work, there 
occurs through such direction, a corresponding perceptual change in the object. The 
conceptual must, Lamarque tells us, “inform the perception of the objects and 
performances.”88 In opposition to the instrumentalism of Schellekens’ position, in 
which the material object is a mere perceptual “prompt” or point of access to the work, 
which is utilised and then kicked away, for Lamarque, whilst it is part of the definition 
of the successful artwork that it distinguishes itself from its material base or object, this 
object does not merely give way to the work. Rather, our perceptual encounter with the 
material object is governed by the intentional direction of the title, resulting in the 
subsequent perceptual ‘transfiguration’ of the object. The material is thus a constitutive 
part of the work, as such a perceptual transfiguration of the material element is 
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86 He offers three quotes at this point: (i) “the idea is paramount and the material form is secondary, 
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constitutive of the artistic experience. For Lamarque, without this perceptual 
transfiguration, we have failed to experience the work. 
In this section I will attempt to establish the particular manner and extent to which 
Lamarque’s insistence on a greater and more significant role for the material and 
perceptual aspects in the ontology of the conceptual artwork can offer any correctives to 
the problems which emerged from Schellekens’ account, and can thus bring us a little 
closer to a more coherent and convincing theory of such art.89 My line of argumentation 
will be the following: Lamarque’s account can act as a corrective to Schellekens’ in his 
insistence upon the recognition that—in so far as conceptual art is a practice that 
continues to produce materialised art objects, regardless of its pretensions to the 
contrary—an account of the perceptual experience as partly constitutive of such art is 
required. However, I consider Lamarque’s account to be problematic on two central and 
related points. First of all, by basing his entire argument about conceptual art upon a 
very simplistic formulation of what constitutes a Readymade—i.e. a commonplace 
object with one title, containing a single idea or concept—Lamarque fails to attend to 
the manner in which such art specifically disallows such a reductive reading and instead 
brings to light the complex network of contextual relations which are its conditions of 
coming into being as such a work. Second of all, within his analysis of the way in which 
an idea or a title can direct a perceptual transfiguration of a material object, Lamarque 
fails to give an explicit and adequate account of the role of the particular material 
properties of the object. Without such an explicit explanation, Lamarque’s argument 
stands in danger of positing the material object as a rather passive substrate, upon which 
any free play of ideas can merely be imposed. 
                                                
89 Simultaneous to Lamarque’s more central analysis concerning perception is, perhaps predictably, 
another examination of the role of the aesthetic in conceptual art. Lamarque not only asks whether art can 
be non-perceptual, but in addition asks whether art can be non-aesthetic, as well as whether something 
can be aesthetic but not perceptual. I am not going to concern myself with this aspect of Lamarque’s 
inquiry for two main reasons. Firstly, the latter two questions are not directly relevant to my own 
investigation and, secondly, unlike in the case of Schellekens’ text, the notion of the aesthetic for 
Lamarque does not seem to frame or to direct the logic of his argument in any significant manner, but 
feels almost entirely external to it. 
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1. Comparing Conceptual Art to Literature 
It must first be noted that Lamarque’s entire justification for thinking that conceptual art 
is best understood as perceptual is derived from a comparison he undertakes between 
conceptual art and literature, i.e., an art form commonly considered to be non-
perceptual. Ontologically speaking—in terms of where the ‘work’ is to be properly 
located—literature, thinks Lamarque, is an interesting case. This is because Lamarque 
considers literature to be characterised by the existence of a separation between the text 
and the work. Though Lamarque does not make this clear, it must be noted at this point 
that his use of the term “text” refers exclusively to the perceptual object, in distinction 
from any notion of an ideal object, whose perceptual existence would be located in its 
multiple, concrete instantiations. With the possible exception of concrete poetry, the 
specificities of the physical text—by way of the particularities of actual words on the 
page—whilst granting initial perceptual access to the work, are not an essential aspect 
of, or constitutive of the work itself. They are, as Lamarque puts it, contingent to the 
identity conditions of the actual literary work. This means that our perceptual access to 
works through texts “is not sufficient to determine what works the texts give us access 
to.”90 In short, the text underdetermines the work. If no particular perceptual qualities or 
features are important in the case of literature, if such features underdetermine the work, 
then it follows that perception itself cannot be said to be constitutive of the work’s 
identity conditions. Lamarque’s description of literature here is interesting, as it 
resonates with the general formula of Schellekens’ ontology of the conceptual artwork: 
the physical and perceptual aspect of the conceptual artwork, whilst it might be 
necessary to access the artwork, cannot be considered to be constitutive of that work. 
However, Lamarque will ultimately challenge this analogy of conceptual art and 
literature. The implication of Lamarque’s position is that, whilst they might both present 
an analogous ontological separation between the material base, or object, and work, in 
the case of conceptual art this separation is both experienced and bridged through 
perception. 
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Despite this basic analogy, it feels surprising that Lamarque begins his text with a 
substantial diversion through a comparison of conceptual art and literature, when such a 
conspicuous distinction exists between them: whilst literature is not ‘visual art’, for all 
its claims to imperceptibility, conceptual art still largely continues to be so. However, 
Lamarque thinks that conceptual art might be considered similar to literature on two 
main counts. Firstly, due to the diminished role of the perceptual in the overall ontology 
of the work, secondly, because of a similarity in the specific role ideas can play and 
how ideas are used more generally. Lamarque quickly drops any potential exploration 
of how this ontology might compare to the case of conceptual art and makes a curious 
detour. “More interesting” than such ontological questions and comparisons, says 
Lamarque, “is the role of ideas in literary art and conceptual art”.91 Lamarque then 
follows this up by claiming that although it might seem that it is in relation to the role of 
ideas that the two art forms are most similar, “to anticipate, I don’t think the analogy is 
very strong”.92 
Here Lamarque explores a few possible analogies between literature and conceptual art, 
through specific reference to the use of ideas. The most promising analogy of what the 
idea is in literature, says Lamarque, is to think of it as a theme. “A theme is an idea or a 
conception, which gives coherence or interest to a work’s ostensible subject”. If the 
theme of Animal Farm, for example, could be said (rather crudely) to be communism, 
then this would, presumably, have gained its thematic character through our having 
engaged with its subject, i.e., the shift in the relations between the animals on the farm, 
after they have overthrown their human enslavers and expropriated from them the 
means of production. What seems significant about this account of how ideas—
understood as “themes”—operate in literature, is that, as opposed to being clearly 
posited beforehand as propositions, they instead develop out of—acquire thematisation 
through—the very specific details of the work. In short, there is a “close integration” of 
theme and subject in literature.93 In opposition to this, thinks Lamarque, in conceptual 
art, where there is an informing thematic idea, “it is only loosely, perhaps 
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metaphorically, connected to the specific item displayed, be it a performance, a 
sequence of numbers, a disparate collection of objects, an empty frame, lights turned on 
and off, a beach hut, a pile of clothes, or […] a provocative sentence”.94 Whilst the 
ideas and conceptions of conceptual art might “prompt reflective thinking of a thematic 
kind”, the close integration of subject and theme in the literary case—i.e., “the way the 
subject matter both enhances and defines thematic content”—is missing”.95 If we are to 
compare literature to conceptual art along the lines of thematic coherence then, we 
would have to admit that any such complexity that is realised in conceptual art is, as we 
might say, “external not internal to the work”.96 Lamarque will want to argue for the 
possibility of a more internal connection between the ideas and material of conceptual 
art, yet one which will not compromise the emphasis upon the idea. 
Lamarque then attempts to find another literary device, which might be said to be more 
analogous to the operation of ideas in conceptual art. This device is “poetic conceit”—
i.e. when two things that are ostensibly different come to be woven ultimately together 
by working out in details. Here, Lamarque uses the example of John Donne’s absent 
lovers, as being like legs of a compass or the sexual connotations he weaves out of a 
fleabite.97 In poetic conceit, a potentially mundane idea is weaved into a metaphor of 
endless elaboration, the details of which emerge through the literary technique and skill 
of precision of expression, image and description. Conceptual art can use snippets of 
language to aspire to something like poetic conceit. However, claims Lamarque, it is 
ultimately incapable of working out and articulating its ideas—the only conditions 
under which they would become interesting, claims Lamarque98—through such 
analogous elaboration. The central distinction that Lamarque seems to make between 
the use of ideas in literature and in conceptual art then, is that conceptual art lacks the 
resources99 to tightly develop or to “follow through” on the ideas that it posits, merely 
having the basic capacity to “suggest”. This account, it should be recognised, sits 
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comfortably with the tendency in conceptual art to place an emphasis upon spectator 
participation. 
What Lamarque takes from this diversion through the case of ideas in literature is that if 
it were true that conceptual art were trying to do something akin to literature with 
regards to the construction of its ontology, then we would have to say that it falls flat. 
Lamarque then directly concludes from this that, due to this potential inadequacy, we 
should resist thinking about the kind of separation between the perceived material 
“access” and the “work” that are common to theories about the ontology of literature. 
Instead, Lamarque claims that “to understand what is unusual and of interest in 
conceptual art it is best to hang onto something like the notion of appreciative 
experience and to recover at least some role for the visual aspects of conceptual art, thus 
returning us inevitably to perception.”100 Whilst I wholly agree with the essential point 
that Lamarque is making, the particular manner in which he arrives at it is 
unconvincing. 
Two points should be made here. Firstly, the investigation by way of a comparison with 
literature feels largely tangential. Lamarque shifts the issue at hand from the original 
investigation of comparing conceptual art to literature specifically on the grounds that 
literature is said to be non-perceptual, to a general comparison of different ways in 
which conceptual art can be considered analogous to literature, such as in the role 
played by ideas. It might well be the case that Lamarque thinks these are connected, i.e., 
that conceptual art attempts to be non-perceptual through emphasising ideas. If this 
were the case then the appeal to ideas and the subsequent suggestion that conceptual art 
might be perceptual would make more sense, but he doesn’t make this clear at any 
point. Secondly, the two reasons Lamarque gives for why conceptual art should stress 
perception at all—if, as some conceptual theory claims, the idea is paramount and what 
the object looks like is unimportant—are both normative in character. The first reason is 
(1) an idea per se is not sufficient to be art unless something is done with it—it is either 
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worked out or elaborated in an interesting manner.101 The second reason is (2) if 
conceptual art aligns itself too closely with non-perceptual art such as literature, then it 
appears an impoverished art form.102 Whilst I agree with the first point and with the 
implications that arise from it with regards to the necessity of factoring in perception, 
the second point is weak. First of all, it is not enough to say that conceptual art must be 
perceptual otherwise it would appear a diminished art form in relation to literature. An 
all too easy response to this would simply be to suggest that it in fact is a diminished art 
form and does in fact fall flat. More importantly however, it is not clear at all that 
conceptual art has pretensions to be akin to, or to align itself with, other non-perceptual 
art forms such as literature. Lamarque seems to make this analogy based purely upon 
the fact that conceptual art often uses text and thus trades upon a distinction between the 
material object and the work. However, whilst these features or tendencies might 
correspond somewhat to aspects characteristic of literature, one major distinction 
between the two seems prominent: conceptual art remains quite firmly a visual art, 
whereas literature is not. It seems to me that Lamarque could have made his point about 
the perceptual character of conceptual art much clearer and stronger by focusing his 
argument upon the way in which conceptual art, unlike literature, still largely deals in 
the production of discrete, often particularised, visual objects. This to me seems like a 
more obvious basis upon which to argue for an account of conceptual art that gives 
more consideration and centrality to the perception of material. I would like to go along 
with the direction of Lamarque’s argument for the time being, i.e., that conceptual art 
might be best understood as necessarily perceptual, and to try to draw out the 
implications of his specific theory on the character and role of the material. 
2. Experiencing Art as Art 
One factor that appears consistently of all art, says Lamarque, is that we “experience” it 
as art.103 Implicit within this claim is the idea that experience is essentially experience 
of a certain kind of thing. Experience is informed or directed by knowledge of the kinds 
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of objects we are experiencing.104 Here Lamarque appears to be offering an example of 
how the wider notion of the ‘experiential’ aspect of art is rendered subservient to the 
ideational: our experience is directed by what we know about the type of thing we are 
encountering. As Lamarque has claimed that such an ontological distinction is common 
to all art however, a further qualification is required to articulate what is particular 
about works of varying kinds. An example is seen in relation to literature. Thinking 
about literature “highlights the distinctiveness between works and texts and concerns 
the idea of a distinctive attention to or interest directed at a text (or an object more 
generally).”105 If the text is distinct from and underdetermines the work, then there must 
be a distinctive kind of attention we can have to that text, which bridges our access to 
the work. For Lamarque, in the case of literature, this constitutes a particular “kind of 
reading”.106 It appears that what Lamarque takes to be unique about conceptual art is 
that this experience of distinctive attention emerges from a knowledge, not of the kind 
of work an artwork is—a literary work or a conceptual work— but rather, of whether 
something is an artwork or not in the first place. Conceptual art trades upon this 
distinction between artworks and mere things, precisely by presenting objects for visual 
attention which raise the question of whether or not they are art. Such commonplace, 
everyday objects are generally referred to as Readymades. For Lamarque, the 
distinction raised by such examples is “pivotal” for conceptual art and one of its 
“greatest contributions”.107 
Though his ultimate objective is to show that perception is necessary to an experience 
of conceptual art as conceptual art, Lamarque prepares the path by initially trying to 
demonstrate a much weaker claim, i.e., that ‘experience’ is constitutive of the 
distinction between a work of art and a mere real thing. This claim is weaker 
specifically because the category of “experience” is a much broader and inclusive 
category than “perception”. Whilst perception seems to be defined in relation to its 
specifically material object, experience, as Lamarque explains, encompasses both 
phenomenological and intentional content. Lamarque puts forward two principles, 
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which he calls the empiricist principle and the distinctness principle.108 The empiricist 
principle states that “if there is a difference between a work and a ‘mere real thing’ or 
object (including a text) then that difference must yield, or be realizable in, a difference 
in experience.”109 The distinctness principle, which is apparently a “corollary” to the 
empiricist principle, states that “if a and b are distinct works then there is an experiential 
difference between them, when experienced correctly”. Whilst it is difficult to see how 
the second principle is supposed to follow from the first, appearing more as a parallel 
than a corollary, Lamarque seems to drop the distinctiveness principle anyway, making 
no significant further reference to it. Let’s focus upon the empiricist principle for a 
moment then. Such a difference in experience, claims Lamarque, can either take the 
form of (1) phenomenological differences, which simply seems to designate broadly 
experiential or aesthetic seeming qualities like “pleasant, disturbing, vivid” (2) 
intentional content, or (3) both. Whilst Lamarque presupposes the necessity of (2), his 
aim is to ultimately argue for (3). Lamarque wants to suggest that in the case of the 
artwork, such a difference in experience predominantly requires an experience that is 
both intentional and phenomenological. If we take John Cage, to use Lamarque’s own 
example, merely listening to ambient sounds for 4’ 33’’ does not constitute an artwork. 
I generally agree with this point. Whilst it might be argued that the tendency for 
contemporary art to try to dissolve the boundaries between art and real life—through the 
introduction of commonplace objects into galleries and the phenomenon of site-specific 
performances and non-gallery based artworks, for example—might have rendered more 
acute the capacity to have experiences of everyday situations, events and objects which 
feel specifically artistic, there still remains, I think, a distinct attentiveness to intention, 
which occurs through the actual framing of a work. Lamarque also wants to claim that 
merely proposing the idea of the piece is not an experience of the work.110 To be 
capable of experiencing the work as a whole, we must instead experience the sounds 
through the intentional direction or framework Cage sets up.  
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As Arthur Danto famously states in his essay ‘The Artworld’, “to see anything as art 
requires something that the eye cannot descry.”111 This idea is fleshed out in 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Here, Danto demonstrates how a group of 
perceptually indiscernible items could become distinct works of art that yield distinct 
experiences by way of the manner in which their titles act as an intentional direction for 
interpretation. “There is nothing particular about the kind of object that the artwork is”, 
states Danto, “which can determine it as art.”112 For Danto then, a central characteristic 
of conceptual art is that the kind of material base, object or thing used, whilst perhaps a 
necessary component of the work, always  “underdetermines”113 its work character. 
Lamarque wants to both agree with this point yet also move beyond it. For Lamarque, 
not only can the intentional direction of the title lead one to distinct experiences of 
indiscernible items—whether commonplace or artwork—but “quite possibly a different 
phenomenology”.114 These two positions are compatible for Lamarque: to experience 
art as art can both require “something that the eye cannot descry”, as well as potentially 
something that it can. Knowledge that what is perceived is a work of art and not a mere 
thing, as it were, can, according to Lamarque, alter the phenomenology of that object. 
The implication seems to be that, in the case of the Readymade, the general principle, 
which Lamarque takes to be constitutive of all art, i.e., the experience of the work of art 
as art, is centralised and rendered perceptual. What this seems to imply is that for 
conceptual art, the issue of the ontology of the artwork becomes the prominent content 
of the artistic experience, whilst what characterises conceptual art as visual art is that 
such ontological issues must present themselves perceptually. In the case of the 
conceptual artwork, the “as art” experience—the very process or operation of artworks 
that necessitates a transfiguration of the material base into a work—is revealed or 
brought to light. This requires the perception of material base as mere material base, 
otherwise the experience of the work as art could not be presented for questioning. The 
distinctive mode of attention of conceptual art is, at least partially, a perceptual attention 
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directed towards the material object. This to me makes sense of the fundamental 
difference between literature and conceptual art previously mentioned, i.e., the latter is 
specifically visual art, whilst the former is not. Lamarque’s central objective is to 
analyse the manner in which knowing that a material object—one which is perceptually 
indiscernible from an everyday object—is an artwork can affect our perception of that 
material object. This seems to pose the very interesting question of how ontology and 
perception interrelate within the distinct experience of the conceptual artwork. 
However, it must be noted that even if the empiricist principle is true, at this point in the 
text, Lamarque has demonstrated only that there must be a proper ‘experience’ of 
conceptual art as conceptual art, wherein ‘experiencing’, Lamarque admits, is a 
vague115 and inclusive category, which might involve (but is not exhausted by and does 
not require) the sub-category of perception.116 Lamarque nevertheless asserts that, 
“there must be something that counts as perceiving (or experiencing) conceptual art as 
conceptual art.”117 At this point, Lamarque is unjustified in introducing the concept of 
‘perceiving’. Lamarque seems to merely swap ‘experience’ for ‘perception’, as though 
they were interchangeable. If perception is a sub-category of experience, then arguing 
that X is the case for experience is not sufficient to show that X is the case for 
perception. By simply inverting the order of priority, such that perception is now made 
the subject of the sentence, supported by the parenthetically placed notion of 
experience, Lamarque manages to smuggle perception back into the picture without 
having argued for it. . For a convincing argument, Lamarque must either give a direct 
account of how intentional direction can affect perception, or he must offer some 
account of how his claim regarding experience relates to perception. It must be noted 
that Lamarque does not provide an adequate argument for this claim at any point in the 
text. Regardless of this, to assess whether the claim of perceptual necessity is plausible, 
it seems to me that everything rests upon what Lamarque means when he claims that the 
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intentional direction constitutive in transfiguring a mere real thing into an artwork can 
result in a different phenomenology. 
3. Perceptual Transfiguration of the Commonplace 
“My concern”, claims Lamarque, “is how perceptions are affected at a more 
fundamental level, the level at which a work is distinguished from a mere object.”118 
The question, then, is how knowing, for example, that Brillo Box119 is an artwork and 
not a brillo box, can affect our perception of the material object in front of us. Lamarque 
seems to be suggesting that the process of ontological categorising affects perception in 
a more “fundamental” way than other kinds of distinctions. In the case of conceptual 
art, the generalised formula through which we experience X as a work of art is itself 
made prominent. For Lamarque, this results in a perceptual experience. If this is correct 
then an interesting picture of conceptual art begins to emerge in which it is precisely in 
the manner in which such art affects perception at the more fundamental level of 
ontology that it is distinguished from other art. Conceptual art then would not merely be 
a perceptual art form, but an art form for which perception were a fundamental and 
constitutive component. 
But how precisely might we characterise Lamarque’s understanding of perceptual 
transfiguration? This rather crucial development in Lamarque’s text is not given any 
explicit elaboration. However, Lamarque states that when we experience what are 
otherwise everyday material objects as works of art, the objects literally seem in 
appearance to be “different from what they are”.120 This claim taken on its own sounds 
slightly mystical. Lamarque appears to be implying that what is in actual fact an 
everyday object appears as something distinct from what it is. However, Lamarque then 
qualifies this position. What it is to perceive conceptual art as conceptual art, he tells us, 
is at least partially a perception of “saliencies and significance”.121 That is to say, 
artworks must invite a kind of perception which “makes salient particular aspects and 
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suggests significance for them”.122 If they do not do this then they have failed as 
artworks, “precisely because they have failed to distinguish themselves from the things 
that are their constitutive base.”123  Though Lamarque never clarifies through empirical 
examples precisely what he means by this, he appears to be saying merely that the 
intentional direction of the title can bring to light and make prominent or conspicuous 
certain features of the object which might have gone unnoticed in our everyday 
perceptions of them. 
4. The Character and Role of Materiality 
If it is correct that perception plays a constitutive role in an experience of the conceptual 
artwork, then it follows that the material element or objects of conceptual art must 
necessarily be central to the work. It cannot be the case that the material element merely 
provides a perceptual access to the work, as Schellekens seems to think, even if this role 
is given more importance through the necessity of the artwork’s being a certain kind of 
object or thing. This is because the way in which that material element or object is 
“transfigured” perceptually must also be included as a constitutive part of the work. In 
fact, this perceptual attention to the transfigured object in Lamarque’s account seems to 
constitute something like a ‘focus of appreciation’, as it is posited as the result or end to 
which the conceptual or the intentional directs us. For an artwork to establish itself as 
an artwork requires that it distinguish itself from its constitutive base, i.e. from the 
material object presented. In the first instance then, the material is significant insofar as 
it constitutes an everyday object, that is, an object, which comes already formed from 
matter and has a certain use in a non-art context, i.e. a Readymade. In the second 
instance, the title must pick out or bring to light certain inherent features of that object: 
it must give it, as Duchamp once stated, “a new thought”.124 Finally, this thought must 
be recognised perceptually through a visual encounter with the work. However, there 
are two related problems with Lamarque’s theory. The first is that his analysis of 
conceptual art is based entirely upon an overly simplistic reduction of what a 
Readymade is and how it functions as art. The second is, despite the centrality he 
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affords the material, his account fails to draw out with adequate complexity the 
character of the phenomenal change it assumes and this is at least partly due to the 
underspecified notion of materiality in Lamarque’s account. I would now like to take 
these points in turn. 
As he makes clear, Lamarque’s analysis of conceptual art relies entirely upon what he 
calls the most “fundamental” ontological distinction, i.e., the distinction between an 
artwork and a mere real thing, which Danto brought to critical light in his investigation 
of the Readymade in Transfiguration of the Commonplace.125 It could then be argued 
that Lamarque’s account is flawed specifically because it appears to reduce conceptual 
art per se to the case of the Readymade, which, one might claim, is nothing more than a 
sub-category of conceptual art. However, whilst I recognise that not all conceptual 
artworks are Readymades, I generally agree with Lamarque’s point that the 
Readymade—and its artistic investigation into the ontological distinction—is “pivotal” 
for conceptual art, in that it was of crucial importance in the development of its logic. 
The logic of the Readymade has had a strong presence in contemporary art since the 
1960s—brought to light and popularised even further by philosophers like Danto who 
extracted from it pressing ontological questions. However, to my mind, what is 
significant about this logic, and that which carries over into conceptual art practice is 
entirely missing from Lamarque’s account. 
Lamarque characterises the significance of the Readymade through a reductive 
formulation of its character as an artwork, i.e., as a relation between one discrete 
commonplace object and one concept or idea contained within the title. By virtue of this 
reduction, a central tendency of the Readymade and, I think, of conceptual art in general 
is marginalised. This tendency is how the Readymade operates to effect a separation 
between the material base and the work, in order to provoke a perceptual encounter of 
ontological categorising, yet to do so specifically through the bringing to light of the 
full complexity of the surrounding art-historical and contextual relations that condition 
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and enfranchise something as art. This was a point made in its full complexity by Danto 
himself, albeit in a manner that rendered the entire process overly cognitive, at the 
expense of an account of how materiality itself participated in this process. Yet in 
Lamarque’s account, this complexity of the prominence of the ontological in 
Conceptual art gets reduced down into a simplistic formulation that such art attempted 
to overcome. A more sophisticated account of conceptual art needs to move beyond the 
simple formula just described and consider the ontological challenge of conceptual art 
in deeper terms. Conceptual art is not best considered as a tight relation between an 
object and an idea: it is not reducible to the mere inversion of the traditional relation 
between conceptual and perceptual. Instead—as the logic of the Readymade 
demonstrates—it is a more fundamentally ontological investigation into the conditions 
under which X is an artwork and an examination into where the artwork begins and 
where it ends. 
The second problem with Lamarque’s account concerns the way in which he 
characterises the role of material in the case of the Readymade. As we have seen, 
Lamarque’s account formulates the relation between the title and the material object as 
one in which the idea or concept in the title directs a perceptual transfiguration of the 
object by suggesting certain “saliences and significations”, i.e., by suggesting a new 
way of seeing it. Lamarque does not provide an explicit statement of whether the 
material has a positive or resistant role to play in this account, or alternatively is a 
merely passive substrate which yields to whatever cognitive direction it is given. 
However, at one point in the text he seems to suggest that the material qualities of the 
objects are significant because they must first “invite a kind of perception, which makes 
salient particular aspects and suggests significance for them”.126 It seems from this 
quote that Lamarque is gesturing towards the idea that the process is not exclusively 
unidirectional: in addition to the title directing perception, the material object must be 
capable of inviting the necessary kind of perception for conceptual significations to be 
rendered salient. However, if the role of the material, when functioning well, is to 
“invite” the significations of the title this would seem to suggest that the relation 
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between the two is a complementary and positive interaction. It does not seem to be part 
of the definition of the artwork for Lamarque that the material offers any recalcitrance 
which would secure it a role in the positive constitution of the work. 
If we take the most famous example of a Readymade, Duchamp’s Fountain, one might 
try to make sense of this idea by claiming that the material, in this case a common 
urinal, invites a perception that brings into phenomenological relief certain material 
qualities that the urinal already inherently possesses, but which typically go unnoticed 
unless pointed out. But what are these qualities? One might argue that a common urinal 
possesses qualities that can be identified as somehow reminiscent of a fountain and that 
it is these qualities that are drawn out by its title. One might then argue that an 
experience occurs in which the urinal is perceived, on some level, as a new, strange 
kind of object, a commonplace urinal with certain features reminiscent of a fountain. 
However, this does not seem to offer a convincing or very rich reading of Fountain and 
how it operates as an artwork. 
Concluding Remarks 
The significance of Lamarque’s overall account is its insistence that a perceptual 
encounter with the material presentation of the work remains constitutive of that work. 
This account thus manages to retain a recognition of the significance of conceptual art’s 
being a specifically visual form of art which predominantly involves objects produced 
for artistic presentation in a gallery. This account thus has the advantage of avoiding the 
overly strict marginalisation and instrumentalisation of the material object seen in 
Schellekens’ account, which has been demonstrated to be at a disjuncture with an 
account of how conceptual art is actually experienced. However, Lamarque’s account is 
problematic, precisely because it places too much emphasis upon the capacity of the 
cognitive processes to transfigure the material object, without an adequate account 
either of the manner in which those two elements interact, or of the positive role played 
by the material object with its particular material properties, in both formulating and 
providing recalcitrance to the concept or idea of the work. On Lamarque’s account, the 
material object appears as a rather passive substrate which can be transformed merely 
by juxtaposing it with different concepts. Such a transformation seems to consist in the 
bringing to light of certain features already inherent within the material object, which 
  
47 
typically go unnoticed. However, it is difficult to see how this unnoticed aspect for 
Lamarque is anything more than the fact that it has certain perceptual similarities to 
another more exalted object. For Lamarque, the perceptual transfiguration through 
which we experience the coming into being of the urinal, for example, as art is 
constituted by a perceptual experience in which we perceive how it is possible to see a 
urinal as a fountain. 
Part Three: Embodiment 
Introduction 
In his article, ‘Whatever Happened to “Embodiment”? The Eclipse of Materiality in 
Danto’s Ontology of Art,’127 Diarmuid Costello suggests that, in so far as art practice 
remains a domain within which particular material objects, entities, or events are 
produced or presented, materiality must be afforded a more positive and constitutive 
role in the ontology of the artwork. As the title suggests, this text is a response to Arthur 
Danto’s ontology of art, as set out in Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Costello’s 
main argument is that, despite his description of works of art as “embodied meanings”, 
Danto’s ontology of art fails to take the fact of embodiment seriously,128 because it gives 
insufficient attention to how materiality can rebound and impact upon intention and 
interpretation.129 Costello effectively identifies Danto’s ontology as unidirectional: it 
places too much emphasis upon the power of cognitive processes—i.e., in this case, 
intention and interpretation—to simply “transfigure” the material object into an artwork. 
As a result, thinks Costello, “works of art tend to be rendered diaphanous by Danto’s 
actual analyses of them”, in that their semantic content is “extracted from its material 
host in such a way as to make whatever meaning they are held to embody amenable to 
paraphrase”. If works of art could be reduced to the “meaning-intentions” of the artist, 
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they would amount to little more than a “peculiarly indirect, encumbered and obscure 
form of utterance” as opposed to “works of art, properly so-called.”130 
However, a distinguishing feature of art, thinks Costello, is that its meaning exceeds any 
determinate intention that might have motivated it. For Costello, even in the case of 
more “cognitive” kinds of art, or art that is “governed at a higher level by intentional, 
and hence necessarily cognitive considerations (e.g to communicate x or represent 
y),”131 something must distinguish those works from mere statements of intent. Whilst a 
common question that emerges when faced with a work of contemporary art is “what 
might have moved someone to produce that? Or, what could something like this 
mean—as art?”, it is not the case that an adequate or desirable response to such art 
would be to merely answer this question.132 An experience of art does not simply 
exhaust itself in deriving an accurate interpretation of the artistic intention but, crucially 
for Costello, there persists a dimension that “engages and sustains our interpretive 
interest.”133 To take the fact of embodiment seriously, claims Costello, requires an 
account of how material particularities of the work can both “enrich” and “constrain” 
the cognitive components of intention and interpretation. As we have seen, a problem 
with Lamarque’s theory was his failure to give an account of the manner in which the 
specificities of the material properties of the object might be capable of setting certain 
limits for the cognitive or intentional aspect of the work. It is my contention that 
Costello’s argument takes us one step beyond that of Lamarque’s, since it proposes that 
materiality both grounds cognitive processes—i.e., intention and interpretation—but 
also resists or is recalcitrant to them. 
Such an account is potentially beneficial, as it disallows the construal of the material as 
a mere “prompt” through which we access the work—as Schellekens would have it. 
Instead, materiality is that which engages our interpretation and then sustains that 
engagement, through its being in excess of any easily identifiable or ultimate intention. 
Neither then, can the material be a mere “vehicle”, i.e., that which merely carries or 
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transmits the intended meaning. Instead, the material element of the work has a positive 
and active role in the constitution of the work: it “renders meaning sufficiently opaque 
to engage, and then sustain, our interpretative interest in the first place.”134For Costello, 
implicit within the definition of art is the idea that it generally involves non-cognitive 
excess. “There is always something in works that cannot be rationally accounted for”, 
claims Costello, “that, so to speak, is there, though not because the artist put it there”.135 
Despite this claim, Costello’s specific formulation of the positive and significant role of 
the material hinges upon his centralisation of the process of artistic labour. It is for 
Costello the process through which artworks are made which can come to constrain how 
they function semantically.136 
My line of analysis will be the following. Due to the problems which emerged from 
Schellekens’ attempt to render the material marginal in the case of conceptual art, I 
would like to take seriously Costello’s central claim. The claim is that, in most cases, 
when artists continue to produce and exhibit materialised artworks—even those of an 
explicitly intellectual kind, such as conceptual art—the meaning of the work cannot be 
identical with an intention implanted in it by an individual artist. Instead, a consequence 
of embodiment is that there emerges a certain material recalcitrance which prevents the 
work from being reducible to the simple communication of an artistic idea, concept or 
intention. However, I identify a problem with the specific manner in which Costello 
characterises this material recalcitrance, i.e., as the result of the “sedimentation” of the 
“affective responses” of the artist to the labour process. 
By centralising the labour process of the artist, and by associating recalcitrance with 
“the sensuous, affective or intuitive responses” of the artist to the way in which their 
materials “look, sound or read” as they are being made, Costello’s account is rendered 
inadequate to an analysis of the “non-cognitive” recalcitrance of the material in the case 
of conceptual art more specifically. As a result of this emphasis, I will argue, the 
“corrective” element of Costello’s ontology ends up seeming somewhat expressionist. 
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Whilst I will note that “expressionism” and “conceptualism” are not opposed per se, 
Costello’s focus upon the “affective” dimension, which occurs through the 
“manipulation of materials” seems too close to the kind of “expressionism” that 
conceptual art attempted to eradicate: the expression of the inner feelings of the artist-
subject. Such focus distorts conceptual art and is unable to provide a convincing 
account of for how material might be recalcitrant in such work. I would like to analyse 
the distinct problems that emerge and to see whether there might, nevertheless, be a way 
of holding onto the claim of the significance and recalcitrance of the material. 
1. The Question of Conceptual Art 
Before we look closer at Costello’s argument it is important to note that, unlike the texts 
by Schellekens and Lamarque, this article is not explicitly about conceptual art. Instead, 
as Danto’s before him, Costello is concerned with what he considers to be the “general 
conditions”137of art per se. Costello chooses to focus upon one specific condition of art, 
on account of its ostensible absence from Danto’s ontology: that artworks are 
“generally made from, and so inhere in, a material substrate invested with artistic 
significance through a distinctive kind of activity.”138 Thus Costello views his article as 
offering a “corrective”139 to Danto’s general ontology of art. However, whether 
conceptual art is supposed to be fully implied by, or is instead exceptional to this 
corrective as to the general conditions of art is not entirely clear. It in fact seems to 
occupy an ambiguous position within Costello’s theory. 
Prior to setting out the main body of his theory, Costello makes reference to Richard 
Wollheim’s critique of Danto.140 Wollheim finds Danto’s ontology of art problematic 
because it attempts to extrapolate what Wollheim considers to be exceptional cases, e.g. 
Danto’s hypothetical gallery of indiscernibles and the Readymade, into a general theory 
of art. For Wollheim, to generalise exceptional cases of artworks, and thus reconcile 
them with the general assumptions of art, is to falsify the concept of art. This is because 
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exceptional cases in fact have a place within the concept of art as exceptional 
specifically because “art”, characteristically, has “indeterminate grounds for its 
applicability” and only “broad assumptions” can be made of it.141 Wollheim thinks there 
are two main assumptions that must hold for something to be art: that a work of art can 
be distinguished from a thing, and that two works can be distinguished from each 
other.142 However, as Costello points out, the fact that artworks exist, which do not 
adhere to either one or both of these assumptions—i.e., Duchamp’s Bottle Rack, (1914) 
or Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans (1981)—does not destabilise the 
assumptions.143 To generalise exceptional cases is to deprive those cases of what is 
distinct about them—i.e., that their artistic identity often relies on their being 
understood as test cases for, or the vanishing point of, general assumptions—as much as 
it is to deprive the general assumptions of any sense.144 For Wollheim, what is possible 
in the individual case may only be so because it is not possible in general.145 
Costello’s relatively lengthy reference to Wollheim’s argument, together with his use of 
what could be considered broadly conceptual works to exemplify it—Bottle Rack and 
After Walker Evans—implies that Costello thinks certain conceptual artworks might 
constitute exceptional cases. This need not be a problem. However, if conceptual art as 
a whole or even for the most part proved marginal to Costello’s general conditions of 
art, then Costello would not have produced the “adequate” ontology he was seeking, but 
a rather limited and conservative one. And, since the contemporary art world as a whole 
has little problem recognising conceptual artworks as art, and that such works—broadly 
conceived—have constituted a significant part of art practices for the last 40-50 years, 
the burden of proof would surely be on any philosophy that held conceptual art, at this 
point in history, to represent an exception to a general definition of art. For Costello’s 
“corrective” to be a sufficient responsive to Danto’s ontology of art, it must be capable 
of engaging with and encompassing at least a large amount of conceptual art, broadly 
conceived, such as the Readymade. This is because Danto’s ontology, though indeed 
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general, was nevertheless derived specifically from a study of the unique considerations 
brought to light by Pop art and the Readymade in particular.146 If Costello’s account 
could not engage with these kinds of works adequately, then it would not in fact be a 
corrective in any significant sense, but a mere add-on or perhaps even a counter-
example. Whilst Costello does not make his position clear on this issue, it seems that he 
at least wishes to leave open as a possibility that his “corrective” element—that art 
generally inheres in and is an artistically manipulated material—can in fact apply to 
conceptual works, and even to those cases such as the Readymade. This seems apparent 
by the way that Costello’s examples include works by Marcel Duchamp and Lawrence 
Weiner to suggest that they too might involve a form of “opacity” to meaning, which is 
perhaps explicable in the same manner as more traditional art.147 
2. The Centralisation of Artistic Labour 
Costello chooses to focus on one particular element, which he feels is “underplayed” in 
Danto’s ontology of art: artistic labour.148 Costello’s aim is to demonstrate that it is 
specifically through the process in which an artwork is made from a certain material 
that artworks resist being merely a form of cognitive communication, such as the 
communication of an intention. There are three discrete yet related points which I 
consider central to Costello’s argument concerning the centralisation of artistic labour. 
(1) An artwork “(generally) comes into being” by being made.149 (2) In the case of an 
artwork, “being made” generally means the “manipulation of some set of materials”. (3) 
Through this process of manipulating materials, the artist has a “non-cognitive” and 
“non-goal oriented”, that is to say a “sensuous, affective and intuitive”, response to the 
process of making itself—to how the resulting work “looks, sounds or reads as it is 
being made”—which becomes “sedimented” in the work. I would like to now analyse 
                                                
146 See Zoe Sutherland, ‘Interview with Arthur Danto’ in Naked Punch Review, January 2009.  
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148 Costello. (2007) P87 
149 This is a point that Costello considers to be missing from Danto’s ontology of art. Costello thinks that 
by virtue of Danto’s central metaphor of “transfiguration”, i.e., the idea that mere real things are 
transfigured into artworks through interpretation, he underplays the labour involved in the making and 
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these points one at a time in relation to the specific case of conceptual art in order to see 
what particular problems might arise. 
a. Artworks are made 
Costello’s first claim is that works “(generally) come into being” by being made. Whilst 
this might seem at first glance to be a rather banal truism, it is not an entirely 
superfluous assertion to make about conceptual art. This is because a small number of 
artists have stated in their manifestos that with conceptual art, the work is the idea, and 
as such, it does not necessitate realisation.150 In short, some conceptual artists claim that 
artworks in fact do not come into being by being “made”, in any conventional sense of 
the word. Artists such as Sol LeWitt have claimed to have actually created, i.e., 
conceived of works, which need not and will not ever be materialised.151 Robert Barry 
has stated that he is unsure whether or not his piece Electromagnetic Energy Field 
(1968) actually exists, as its “intensity” is so “low”.152 There are two responses one 
could make to such statements. It could be permitted that such hypothetical, i.e., non-
realised works somehow exist, but that such works constitute an example of the kind of 
exceptional case that Wollheim identified. This would, however, imply the assumption 
that works could be mere ideas, or electromagnetic energy fields, for example. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that they do not exist, except at the level of theory.153 
One might then point to the ostensible disjuncture between conceptual art theory and 
practice and acknowledge that, despite their provocative claims to the contrary, those 
same artists, for the most part, continue to produce and exhibit in some materialised 
mode of presentation as part of their art practice. In this way, the claim that artworks 
generally come into being by being made, i.e., realised or materialised, could be said to 
be inclusive of conceptual art and does not necessitate the latter being rendered 
exceptional. 
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However, for this claim to be adequate to the specific case of conceptual art, it would 
require a broad and inclusive notion of what it is for an artwork to “be made”. Even if 
one wishes to deny that artworks can be mere ideas, it is a fact that conceptual art 
emerged within of a context comprised of the “deskilling” of art education and the (so-
called) “dematerialisation” of art practice.154 Such tendencies can be identified as 
present as early as the 1910s with Dadaism and in Duchamp’s investigation into “social 
codes and values” inherent in attitudes towards labour and creativity.155 The individual 
artist-subject was being decentralised from the process of “making” the artwork in any 
conventional sense, and conceptual artists employed various techniques in pursuing 
investigations into what this could entail and what the artistic implications were. These 
techniques include, but are not exhausted by, the following tendencies. The first 
tendency is the marginalisation or even elimination of the hand of the artist by relying 
on the skills of other productive labourers such as craftsmen to make the work.156 Such 
a division of labour is ubiquitous within conceptual art. For example, in Untitled (1973) 
Michael Asher employed a team to sandblast the ceiling and walls of a private Milan 
gallery, to expose the underlying plaster. However, such a division of labour was not 
only present when specialist workforces were needed: conceptual artists merely 
producing objects for the gallery also employed others to perform their execution. Sol 
LeWitt, for example, typically sent his sculptural works to be fabricated by 
professionals.157 The second tendency is the exhibition of found objects, often of an 
industrially produced and typically functional character. The first found object 
presented as art was, of course, Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel (1913).158 However, this 
strategy carried over into conceptual art practice. An example would be Joseph 
Kosuth’s A Two Metre Square Sheet of Glass to Lean Against the Wall, (1965), which 
                                                
154See Michael Petry, The Art of Not Making: The New Artist/Artisan Relationship, (Thames & Hudson, 
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155 Petry. (2011) P7. Petry contextualises this investigation as a reaction against the old hierarchical 
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consists of an industrial, two-metre sheet of glass, leant against the wall. The third 
tendency is the appropriation of the artworks of others. Robert Rauschenberg famously 
employed this technique in his work Erased de Kooning, (1953)—a precursor to 
conceptual art—when de Kooning deliberately gave Rauschenberg a heavily marked 
drawing to laboriously erase. Peter Osborne has interpreted this in part as a specific 
“refusal” on the part of Rauschenberg of the connotations of expressionism.159 Certain 
conceptualists took up this technique of appropriation. For example, Marcel 
Broodthaers’s work Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard, (1969), is comprised of 
a book of Mallarmé’s poems in which certain words are replaced with thick black lines, 
such that the meaning of words is reconfigured through their spatial and typographic 
relations on the page.160 This exemplifies a destabilisation of conventional artistic skills 
as grounding any definition of artistic authorship and demonstrates the idea of art as a 
kind of art-historical palimpsest. 
What such tendencies exemplify is that conceptual art practice constitutes an 
investigation, not merely into what can and cannot be permitted as art,161 but also into 
how something can become art. To construe an account that emphasises the individual 
artist’s process of making as central to the “coming into being” of the conceptual 
artwork thus necessitates an expansive notion of what it is for the artist to “make” a 
work of art, such that it is able to incorporate a whole range of practices such as 
nomination, conception and performance. In addition to this it would require the 
recognition that the process of “making”, more traditionally conceived, was no longer 
primarily carried out by the artists themselves. 
b. Artistic Labour as the Manipulation of Materials 
With this in mind, Costello’s second point—i.e. that for an artwork to “be made” 
generally means the “manipulation of some set of materials”—looks like it is going to 
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be problematic. At first glance, this appears to be a rather conventional definition of 
artistic making, which instantly brings to mind the process of sculpting, i.e. shaping and 
transforming material with the hands, more particularly. To be capable of encompassing 
conceptual art it would need to be clarified how either the less conventional materials of 
such art, and/or the decentralisation of the artist as maker, could be accommodated by 
this definition. Whilst Costello does not explicitly elaborate on this, various points of 
the article indicate that he at least wants to leave room for the possibility of a more 
inclusive notion of the process of making. Firstly, qualifying that the making of art 
requires “some set of” materials, implies the category of “materials” is open and is thus 
capable of incorporating a range of distinct kinds. Secondly, Costello informs us that he 
has selected the term “artistically worked material” to avoid the “conservative 
assumptions” triggered by the word “medium”.162 A bit later, Costello appears to offer 
an example of what such “conservative” assumptions might involve, when he notes that 
Duchamp’s Fountain has not been worked upon “in any traditional sense, i.e. it has not 
been ‘worked by hand’”.163 This would then suggest that the category of “artistically 
worked materials” is in fact not limited merely to the manipulation of a material with 
the artists’—or anybody else’s—hands. 
The possibility is left open, by virtue of these qualifications, that Costello’s 
identification of the process of making with the manipulation of materials could in fact 
be applied to conceptual artworks, which, as we have seen, often decentralise 
conventional forms of artistic labour, or at least distance them from the role of the artist. 
However, in this case, Costello would need a nuanced account of what can count as a 
“material” and what it is for an artist to “manipulate” them, both of which are largely 
missing from his article. In the face of such an absence of elaboration, there are certain 
works of conceptual art that would clearly seem to problematise this emphasis. For 
example, it would be difficult to identify precisely what constitutes the material in a 
work such as Robert Barry’s Inert Gas Series (1969), such that artist could be said to 
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have “manipulated” them. In this work—if we emphasise the artistic process of 
making—Barry released 2 cubic feet of helium into the Californian desert and, keen to 
get away with as minimal presentation as he could,164 presented to the gallery a short 
textual description of his action. As Barry has explained, the gallery often insisted upon, 
and went as far as to supply themselves, a photograph to accompany his texts, as a 
means of rendering the work more exhibit friendly.165 Again, we see here the 
distribution of artistic labour. As it is implausible to try to argue that the text—literally a 
single sentence description—constitutes the “manipulation of a set of materials” in any 
significant sense, it might lead one to the conclusion that the artist’s materials are 
something other than the text. If we were to take the artist at his word, we would say 
that the work’s material is neither the text, nor the photograph, but is instead the inert 
gas itself, which he released into the atmosphere of the Californian Desert.166 However, 
I think that to take such a claim seriously is to miss the strategic component of the 
artist’s claims and to subsequently miss the irony of the work. As I have already 
suggested, there exists a tendency in conceptual art to decentralise the artist from any 
interaction with conventional forms of making and conventional materials. By 
performing a refusal to engage with any material, other than of a completely minimal 
and impersonal nature, Barry investigates the bare minimum ontological conditions that 
an artwork needs to exist. In doing so, he forces particular conditions to come forward: 
in this case, the requirements for comfortable institutional viewing. 
However, even if we went along with Barry, and took him at his word that the inert gas 
was indeed the material element of the work, it would still need to be established in 
what sense could we say that Barry had manipulated his materials. It is clearly not by 
feeling or shaping the gas, or rendering it malleable by use of the hands. As we have 
already seen though, this is not a problem for Costello, as his account does not tie itself 
to such a definition. We might then claim that Barry has “manipulated” the gas by 
                                                
164 “I sort of start first of all with the idea of no presentation…And then I say, well, the next step, what is 
the least amount of presentation I can get away with?” Robert Barry. (ed.) Norvell. (2001) P90 
165 Barry. (ed.) Norvell. (2001) P91 
166 “I did a show for Seth [Siegelaub] where the material was inert gas, which is odourless and colourless 
and imperceptible.” (ed.) Norvell. (2001) P89. In the same interview, Barry also refers to “mental energy” 
as a “medium”. P90 
 
  
58 
skilfully controlling it, through releasing it into an environment with which he knew it 
would not mix. However, this doesn’t seem right either. Since it is the very nature of 
the gas not to be reactive, neither Barry’s intention, nor his act of releasing the gas 
could be considered to be a “manipulation”. In a sense, Barry’s relation to his 
materials—if we believe those materials to be gas—can be considered the opposite of 
manipulative. As Barry himself explains, he works with materials “without imposing 
my will, or, as much as possible, imposing some preconceived system on them. I guess 
I’m sort of a phenomenologist in the sense that ‘being’, sort of reveals itself.”167 
c. The Affective Response to Materials in the Artistic Process 
Costello’s third point is, I think, considerably more problematic in the case of 
conceptual art. Costello claims that “through the process of manipulating materials, the 
artist’s sensuous, affective and intuitive responses to the process of making itself—to 
how the resulting work looks, sounds or reads as it is being made—impacts upon, or 
becomes “sedimented” in the work”.168 This is true, thinks Costello, “whether the 
material is a sanctioned medium such as paint on canvas, novel juxtapositions of old 
bicycle parts, pixels in a computer-manipulated photograph, the creation of large-scale 
environments, the arrangement of shop-bought items of display shelves, or the bare 
nomination of objects as art.”169 It is difficult to clarify precisely what Costello means 
by the artist’s “sensuous, affective and intuitive responses”, but broadly this seems to 
designate that which is in excess of the strictly cognitive and intentional or “goal-
oriented” relations that the artist has to the material. Bearing in mind what we have 
already discovered about the artist’s process of making in conceptual art, this creates 
various difficulties.  
If we take the example of Duchamp’s 50cc of Paris Air (1920), the problem of artistic 
authorship in conceptual art re-emerges. Duchamp asked a pharmacist to empty a bottle 
containing ‘physiological serum’ and took the bottle to a glassblower to be blown into a 
shape. Duchamp then sent the bottle to Walter Arsenberg, the major collector of 
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Duchamp’s work,170 claiming that he had sent him something that his money could not 
buy: the Parisian air. Whilst Duchamp might very well have had an “affective” response 
to the process of making this work, any attempts to make Costello’s claim work for this 
example feel rather strained. First of all, it is difficult to see what precisely the material 
might be, such that one could claim that Duchamp’s responses were to the way in which 
such material ‘looked, sounded or read’ whilst he was making the work. We might 
claim that Duchamp had “affective” responses to watching the pharmacist or the 
glassblower’s interaction with the making process, but this does not seem to be what 
Costello has in mind, as he insists that the artist responds specifically to his own process 
of manipulation of such materials. More significantly, it is difficult to see how 
Duchamp’s non-cognitive responses to the making of this work could possibly “impact” 
upon it in any significant manner, or become “sedimented” in the work, as is suggested 
by Costello. It is not entirely clear to me precisely what Costello means when he says 
that such responses become “sedimented” in the material form of the artwork, yet it 
does seem that Costello believes that, once “sedimented”, these responses appear in 
some manner, i.e., that sedimentation of the affective and intuitive response of the artist 
become visible or can be perceived. Of Lawrence Weiner’s A 36” Square Removal to 
the Lathing or Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, 1969, (1969), 
Costello claims that it is the “the specific perceptible qualities of the materials in which 
[the work’s] meaning is embodied, and how those materials affect us”,171 which 
constitute and complicate that part of a work’s identity which is in tension with its 
cognitive or intentional content. This, for Costello, “mirrors” the affective response of 
the artist. If the affective response of the artist must become perceptible, it is difficult to 
see what “sedimentation” might mean in the case of Duchamp’s 50cc of Paris Air. 
In a further attempt to make Costello’s argument work, we might instead claim that the 
bottle displays certain patterns—in fact, distinctly cartographic patterns, rather 
reminiscent of an old map—due to traces of ‘physiological serum’ that were left in the 
                                                
170 Walter Arsenberg collected 40 works of Duchamp’s between 1915-1950. See Ecke Bonk, (Trans.) 
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bottle by the pharmacist. This might be the result of the pharmacist’s “non-cognitive” 
response to their part of the process of making the work, i.e., the act of emptying the 
bottle. It is quite plausible that the glassblower might be responsible for admitting into 
the work his or her “affective” responses. One might then argue that those conceptual 
works made specifically through a collective division of distinct kinds of labour might 
bear affective traces in their material which the artist did not put there. This would 
create an account on which the artist might be cast as operating the controlled or 
intentional dimension, whose rational calculations are simultaneously “enriched” or 
“restricted” by the craftsman and his relation to the materials. The meaning of 50cc of 
Paris Air could not then be reducible to Duchamp’s intention to have this work made 
and to send it to Walter Arsenberg, or to send a bourgeois art collector one thing that his 
money could not buy. Instead, the meaning of the work is necessarily “enriched” and 
“restricted” through the non-cognitive impact of the craftsman. Such an idea, as it 
happens, might even chime with an artist like Duchamp, who was, after all, notoriously 
interested in inserting “chance” and contingency into more precise and controlled 
systems of production.172 However, to read Costello’s account in this manner, I think, 
would be to go beyond the remit of this particular text, which insists that the artwork 
“comes into being” through a kind of tension between the cognitive and non-cognitive 
processes of the artist with their materials specifically. The “sensuous, affective, and 
intuitive” response which Costello thinks operates in resistance to the cognitive, goal-
oriented intentions of the artist, is, for Costello, the response of that artist. Whatever the 
artist tries to communicate emerges in part through their relation to their materials. In 
the absence of an elaboration as to what the “manipulation of materials” might mean for 
conceptual artworks more specifically, and through focusing upon the “the sensuous, 
affective or intuitive responses” of the artist to the way in which their materials “look, 
sound or read” as they are being made, Costello’s account seems slightly too anchored 
within a conventional understanding of art making to be able to accommodate most 
conceptual art. 
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IV: Expressionism and Conceptual Art 
Costello’s attempt to re-emphasise the “the sensuous, affective or intuitive responses” 
of the artist to the way in which their materials “look, sound or read” as they are being 
made—his “corrective”—could, to a large extent, be construed as the reinstatement of 
an element of “expressionism” in the ontology of art.173 Costello’s is, as we have seen, 
responding to Arthur Danto’s ontology of art, as laid out in Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace. In a separate text entitled, ‘Danto and Kant, Together at Last?’174 
Costello refers to Danto, (and to Kant), as a “proponent of expressionism in the 
philosophy of art.”175 Now, of course, Danto’s ontology of art in Transfiguration is not 
about art as “expressionism” in any conventional sense of the term, i.e., as the gestural 
expression of an inner feeling, typically associated with German Romanticism and with 
Abstract Expressionism.176 Instead, Danto is a proponent of expressionism, thinks 
Costello, in the sense that he considers works of art to “embody, and thereby express, 
the mental states (broadly construed to encompass beliefs, attitudes and feelings) of 
those that created them and, if successful, to dispose their viewers to a similar state.”177 
It might be argued, therefore, that in re-emphasising the affective dimension of the 
manipulation of materials, Costello is reinstating a role for a more sensuous and 
materially-located expressionism within what have come to be considered 
predominantly cognitive forms of art. 
One might think that any appeal whatsoever to expressionism in the formulation of an 
account of conceptual art would be misguided, due to the fact that many conceptual 
                                                
173 An analogy might be made at this point between Costello’s “corrective” element and R.G. 
Collingwood’s theory of art as expression. In distinction from craft, whereby the craftsman crucially must 
have a very precise idea of what he wants to make before he makes it, the artist becomes conscious of and 
individuates or substantiates to the point of clarity, what it is that he is trying to express, through the 
process of making it. See R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1938)  
174 Diarmuid Costello, ‘Danto and Kant, Together at Last?’ In (ed.) Stock, K & Thompson-Jones, K, New 
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artists set out to evacuate all traces of the emotional, the affective and the subjective 
from their work. Sol LeWitt has claimed how, “to work with a plan that is pre-set is one 
way of avoiding subjectivity,”178 and suggested that conceptual artists usually want their 
work to be “emotionally dry”.179 However, as the October writer Isabelle Graw has 
pointed out, “conceptualism” and “expressionism” need not be entirely polarised 
terms.180 Whilst it is the case that most conceptual artists sought to erase a specific form 
of “expression”—i.e., the ex-pression of an internal and inchoate emotion or feeling of 
the artist181—in order to curb the importance of subjective authorship, this does not 
entail that such art is not expressive.182 In fact, even the most ostensibly inexpressive 
conceptual works, claims Graw, are not entirely devoid of expression.183 Works such as 
Wall Drawings by Sol LeWitt, which employ conceptual forms of planning—i.e., the 
imposition of a “system”, which then apparently makes the artistic decisions—can 
exhibit what Graw calls a “residual expression”.184 But what precisely does Graw mean 
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1980s and 1990s and even up to the current period. As Julian Stallabrass has claimed of the Young 
British Artists, while the means by which art is pursued are “steadily less expressive of the artists 
personality, more reliant on conventional ideas than feelings, more the assemblage of ready-made 
elements than the creation of organic compositions, the personality of the artist, far from shrinking, has 
greatly expanded, sometimes overshadowing the work. Furthermore, the very fact that artists do very 
little to their material but nevertheless garner huge rewards leads to a fascination with the artist as an 
individual.” See Julian Stallabrass, High Art Lite, (Verso Books, London, 1999). 
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184 Isabelle Graw. (2006) P121. Sol LeWitt is an example of an artist who notoriously favoured such 
“system-based” conceptual procedures, as a way of avoiding the expression of his artistic subjectivity. 
See Paragraphs on Conceptual Art. (1969) 
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by the term “residual expression” and how does this relate to Costello’s notion of 
“sedimentation”? 
There appear to be two distinct kinds of “residual expression” which Graw thinks can 
occur in conceptual works. The first kind of “residual expression” is an unavoidable, 
minimal level of aesthetic or formal preference, inherent within the selection of all 
presentational modes, artistic practices or processes. Through merely choosing an 
artistic procedure, even if that procedure is a “system”, the artist simply cannot avoid 
expressing some personal predilection or enthusiasm for a specific form or style.185 This 
is a familiar argument, one that is often used as a corrective to Duchamp’s claim that the 
basis upon which he chose the urinal for his work Fountain, was that it was 
aesthetically indifferent. In this case, “expression” is not the externalisation of a deep 
emotional state or feeling of the subject, but ostensibly a rather accidental confession of 
a preference for certain styles. The distinction between, for example, Abstract 
Expressionism and conceptual art on the issue of this first notion of expression then, 
might be related to intention. Whilst a central objective of Abstract Expressionism 
might be to express the emotional, intuitive and psychological state of the artist, any 
such expression that occurs in conceptual art is truly “residual” to the artistic process, 
and not a fundamental component of the process itself. 
The second kind of “residual expression” Graw identifies is not concerned with the 
artist-subject at all, and Graw seems to refer to it as a means of demonstrating that 
“expressionism” does not require the centrality of an expressive subject: even the most 
seemingly objective processes can have expressive possibilities. To take an example of 
an artwork used by Graw herself, in Variations Piece No. 34 (1970), Douglas Huebler 
photographed a variety of people’s faces immediately after telling them that they were 
“pretty”. Each facial expression that was captured stood as a confession as to what 
effect compliments of this sort had on people. In Graw’s eyes, this artwork examined “a 
sort of phenomenology of expression under the conditions of a celebrity culture 
characterised by a generalisation of the Culture Industry in which vacuous compliments 
                                                
185 Isabelle Graw. (2006) P124 
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are liberally dispensed.”186 For Graw, what is expressed is in no significant or 
fundamental way anything about the artist, but instead, constitutes an expression of the 
“circumstances” that the work sets up, and the manner in which those circumstances 
frame or allow the “expression” of wider social conditions.187 Another example Graw 
draws upon is John Baldessari’s The Back of all Trucks Passed While Driving From Los 
Angeles to Santa Barbara, California, Sunday 20 Janurary, 1963. (1963). Baldessari 
photographed a range of trucks from the back, but at slightly different angles. Each one, 
in some way, resembled a face.  
The fact that Graw uses multiple examples wherein the “expressionist” content of the 
work is designated by the fact that the work represents or gestures towards facial 
expressions is, I think, quite problematic and misleading, as it implies that her theory 
can be reduced down into a crude notion of expressionism in conceptual art.188 If all it 
means for conceptual art to be capable of containing expressionist tendencies is that 
some works contain or allude to human facial gestures, it would seem that the 
dichotomy between “expressionism” and “conceptualism” had not really been 
challenged in the manner initially claimed in Graw’s text. In the place of an expression 
of the inner feelings of the artist-subject, expressionism on this account would be 
reducible to either the literal facial expression of someone other than the artist, as in the 
case of Huebler’s Variations Piece No. 34, or the rather gestural examples of the 
expression of human faces, which can be found to be contained within inanimate 
objects, such as the trucks in Baldessari’s piece, The Back of all Trucks Passed While 
Driving From Los Angeles to Santa Barbara, California, Sunday 20 Janurary, 1963. To 
my mind, by choosing mostly examples such as these, Graw is in danger of obscuring 
what is interesting about her argument, i.e., the claim that “expressionism” does not 
require a subject and that even the most seemingly dry and objective processes can have 
                                                
186 Isabelle Graw. (2006) P130 
187 Isabelle Graw. (2006) P130 
188 Another example that Graw uses is of Adrian Piper’s Catalysis (1970), where Piper walked the streets 
wearing a T-shirt with “Wet Paint” written with wet paint. In Graw’s eyes, this is “expressionist” 
specifically because “any bodily movement is thus transmuted into a painterly gesture, provoking 
reactions from passers-by. This work engages, so to speak, in “expressology” by calling upon bystanders’ 
radically motivated fears of contact, translating them into the code of painting, and thus rendering them 
visible.” (2006) P122  
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expressive possibilities. This particular idea would perhaps be more capable of 
encapsulating what would need to be distinct about “expressionism” in its relation to 
“conceptualism”. 
The most central and significant point that Graw is making is, I believe, that if 
conceptual art can be said to display a “residual expression”, then such residue is more 
accurately to be understood as an expression of more objective “circumstances” and of 
non-subject-centred processes of artistic making. Expression in conceptual art could not 
be predominantly expression of the internal emotions or intuitions of the artist-subject, 
but, crucially, neither is it the response of the artist to the process or procedure, even of 
more conceptual forms of making. For Costello’s account to be capable of 
accommodating this idea, it would need to abandon its commitment to understanding 
the “sedimentation” of “non-cognitive” and “non-goal oriented” responses to material 
as the result of the response of the artist to the way such materials “look, sound or read” 
during the process of making. This is because, whilst Costello’s account of the 
“manipulation of some set of materials” might be capable of referring to more 
conceptually-controlled processes of making, such as the imposition of “systems”, it is 
misleading for a theory that wishes to accommodate the distinct case of conceptual art 
to claim that it is the artist’s affective responses to such systems, which become, in any 
way, a significant residue in the work. 
The Material Revisited 
As I have demonstrated, adhering to an account which centralises the “manipulation of 
materials” by the artist-subject raises problems for and is, I think, ultimately inadequate 
to conceptual art. This does not necessarily mean that conceptual works are entirely 
devoid of affective dimensions. However, if such dimensions can still be said to be 
present in the conceptual work, it might be the case that they are better understood—
along the lines of Graw’s thesis—as the “residual expression” of the context or 
circumstances that the work sets up. What is clear however, is that to posit the 
“affective response” of the artist to how the materials “look, sound or read” as they are 
being manipulated is not convincing. The question then is whether Costello’s original 
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point—that the artwork is not reducible to the transmission of an intended meaning,189 
because the materiality of the work not only grounds and sustains, but offers resistance 
to both intention and interpretation—might still apply to such art generally. For this to 
be possible would require a notion of material “resistance” which is different from that 
of the “sedimentation” of the “affective response” of the artist to the materials through 
the process of making the work. Costello’s claim that “there is always something in 
works that cannot be rationally accounted for—that, so to speak, is there, though not 
because the artist puts it there,”190 must perhaps be taken in its strongest formulation, 
i.e., that which cannot be accounted for is not best understood as the response of an 
artist-subject at all, either a “cognitive” or an “affective” response. 
Towards the end of his text, Costello turns his attention away from intention and the 
process of making and more towards the issue of interpretation. Costello’s main point is 
this: just as an artist’s intention is necessary but not sufficient to make what he or she 
produces art, so, correspondingly, interpretation is necessary but not sufficient to treat 
what he or she has produced as art.” The material form itself, in which meaning or 
intention is embedded, occasions an “affective dimension” and it is due to this fact that 
the work can “elicit” and “sustain” interpretation in the first place. Significantly for 
Costello, such an “affective dimension” occasioned by the material form itself is 
capable, not merely of embodying meaning, but of resisting it by rendering it opaque,191 
hence, I presume, the interpretive sustenance: the implication is that we retain an 
interpretive interest in the work precisely because we cannot render its interpretation 
transparent.192 
To illustrate this point, Costello takes as his example Lawrence Weiner’s A 36” Square 
Removal to the Lathing or Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, (1969). 
He selects this work specifically because he feels that it consists, in many respects, of 
exactly what the title describes,193 i.e., it is ostensibly identical to its concept or 
intention. The question, then, becomes what it is precisely about the work which 
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192 Costello. (2007) P89 
193 Costello. (2007) P89 
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disallows a simple identification between interpretation and meaning. For Costello, 
there seem to be two central drives in the work. Firstly, there is the process of 
interpretation, which attempts to arrive at a work’s meaning. Costello describes this by 
reference to what Danto calls an ‘enfranchising theory’, which positions and legitimates 
an artwork historically in its relation to other works and to the historical trajectory of art 
more generally. Such interpretation secures the work a certain historical particularity. 
Secondly, there is the grounding of and resistance to such interpretation. The material 
qualities of the work must not only invite such a historically specific “enfranchising 
theory”, but must also secure the work “as the specific work that it is”.194 It appears to 
be this specificity that Costello thinks is capable of resisting such simple interpretation. 
As Costello notes of the work, “the rough texture of the wall exposed by the removal 
invokes the history of reductive monochrome painting”. However, it can do so because 
“the texture of the wall revealed, and the way the rough edges of the removal operate 
like a kind of negative after-image of the paint-encrusted edges of the canvas that was 
once there, if only virtually, that is, before painting was historically superseded on the 
reductive, essentialist and teleological theory of art history, that this work invokes.” It 
seems that for Costello it is the particularity, secured to the work specifically by its 
material element, which constitutes the recalcitrance of the work. For Costello the 
“affective dimension”, which is occasioned by the work’s material form, e.g., in this 
case, the “rough texture of the wall” affected by the removal, somehow “mirrors”195, or 
is a reflection of the “affective responses” of the artist to the materials as they are being 
manipulated. However, to my mind, it does not seem necessary that this be the case. 
Concluding Remarks 
After analysing a variety of works, it seems that the centralisation of artistic labour—as 
the “affective responses” of an individual artist to how the work looks, sounds or reads 
as it is being made—is ultimately misleading and inaccurate as an account of conceptual 
works more particularly. The fact that this account manages to render marginal a 
significant amount of conceptual works results, I think, in its applicability as a 
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meaningful “corrective” to Danto being questionable. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that we must abandon Costello’s main point altogether, i.e., that works 
of art resist being reducible to any straightforward notion of the communication of 
intention or meaning, by virtue of the recalcitrance that emerges through their being 
embodied in a material form. If such recalcitrance is not to be explained through 
recourse to notions of the subjective, then we must seek an explanation which is capable 
of construing it in more objective terms. As we have seen, much conceptual art 
emphatically decentralised the specific labour of the artist, conventionally understood, 
in a variety of ways. One of the central effects that this had was to demonstrate, as 
Kosuth explains, that things are art “in their use (relation) not through the aesthetic 
choice, composition, craftsmanship”.196 On this account, art functions or comes to life 
through its active relations to its surroundings. We might then seek an understanding of 
the positive role of materiality through this specific form of objective lens: to take the 
artwork in its own relations. 
Summary of Chapter One 
The theoretical claims of a small group of conceptual artists have come to heavily 
mediate an intellectually focused understanding of, and engagement with, conceptual 
art. It is my contention that it is necessary to return more explicitly to the actual works 
themselves which, regardless of the theoretical claims of certain artists, continued to be 
produced and thus which, with the passing of time, have come to stand as art objects in 
the gallery, alongside other works from the history of art. An ontology such as the one 
constructed by Schellekens is successful in offering a philosophical account that 
attempts to take the stronger theoretical claims of conceptual artists as seriously as 
possible, an account which, perhaps, some such artists might actually endorse. 
However, what Schellekens’ attempt at constructing such an account testifies to and 
brings into focus is the disjuncture between conceptual theory and conceptual practice. 
Marginalising and instrumentalising the material element of the work to the extent that 
she does, such that the material is a mere “prompt” and the idea becomes the only 
proper site of value, creates an ontology that proves awkward, inadequate and 
                                                
196 Joseph Kosuth, ‘1979’, Symposium über Fotografie (ex. cat.) Graz, 1979, P 37-44 
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ultimately unstable, both in terms of the logic of its own argument, and in terms of its 
misrepresentation of what it is to actually experience a conceptual work. An adequate 
ontology of conceptual art needs to give attention to the artworks presented, and not 
merely to the theory. 
Lamarque’s ontology critically moderates the claims of the conceptual artists in a 
manner that takes seriously the fact that they still largely produced and exhibited art 
objects. Whilst admitting the dominance of the conceptual or ideational aspect of 
conceptual art, it assigns to such aspects the ultimate function of directing our 
perceptual encounter with the materialised work. What is unique about the artwork in 
distinction from other entities is that it directs us to encounter the material element 
presented in a specific, unusual manner, i.e., as something beyond what it may be as a 
mere object or set of materials. However, Lamarque posits the relation between the 
ideational and the material as unilateral and reductive, in that it involves one idea or 
concept directing our perception of material in a specific manner. A perceptual 
encounter with the material, though the ostensibly defining characteristic for Lamarque, 
yields entirely to the cognitive, intentional direction. What Lamarque’s theory is 
missing is a developed account of how the material can be seen as active or resistant 
within the process of a phenomenal change. It thus implies that any idea can be tagged 
onto any object, without an analysis of the complex manner in which the material 
element can itself either bring to the fore or restrict various meanings or significations. 
Costello offers a more specified account of how the material can be seen as active 
within the process of the phenomenal change, which underpins the constitution of an 
artwork. For Costello, the material element does not merely yield to the cognitive 
through being perceptually transfigured by an intentional direction. Instead, materiality 
provides the condition upon which the cognitive can find its grounding in something 
substantial, whilst also offering recalcitrance to the cognitive. On this account then, the 
material qualities of the artwork are assigned greater significance in their capacity to 
shape meaning, yet also resist being rendered fully intelligible. This not only contributes 
towards an explanation of why conceptual artists might continue to invest their time and 
their artistic efforts in the presentation of materialised artworks, but also—due to the 
fact that the material itself is involved within the shaping of meaning—permits that the 
material itself is a source of significance. Despite all of this, through his centralisation 
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of the artistic labour of the artist-subject, Costello presents an overly conservative and 
expressionist account that cannot ultimately accommodate conceptual art in its unique 
character. 
What is required is an account of the ontology of the conceptual work that will draw out 
more explicitly the character of its phenomenological operations. To emphasise the 
existence of such phenomenological operations requires a more substantial 
thematisation of the relation between the elements of ideality or conceptuality and the 
materiality within such works. This requires an ontological account in which, following 
Costello, the material qualities of the artwork are assigned greater powers of ontological 
determination and greater significance in their capacity to shape meaning, both through 
substantiating it and through offering recalcitrance to intelligibility. However, it must be 
an account that de-emphasises the role of the “sensuous, affective or intuitive” 
responses of the subject to the way the materials “look, sound, read” as they are being 
made. It must be an account that offers a novel analysis of the coming into being of the 
artwork and thus a novel analysis of the manner in which the material element of the 
work can come to substantiate and be resistant to meaning. Decentralising the 
responsibility of the artist-subject for the coming into being of the artwork, and for the 
precise character of the relation between the ideational and the material, might require 
us to consider the artwork as fundamentally ontological in itself, i.e., that through the 
work, new configurations of the relation between the ideational and material elements 
are formed in a manner that is, to an extent, beyond the intentional direction of the 
subject. This brings ontology and ontological determination to the fore as an active 
process in itself and at the same time thematises the relation between phenomenology 
and ontology. Such an account might very well turn out to be capable of telling us 
something unique about conceptual art—which, as we have seen, decentralised the 
artist-subject—as a means of revealing the operations and relations at play within the 
work.
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Chapter Two: Heidegger’s Artwork 
Introduction 
This chapter will investigate whether or not and the extent to which Martin Heidegger’s 
ontology of the artwork can contribute to an account of conceptual art in a way that 
develops the ideas examined so far, whilst avoiding their various problems. In his 1936 
text, ‘Origin of the Work of Art’,1 Heidegger provides an explicit and lengthy 
thematisation of the relation between what have broadly been conceived so far as the 
ideational and the material elements of the artwork. Heidegger’s central objective in this 
text is to challenge a very particular formulation of this relation, one which Heidegger 
identifies to have dominated the history of philosophical aesthetics since Aristotle, i.e., 
the relation of ‘form’ and ‘matter’, or, in Aristotelian terms the ‘hylomorphic structure’. 
To conceptualise the artwork by way of the hylomorphic structure is, for Heidegger, to 
understand its most essential character as an equipmental product of human production,2 
which appears as a mere art-object amongst other ‘objects’ or ‘things’. One of 
Heidegger’s central aims will be to distinguish the artwork from these two types of 
entities, i.e., from ‘objects’, which are ‘present-at-hand’ [vorhanden],3 and from pieces 
of equipment, which are ‘ready-to-hand’ [zuhanden].  
Significantly for Heidegger, the ontological character of the artwork cannot be 
exhausted by categorial conceptions of ‘objecthood’ or ‘entity-ness’. The artwork is not 
simply a material ‘substructure’, to which we can assign or attribute an idea, a concept 
or an intention. The question of the ontology of the artwork therefore is not 
fundamentally a question as to the character of the relation, or the balance of priority 
between a static material entity or object and an isolatable ideational component, as 
presented by some of the accounts analysed in Chapter One. Instead, for Heidegger, the 
                                                
1 Martin Heidegger, ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ (1936) in (trans) Farrell Krell, Basic Writings, 
(Routledge, London, 1978, 1994) 
2 Joseph Kockelmans, On the Truth of Beings reflections of Heidegger’s later philosophy, (Indiana 
University Press, Indiana, 1984). P177  
3 As Graham Harman explains, Heidegger uses the term vorhandenheit to refer to three separate 
instances: (1) phenomena present in consciousness, (2) broken equipment, which then becomes obtrusive, 
(3) natural physical objects. See Harman, ‘Technology, Objects and Things’ in Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, May 2009. P4 
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artwork is itself ontologically fundamental. It is a ‘site’ in which the process of 
ontological determination shows itself to be “at work”. Thus, as Miguel de Beistegui 
claims, with the artwork for Heidegger, “something takes place, something happens. As 
work, the work is nothing outside this taking place or this happening.”4 What takes 
place is a demonstration of the specific way in which entities appear, as themselves and 
as meaningful, from out of a specific context of relations or an environment. The 
artwork for Heidegger sets up and sustains meaning, and it does so in a manner which 
prevents such meaning from being rendered fully transparent and intelligible. This is 
partly because for Heidegger, the ontological determination that unfolds through the 
artwork is a particularising and a historical process of phenomenological unfolding.5 
As such, it extends beyond and cannot be fully attributed to, or mastered by the 
intentions—either cognitive or non-cognitive/affective—of the artist-subject.  
Whilst there continues to be much debate on this issue, I am convinced by Joseph 
Kockelmans’ argument that, despite Heidegger’s so-called Kehre or turn, ontological 
account of the artwork can still be considered as intrinsically phenomenological.6 It is 
my contention that to theorise precisely how the artwork can still be ontologically 
determining in such a way that it can emerge from and reconstitute its environment— 
whilst simultaneously insisting upon the decentralisation of the artist-subject— 
Heidegger requires a process of some sort to be inherently operating within the artwork. 
For this, Heidegger re-conceptualises the hylomorphic structure—the relation of form 
and matter—as a relation of “intimate strife”7 between what he calls the ‘World’ [die 
Welt] and the Earth [die Erde]. The relation between World and Earth operate to explain 
how the artwork can both set up an historically specific context of meaning, beliefs and 
attitudes, yet can simultaneously disallow the locus, or centre of this context to be 
rendered fully transparent or intelligible.  
                                                
4 Miguel de Beistegui, ‘The Saving Power of Art’, in The New Heidegger, (Continuum, London, 2005).  
P139 
5 As Mike Lewis points out, the attention to history is “a crucial part of Heidegger’s innovation in 
phenomenology”. Mike Lewis & Tanja Staehler, Phenomenology: an introduction, (Continuum, London, 
2010). P67 
6 This is argued at length in Joseph Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Artworks, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 1985). 
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Despite what I anticipate to be limitations in its applicability, it is my contention that 
Heidegger’s specifically phenomenological analysis of the ontology of the artwork in 
‘Origin of the Work of Art’ is capable of developing some of the ideas that emerged in 
the previous chapter whilst also avoiding their pitfalls. Firstly, it follows on from 
Costello’s “corrective” to Danto’s ontology of art by virtue of the fact that Heidegger 
posits the material element, not as subservient to the ideational or conceptual, but as 
holding a position of priority in the ontological determination of the artwork. In a 
similar manner to the role played by the material for Costello, Earth for Heidegger is 
that which substantiates and gives the intelligible grounding, but it is also that which 
resists ever becoming fully intelligible. What definitively comes to the fore in the 
artwork is a certain hidden element, that aspect of materiality that is resistant to being 
rendered wholly cognitive. Secondly, it can develop this idea of material recalcitrance 
much further, due to the fact that the relation between World and Earth is so explicitly 
thematised by Heidegger. Thirdly, it can avoid the over-emphasis in Costello’s text 
upon the “sensuous, affective and intuitive” responses of the artist-subject, as a central 
element of recalcitrance and delineation in the artwork.8 As became the tendency of 
Heidegger’s later philosophy, ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ can be seen to decentralise 
what had been a prominent emphasis of his early thought, i.e., the human logos, or 
‘discourse’ as the central lever from which meaning is brought to light and secured. 
Instead, the phenomenological relations of the artwork in this later text are posited as 
being governed by a more objective and specifically historical ontological 
determination, rather than being presented merely as the consequence of the cognitive 
or non-cognitive intentions of the artist-subject.  
In addition to taking up and developing these issues more deeply, I believe that ‘Origin 
of the Work of Art’ might also be able to offer a unique way of thinking, not merely 
about how the material operates in its relation to the intelligible within the ontology of 
the artwork, but what artistic materiality is in the first place. Through the introduction of 
Earth Heidegger attempts to describe the positive and more strictly phenomenological 
role of the material in the ontological determination of the artwork. As will be 
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demonstrated, with the dissociation of artistic materiality from ‘objecthood’—what 
Heidegger calls ‘presence-at-hand’ [Vorhandenheit]—comes the capacity for the 
expansion of the concept of the ‘material’, both in terms of the wideness of its 
application and in terms of its significance. The task of this chapter will be to draw out 
the specific characteristics of the concept of Earth that can help open up a way of 
discussing a tendency of many conceptual artworks of an expanded material practice. 
By expanded materiality, I do not mean the tendency of the conceptual artist to simply 
use a wider range of less conventional materials, but more accurately, the way in which 
such art facilitates the capacity for a wider range of phenomena to appear through the 
work and thus to count as artistic materials.  
This chapter will be divided into four parts and will take the following structure. Part 
One will consist of a careful articulation of the key notions set out by Heidegger in 
Being and Time in his explication of the ‘Phenomenological Method of Investigation’ 
and where relevant, an explanation of how such notions appear altered or developed in 
‘Origin of the Work of Art’. Particular attention will be given to understanding 
Heidegger’s method of destructive retrieve, his etymological recovery of the terms 
‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’, his unique delineation of the method of ‘phenomenology’ 
and the manner in which this is inextricably linked to a notion of aletheia, i.e., 
Heidegger’s concept of truth. Part two will explain the ‘symbolic’ notion of the artwork 
against which Heidegger positions his account. The ‘symbolic’ notion is that an artwork 
is essentially a material substrate to which we attach a symbolic or allegorical meaning. 
Part Three will consist of an in-depth critical analysis of the applicability of Heidegger’s 
main conceptual construction of the relation between World and Earth to an account of 
conceptual art. Due to the sheer complexity of these notions—in particular World, 
which is a concept of central importance throughout Heidegger’s philosophical career—
Part Three will be divided into two sections. The first section will be an exposition of 
the terms World and Earth and their development through Heidegger’s work. The 
second section will be an analysis of how these terms operate together in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological account of ‘truth’ as aletheia. Part Four will take a focused look at 
the privileged role of materiality in the ontological determination of the artwork, and 
will investigate whether or not and in what particular ways this relation might offer a 
more complex and expanded concept of what artistic materiality is, or can be. Due to 
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the fact that Chapter Three of this thesis is reserved for a more explicit and concrete 
exploration and development of this ontology, through examining how it might be 
applied to a range of conceptual artworks, this chapter is primarily a theoretical 
grappling with Heidegger’s ideas.  
A Note on Heidegger’s Relation to Contemporary Art 
Before I begin with the central analysis, it seems important to pre-empt a potential 
criticism of invoking Heidegger at this stage. One might contest that, due to the fact that 
‘Origin of the Work of Art’ was written around thirty years prior to the conceptual art 
movement, it cannot be said to be concerned with conceptual art in any direct way. In 
fact, certain thinkers such as Otto Pöggeler contest that Heidegger never developed a 
genuine philosophy of art at all.9 What is more, one might also point out that, whilst still 
producing texts and giving lectures on the topic of art until as late as 196710—
coincidently, an intensely productive and truly formative year for the conceptual art 
movement and conceptual art theory11—Heidegger in fact remained relatively resistant 
to engaging with artistic production of a contemporaneous nature. However, certain 
thinkers such as Gianni Vattimo have suggested that Heidegger’s ontological approach 
to art in fact exhibits the same spirit as the tendencies of its contemporaneous avant-
garde practices. This is because Vattimo considers Heidegger’s specifically ontological 
approach to art to be fundamentally questioning the fact of art itself and to be defending 
the significance of art to human existence.12 However, such sentiments are uncommon. 
Most scholars emphasise instead that whilst Heidegger’s career coincided with the 
artistic movements of Cubism, Surrealism, Abstract Expressionism and Minimalism, he 
appeared to remain largely resistant to contemporary art. I find Vattimo’s thesis 
compelling, and will, to a certain extent be pursuing this line of thought, though rather 
implicitly throughout this chapter. However, despite this, it also does seem true to say 
                                                
9 Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), P207. 
10 The last lecture given by Heidegger was ‘The Provenance of Art and the Destitution of Thought’, in 
1967. 
11 In 1967 alone, Artforum published many key texts of conceptual art theory including amongst others: 
Michael Fried’s ‘Art and Objecthood’, Sol LeWitt’s ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art and Barbara Rose’s 
‘The Value of Didactic Art’. 
12 Gianni Vattimo, ‘The Ontological Vocation of Twentieth Century Poetics’ in Art’s Claim to Truth, 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1985). P45-46 
  
76 
that Heidegger’s actual feelings about contemporary art appear to have been rather 
antagonistic, and his philosophical engagement with art being produced and exhibited in 
the artworld at that time was relatively sparse. Whilst it is noted that Heidegger was in 
fact quite fond of the works of Paul Klee, Cezanne and Rilke,13 the examples of 
artworks that Heidegger draws upon to demonstrate and develop his ontology of art in 
‘Origin of the Work of Art’ specifically, are limited to such works as a Van Gogh 
painting, a Meyer poem and a Greek Temple. Such works seem more akin to museum 
pieces, as opposed to active components in an ‘artworld’, or radical avant-garde 
provocations. This had led thinkers such as Joseph Kockelman to doubt where 
Heidegger’s reflections leave us in relation to contemporary art.14 
The attempt to make Heidegger’s ideas work for contemporary art is, as Daniel 
Dahlstrom has said, the attempt “to think what is unthought in his thinking.”15 Despite 
this obstacle, at a glance, there are clear parallels that exist between the inherent 
objectives of conceptual art and Heidegger’s re-conceptualisation of the artwork along 
ontological lines, respectively. These include the following. (1) The rejection of the 
artwork as entirely reducible to a material object exhibited, whilst still taking the 
question of ‘thinghood’ seriously.16 (2) The rejection of the artwork as an entity to be 
engaged with primarily by way of a theoretical and perceptual gaze.17 (3) The rejection 
of ‘representation’—i.e. the re-presentation of reality—as constituting the primary 
function of the artwork. (3) The significant downplaying, and often rejection, of a 
certain notion of aesthetic experience, i.e. a subjective experience associated with 
feelings of the beautiful, as the raison d’être of art. (4) The decentralisation of the 
affective traces of the individual subject-artist as constituting the cause of the work and 
                                                
13 As Julian Young describes, Heidegger seemed to hold esteem for Cezanne, Rilke and Braque, as well 
as discovering Klee in the 1950s. See Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001). P65. Miguel de Beistegui adds Picasso to this list. See de Beistegui. (2005). P146 
14 Joseph Kockelmans, (1985). P.87 
15 Daniel Dahlstrom, ‘Heidegger’s Artworld’ in (ed.) Harries & Jamme, Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, 
Technology, (Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1995) P125 
16 As I have argued throughout this thesis, conceptual artists continued to take seriously the role of the 
material object in their work, even when they were questioning that role through artistically 
experimenting with its removal. 
17 For Heidegger, the theoretical gaze would constitute something akin to the way that scientists examine 
things. Even conceptual artists that consider their work “theoretical” in character would have rejected an 
account of art as an object of gaze.  
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its meaning. (5) The concern with a specifically ontological investigation of the 
artwork, and with the relation between art and broader questions of ontology per se. 
Most of these central objectives of conceptual art emerged at some point in the previous 
chapter as being neglected to varying extents by recent philosophical literature on the 
topic. At first glance then, Heidegger’s theory of art—at the very least in terms of its 
general orientation and direction—seems to be able to offer a new platform for thinking 
about conceptual art, one that can incorporate each of these factors.     
Various recent texts and conference papers have attempted to actually address the 
question of the applicability of Heidegger’s theory of the ontology of the artwork to 
more contemporary art forms such as conceptual art.18 Most of these attempts end up 
being little more than suggestive: whilst flagging up the possibility for the 
accommodation of more contemporary or conceptual artworks, they often stop short of 
undertaking the actual detailed philosophical analysis needed to fully demonstrate this 
point. An example of this can be seen in the work of Michael Haar,19 Raj Singh20 and, 
to a lesser extent, Miguel de Beistegui.21 Simultaneous to this, there is a further 
tendency for some thinkers publishing on this topic to misrepresent the Heideggerian 
notions of World and Earth, i.e. to either conflate them too heavily with those concepts 
they are attempting to overcome—‘form’ and ‘matter’—or to interpret them too 
literally, when it comes to actually applying them to a discussion of contemporary 
artworks. An example of this latter tendency occurred in a recent paper delivered at the 
                                                
18 See, for example, Miguel de Beistegui’s ‘The Saving Power of Art’, Daniel Dahlstrom’s ‘Heidegger’s 
Artworld’. In addition to this, Cameron Tonkinwise and Mark Titmarsh delivered a paper at the 21st 
Century Heidegger Conference at University College Dublin, 2010, entitled, ‘Art Vs Design: Saving 
Power vs. Enframing, or, A Thing of the Past vs. World-Making.’ References to the possibility that 
Heidegger’s theory might be able to accommodate certain contemporary artworks are also given in a 
range of other secondary texts. See for example, Haar, Michael, Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the 
Grounds of the History of Being, (Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1993).  
19 Whilst Haar invokes Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup piece at one point in his text to exemplify his 
claim that all works need an “earthly” substance, he does not in any way explore the character or 
implications of this idea. Haar. (1993). P109 
20 Whilst Raj Singh claims that, “even a piece of abstract art can be viewed as dealing (however 
abstractly) with entities and the world” See ‘Heidegger and the World in an Artwork’ in The journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism (48:3, Summer, 1990). P221 
21 De Beistegui suggests that contemporary artworks that use video, concrete or steel might count just as 
equally as art in the Heideggerian sense as those sculpted from stone or wood. However, he does not 
develop a detailed articulation or analysis of how such contemporary works might be conceptualised 
through a Heideggerian lens. De Beistegui. (2007). P146     
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conference 21st Century Heidegger at University College Dublin in September 2010. 
The authors of the paper, Mark Titmarsh and Cameron Tonkinwise, were extremely 
careful and conscientious in presenting the notions of World and Earth, insisting that 
they should be understood in their “extended phenomenological sense”.22 However, in 
applying them to the contemporary artworks they selected, the World is described by 
recourse to a wheelbarrow—a formerly useful tool, now a Readymade—whilst the 
Earth is described by recourse to a spillage of flowers across the floor.23 In applying 
these concepts to an actual work of contemporary art, Titmarsh and Tonkinwise end up 
taking them too literally—in particular, the concept Earth it seems—and in doing so, 
reduce their significance from the deeper phenomenological sense to a literal 
correspondence. To have genuinely examined the applicability of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological notion of World and Earth to conceptual art, it is important to this 
investigation that such tendencies be avoided. To avoid such tendencies we must first of 
all attend, not to the question of what World and Earth are—as though they are a 
particular content to be discovered—but of what art is, of how it operates in distinction 
from other things. The question of this chapter is whether or not and the extent to which 
it is possible to think through the concepts of World and Earth, in a way that allows 
them to specifically retain their true phenomenological sense. What is required first and 
foremost to set up this investigation then, is a clear understanding of what this truly 
phenomenological sense might mean. For this we need a detailed and concise account 
of phenomenology, as constituted in its Heideggerian formulation. 
Part One: Heideggerian Phenomenology and the 
Phenomenological Method 
To adequately comprehend Heidegger’s account of the artwork as set out in ‘Origin of 
the Work of Art’ we need to examine the central components and concepts at work in 
the Heideggerian phenomenological method more generally, as well as how they relate 
to each other. These are the following. (1) Heidegger’s method of destructive retrieve. 
                                                
22 Mark Titmarsh & Cameron Tonkinwise, ‘Art Vs Design: Saving Power vs. Enframing, or, A Thing of 
the Past vs. World-Making’, (unpublished manuscript), 21st Century Heidegger Conference at University 
College Dublin, Sept 2010. 
23 The artwork referenced is one of Titmarsh’s own works, entitled, ‘Moraine’ (2006) 
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(2) Heidegger’s unique conception of hermeneutic ‘phenomenology’, which itself must 
be broken down into an analysis of its two components, (a) phainomenon, or 
‘phenomenon’, and (b) logos or ‘discourse’. (3) Heidegger’s notion of aletheia, or truth, 
and how it relates to the two components ‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’. For a thorough 
and precise exposition of these concepts we will need to return for a moment to 
Heidegger’s main work of 1927, Being and Time.24  
To rely upon Heidegger’s presentation of his central concepts in Being and Time might 
initially strike one as misleading. After all, ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ approximately 
corresponds to what Heidegger himself has referred to as a “Kehre” or ‘turn’ in his 
thinking, which Heidegger scholars typically understand to mark the beginning of what 
is referred to as the late period of Heidegger’s work.25 Central to this transition is a 
move away from what in Being and Time Heidegger terms his ‘existential analytic of 
Dasein’—focused on an analysis of the ‘Being-in-the world’ of an individual Dasein—
towards an analysis of the history of Being, i.e. an analysis of how different histories of 
Being emerge and are sustained. ‘Dasein’ is Heidegger’s term for the human being in 
his early works of philosophy.26 We will look more closely at the term ‘Being’ shortly, 
but for now we can define it roughly as the ‘conditions of possibility’ of the 
‘phenomenon’. However, it is my contention that— whilst there are significant ways in 
which these preliminary concepts become altered, developed or given greater centrality 
in Heidegger’s later work—the definition and understanding of the full implications of 
these concepts, persists as the central concern that run continuously throughout 
Heidegger’s intellectual career. As Mark Wrathall makes clear in his recent publication 
Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language and History,27 Heidegger’s 
formulation of phenomenology and description of aletheia or ‘truth’ in Being and Time, 
is fundamentally bound to his later work principally through his ongoing investigation 
into the ontology of what he more generally terms ‘unconcealment’. I will now look at 
                                                
24 Martin Heidegger, (Trans.) Macquarrie & Robinson Being and Time, 1927 (Blackwell Publishing, 
London, 1999) 
25 W.J. Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, (Fordham University Press, New York, 2003). 
26 Lewis & Staehler periodise Heidegger’s focus on the concept of ‘Dasein’ as roughly between 1919 and 
1931 to refer to the way in which humans are ontologically specific in the fact that they understand 
Being. (2010). P73  
27 Mark Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language and History. (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2011) 
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the key concepts in turn and attempt to briefly trace their development in Heidegger’s 
thought. 
1. Heidegger’s Methodology of Destructive Retrieve 
Heidegger’s methodology consists of a relation between two operations; namely, his 
destructive retrieve and his hermeneutic phenomenology. I will now look at these 
operations in turn. To understand what Heidegger means by destructive retrieve, it is 
beneficial to turn to the opening sections of Being and Time, in which he explicitly sets 
out and clarifies the methodologies he will use in his investigation into ontology, or the 
question of the meaning of Being. “If the question of Being is to have its own history 
made transparent”—claims Heidegger—“then this hardened tradition must be loosened 
up, and the concealments that it has brought about must be dissolved.”28 The notion of 
‘loosening up’ is central to understanding Heidegger’s philosophical methodology. 
Significantly, for our analysis of the artwork, the first half of ‘Origin of the Work of 
Art’ takes the form of an overturning of the concept of the traditional ‘thing-concepts’ 
that have dominated the history of ontology, in an attempt to demonstrate that the 
artwork is not merely a material substrate X to which we can simply attach meaning or 
intention Y. The destructive retrieve of the ontological tradition is not at all a crude 
rejection or dismissal of that tradition, but is rather a process of shedding any arbitrary 
conceptual excesses which, despite expressing a particular historical mode of human 
relation to the world, have become hardened into objective truths, that dominate 
experience. The destructive retrieve first shows, as Mike Lewis explains, that the 
traditional content of ontological thinking in fact has a definite history.29 In Heidegger’s 
own words, ontological thinking first displays its “birth certificate”30 and then proceeds 
to “destroy” whatever is philosophically unjustifiable in that content.31  
                                                
28 Heidegger. (1927) §6, P44, 22 
29 Lewis & Staehler. (2010). P68 
30 Heidegger. (1927) §6 P44, 22 
31 Such a method of conceptual unearthing appeared extremely radical to thinkers such as Herbert 
Marcuse, who initially read Heidegger’s philosophy to be an “ontologically veiled critique of reification” 
an attempt to surmount the fetishization of appearances that characterised the shadow-world of bourgeois 
immediacy, the conceptual apparatus of which was the deterministic world-view of bourgeois science. 
See Richard Wolin (ed.) Heideggerian Marxism, (University of Nebraska Press, Nebraska, 2005), xv 
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However, crucially, for Heidegger, such destruction has an inherently positive moment 
in that it simultaneously ‘retrieves’ or ‘appropriates’32 what Kockelmans refers to as the 
“primordial experience”, and what Lewis refers to as the “core of truth”.33 What is 
retrieved is that which is always already implied within what Heidegger describes as our 
“pre-ontological” understanding,34 and which is necessarily presupposed in any account 
of ‘objective truth’. The retrieval of such primordial operations is that from which 
genuine philosophical insights are capable of flowing.35 As Stephen Mulhall clarifies, 
such enquiry is not ‘destruction’ typically conceived, neither is it ‘reconstruction’; 
Heidegger’s project is rather “de-constructive”.36  Destruction in this sense is thus 
neither a “shaking off the ontological tradition”, nor a “vicious revitalising of 
ontological standpoints”.37 Instead, the aim of the destructive retrieve is to discover the 
“positive possibilities” of a tradition, and this—Heidegger tells us—always means 
“keeping it within its limits.”38 What I interpret to be at stake for Heidegger in 
proclaiming the necessity of ‘limits’ is a need to avoid, or to at least keep in check, the 
tendency of particulars to become subsumed under more abstract forms of 
conceptualising. What seems to function as the fundamental limitation in Heidegger’s 
methodology, a limitation that acts as a protective against such an omnipotent 
conceptual machinery, is that which simultaneously provides the ‘bounds’ and allows 
the positive possibilities of an ontological tradition to be come forth—is an appeal to 
“the things themselves”.39 For Heidegger, the philosophical task of preventing the 
domination of pre-judgements by mere arbitrary conceptions is coupled with an aim to 
make their themes secure scientifically by a working out of our anticipatory conceptions 
in terms of “the things themselves”. Heidegger’s “destructive retrieve”, Kockelmans 
                                                
32 Heidegger says: “In proposing our ‘definition’ of “truth” we have not shaken off the tradition, but we 
have appropriated it primordially.”(1927). §44, P262, 220 
33 Lewis & Staehler. (2010) P68 
34 Kockelmans. (1985) P90 
35 Kockelmans. (1985) P92 
36 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger’s Being and Time, (Routledge, London, 1996). P22. As Mulhall notes at 
this point, ‘deconstruction’ as we typically understand it in its Derridean formulation has its point of 
origin in Heidegger’s method of destructive retrieve. Whilst “deconstruction” has the explicit advantage 
of avoiding the negative connotations of the word “destructive”, I will continue to use the Heideggerian 
term to avoid any potential confusion.   
37 Heidegger. (1927) §6, P44, 22  
38 Heidegger. (1927) §6, P44, 22 
39 This is a reference to the famous phenomenological maxim, coined originally by Edmund Husserl.   
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continues, is thus “driven through and guided by his use of a hermeneutical 
phenomenology”—a philosophical investigative process that compares, in each case, 
the claims made by thinkers of the past with the ‘things’ to be reflected upon”.40 
2. Heideggerian Phenomenology 
To better grasp Heidegger’s unique attempt to radicalise phenomenology, we need to 
return to §7 of Being and Time, where he sets out his ‘Phenomenological Method of 
Investigation’. In 1959, Heidegger retrospectively described the objective of his major 
work, Being and Time, as an attempt to think phenomenology in a more “originary” 
manner.41 For Heidegger, the “originary” and radical notion of phenomenology is to be 
found, not within the texts of Husserl or even Brentano,42 but in the philosophy of the 
Ancient Greeks, in particular Aristotle.43 When Heidegger thus lays out his ‘Preliminary 
Conception of Phenomenology’ in §7 of Being and Time, it is not so much an 
explanation or exposition of the meaning, which ‘phenomenology’ has come to 
accumulate or take on through the phenomenological tradition, but is rather a definition 
of what phenomenology is, and, importantly, should be, i.e., it is a definition of 
phenomenology in its unique Heideggerian formulation.  
The central point that Heidegger wants to make in §7, is to sharply distinguish his own 
unique method of phenomenology from what he calls the purely “formal” 44 conception, 
under which banner Heidegger seems to categorise, not merely the entire tradition of 
phenomenology up until this point, but the whole history of ontology. For Heidegger, 
the history of ontology constitutes a science of the phenomena,45 which indiscriminately 
takes as its object a plethora of different phenomena, and thus levels all phenomena 
                                                
40 Kockelmans. (1985). P40 
41 In 1959, Heidegger explained: “I was trying to think the nature of phenomenology in a more originary 
manner.” See Martin Heidegger, (trans.) Peter. D. Hertz, On the Way to Language, (Harper & Row, New 
York, 1982). P9 
42 It is widely noted that any clear acknowledgement of his indebtedness to Husserl is a deliberate 
omission from Heidegger’s work. Despite this, there are several points at which it seems that Heidegger’s 
appeal to Greek thinking in his de-construction of the history of ontology is pointedly an attempt to 
overcome Husserlian phenomenology. As Stephen Mulhall points out, the deliberate omission of 
Husserlian reference appears puzzling, considering Heidegger’s emphasis upon understanding the 
circumstances of the generation of particular theories. Mulhall, (1996) P22-23 
43 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, (Routledge, New York, 2000). P228 
44 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P54-58  
45 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P50, 28 
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down into a homogenous notion of ‘presence’. What Heidegger proposes is a 
“deformalisation”46 of phenomenology, into its truly “phenomenological” 47 conception, 
which entails ascribing a more exclusive delineation to the boundaries of the 
‘phenomenon’. This concern for the delineation of the phenomenon, which is explicated 
in Being and Time, can be seen as a central issue in Heidegger’s philosophy and 
becomes increasingly thematic in his later work. To comprehend the character of this 
‘deformalisation’ requires an engagement with the manner in which Heidegger pursues 
an etymological retrieval of the word ‘phenomenology’, through first characterising its 
two components, phainomenon and logos, and then “establishing the meaning of the 
name in which these are put together.”48 As Mulhall argues, the extent to which the 
precise details of Heidegger’s etymological retrievals are entirely accurate should be 
considered of less importance than the question of what Heidegger manages to derive 
from them, philosophically speaking.49 I will now look at these two concepts in turn. 
3. Phainomenon 
The Greek term φαινόµενον, or phainomenon, means, “that which shows itself”, i.e., the 
manifest.50 Phainomenon derives from the middle-voiced verb φαίνεσθαι, or 
Phainesthai, which means, “to show itself”.51 This derives from φαίνω, or Phaino, 
which means “to bring to the light of day” or “to put into the light”,52 i.e., into clarity, 
which, in turn comes from the same stem as -φα, like φώς, or “that which is bright” or 
“that wherein something can become visible or manifest in itself,” i.e., the light. This 
means that phenomenology’s object of study, the ‘phenomenon’, is “that which shows 
itself in (and from)53 itself”54, or ‘appears’ as that which is self-manifesting. 
Phenomenology, in its ‘formal’ conception, is thus defined as λέγειν τὰ φαινόµενα “to 
                                                
46 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P59, 35 
47 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P59, 35 
48 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P50, 29  
49 Mulhall. (1996). P24 
50 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 28 
51 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 28 
52 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 28 
53 The presence of from in this construction is used variably in the English translation, but it seems central 
to Heidegger’s notion of self-manifestation. 
54 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 28 
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let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.”55 However, 
as Heidegger points out, such a simple conception can and has admitted a “bewildering 
multiplicity of phenomena”56 in the history of philosophy. Heidegger thinks that a more 
precise qualification is needed in order to arrive at the ‘phenomenon’ proper. If in 
taking the ‘phenomenon’ simply as “that which shows itself” we at the same time 
“leave indefinite which entities we consider as “phenomena”, and leave it open whether 
what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity might have in 
its Being, then we have merely arrived at the formal conception of ‘phenomenon’.57 To 
‘deformalise’ this conception and to grasp it in its true phenomenological sense, thinks 
Heidegger, it is essential that we understand what the ‘phenomenon’ is, and we can 
arrive at such an understanding through analysing its distinctions from, and its relations 
to, two other main concepts. First of all, we must understand the specific way in which 
the notion of ‘phenomenon’ is distinct from, yet “structurally interconnected” with, the 
notion of ‘semblance’ [Schein].58 Second of all, we must understand the manner in 
which ‘phenomenon’ stands in firm distinction from, yet coincides with ‘appearance’ 
[Erscheinung, literally, “shining forth”].59 I will now look at these distinctions and 
relations in turn. 
As we have seen, the ‘phenomenon’ is “that which shows itself”, i.e., the self-
manifesting. However, an entity can show itself in a manner of different ways. For 
example, it might show itself as something that it is not. This form of self-showing is 
called ‘semblance’ [Schein],60 and it designates a kind of error or even a notion of 
illusion. In the case of ‘semblance’, says Heidegger, the manifest it is not “what it gives 
itself out to be”.61 In Greek, the concept of the ‘phenomenon’ also incorporates that 
which is manifest as ‘semblance’.62 Following the Greek, Heidegger thinks these are 
distinct, yet not entirely separate concepts: they have a structural interconnection. This 
is because, “only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of 
                                                
55 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P58, 34 
56 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P54, 31 
57 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P54, 31 
58 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 29 
59 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 29 
60 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 29 
61 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 29 
62 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 29 
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showing itself—that is, of being a phenomenon—can it show itself as something which 
it is not; only then can it ‘merely look so-and-so.”63 It seems to me that by virtue of this 
distinction, Heidegger wants to bring to light two central and interconnected points: (1) 
‘semblance’ too should be defined positively as a mode of self-showing, or a 
signification. However, (2) such signification by way of ‘semblance’ is a “privative 
modification”, which is founded upon a more “positive and primordial signification”, 
i.e., the ‘phenomenon’.64 ‘Semblance’ thus presupposes a more primordial mode of 
appearance, and it is specifically this unique primordial mode that Heidegger wishes to 
secure as an attribute of the ‘phenomenon’ proper.  
The ‘phenomenon’ must also be understood in its distinction from ‘appearance’. 
Heidegger begins by taking ‘appearance’ in this case as what one talks about when 
referring, for example, to the “symptoms of a disease.”65 As symptoms manifest 
through the human body they simultaneously “indicate” or “announce” that which does 
not show-itself, i.e., the disease. However, importantly for Heidegger, the true sense of 
‘appearance’ is not ascribable to that which shows-itself, “it means rather the 
announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself.”66 ‘Appearance’ is a 
“not-showing-itself”,67 insists Heidegger, and refers to the basic formal structure of all 
“indications, presentations, symptoms and symbols”.68  Here, Heidegger can be seen to 
be ascribing an emphasis to that which does not show itself. Though ‘appearing’ is 
never a showing-itself, in the sense of the ‘phenomenon’, ‘appearance’ is dependent 
upon ‘phenomenon’ and presupposes it because to announce itself as that which does 
not show itself, it necessarily must do so through that which does show-itself.69  
Despite the fact that the ‘appearance’ is that which does not show itself, Heidegger 
wants to distinguish it from the Kantian sense of phenomena, which stands in 
opposition to the noumena.70 Kant uses the notion of ‘appearance’ in a two-fold manner, 
                                                
63 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 29 
64 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P51, 29 
65 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P52, 29 
66 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P52, 29 
67 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P52, 29 
68 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P52, 29 
69 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P53, 29 
70 Mulhall. (1996) P25 
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claims Heidegger.71 It is used to designate both that which shows-itself—for Kant, the 
“objects of empirical intuition”72—but also to designate what Heidegger describes as 
“an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance, an emanation which 
announces”.73 On this view, that which does the announcing, emerges in what is itself 
non-manifest, and emanates from it in such a way that the non-manifest comes to be 
thought as something that is essentially never manifest, i.e., the thing-in-itself.74 As 
such it constitutes something ‘brought-forth’, yet this something does not make up the 
real Being of what brings it forth. What we end up with, thinks Heidegger, is “mere 
appearance”.75   
Nevertheless, I interpret the reference to the Kantian construction of ‘appearing’ to be 
extremely important because from it, Heidegger seems to derive his notion of what the 
‘phenomenon’, and thus the object of true phenomenology, should be. What the Kantian 
formulation of ‘appearance’ demonstrates, is that when something appears and thus 
shows itself to be a phenomenon, there is always already something prior to it, which 
accompanies it in every case, and in so doing, shows itself “unthematically”.76 For 
example, Stephen Mulhall has claimed that the Heideggerian ‘phenomenon’ can be 
understood by analogy with the Kantian notion of knowledge, wherein time and space 
are conceived of as forms of sensible intuition.77 For Kant, time and space are not 
entities, nor are they properties of entities, such that we could “discover” them as part of 
the “content” of sensible intuition. Rather, time and space are forms of sensible 
intuition, which must be assumed as the ‘horizon’ within which any object can possibly 
be encountered. They are the conditions of possibility for the experience of entities. As 
such, time and space constitute that which must necessarily accompany every entity, yet 
are not themselves encounterable as objects of experience.78 However, claims Mulhall, 
what Kant had demonstrated is that a nuanced philosophical investigation, “can make 
them an object of theoretical study, and thus it is possible to thematise that which is 
                                                
71 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P53-54, 30 
72 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P54, 30 
73 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P53, 30 
74 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P53, 30 
75 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P53, 30 
76 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P55, 31 
77 Mulhall. (1996) P25  
78 Mulhall. (1996) P25 
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present and foundational but which typically goes unthematised in everyday 
experience.”79 In an analogous fashion, ‘phenomenology’ for the early Heidegger, will 
be the method through which the ‘pre-ontological’ and primordial ground or foundation 
of the manifest can be brought to thematically show itself. Early Heidegger calls this 
ground or foundation, the Being of beings. 
4. The ‘Phenomenon’ as the Demand of Being 
Through these comparisons we have established what the true ‘phenomenon’ is not, i.e., 
it is not simply ‘semblance’, ‘appearance’ or ‘mere appearance’. We have also moved 
towards an account of what it is like, i.e., the ‘phenomenon’ is that which accompanies, 
and which is thus necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly.80 It 
is that which “proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is that 
which lies hidden”,81 or remains concealed in an exceptional way yet, at the same time, 
belongs to that which shows itself so essentially that it constitutes its “meaning” and its 
“ground”.82 Due to the fact that Heidegger considers there to be a tendency towards 
“covered-up-ness” or concealment, the thematic object of phenomenology must be “that 
which demands83 that it become a phenomenon, and which demands this in a distinctive 
sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing.”84 Heidegger’s theory thus 
attributes what was a purely “formal” and relatively indiscriminate phenomenology 
with a precise thematic object. Rather than characterising the ‘phenomenon’ broadly as 
that “which shows itself”, Heidegger reveals it to be that which does not show itself, yet 
has the greatest urgency to be brought to light, to be named and rendered manifest. 
There is therefore a “double-play” at work in the Heideggerian notion of 
phenomenology between self-showing and self-concealing: the “distinctive” 
phenomenon is both formal, i.e., it both shows itself in itself and phenomenological, 
i.e., it is that which lies hidden, yet has the greatest demand to be brought to light. This 
‘double-play’ is something that, as we shall see, reoccurs in Heidegger’s later work in 
                                                
79 Mulhall. (1996) P25 
80 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P59, 35 
81 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P59, 36 
82 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P59, 35 
83 My italics. 
84 Heidegger. (1927) §7, P59, 35 
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relation to his emphasis upon aletheia, or ‘truth’ as the dis-closive operations of the 
struggle between the World and the Earth in the artwork. On my interpretation, the 
artwork for Heidegger will constitute the logical fulfillment of the deformalisation of 
phenomenology, in that it will constitute the specifically self-contained site in which 
this ‘double-play’ of disclosure takes place. The artwork is, as Lewis claims, “an 
exemplary phenomenon”.85 
However, Heidegger also gives the ‘phenomenon’ a more positive characterisation. In 
his ‘Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology’ in sub-section C of §7, Heidegger 
claims that that which “remains concealed in an exceptional way or what falls back and 
is covered up again, or shows itself only in a distorted way, it is not this or that being 
but rather, as we have shown in our foregoing observations, is the “Being of entities.”86 
This is what allows Heidegger to thematise the relationship between phenomenology 
and ontology. He claims that, “phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the 
theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as 
phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of 
“phenomenon” what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the very Being of 
entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives.”87  
In working through these various distinctions, as Dermot Moran points out, Heidegger 
distinguishes phenomenology proper from all other forms of phenomenalism.88 
However, due to the fact that things do not always manifest themselves as they truly are, 
the phenomenological method cannot be mere description89 but must instead be the 
seeking after a meaning that is perhaps hidden by the specific mode of appearing of 
entities.90 In addition to this, because the true ‘phenomenon’ is that which “lies hidden” 
by virtue of an entity’s mode of appearance, yet demands to be brought into thematic 
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light, a hermeneutic dimension is required.91. This seeking after meaning is what links 
phainomenon to the logos. 
5. Logos 
Phenomenology is the λόγος, or logos, of the phenomenon. Logos provides the 
necessary intervention, which lifts the phenomenon out of concealment and renders it 
manifest, not merely as this or that phenomena, but such that it might become a proper 
thematic object of phenomenology. Although the Greek notion of logos, “is always 
getting interpreted” as ‘reason’, ‘judgement’, ‘concept’, ‘definition’, ‘ground’ or 
‘relationship’, Heidegger makes it clear that it does not designate any of these terms but 
is instead a mode of making manifest which is prior to and more primordial than these 
terms. Heidegger defines the basic signification of logos as “discourse” [Rede].92 
However, discourse should not be understood in the common sense of 
“communication”.93  Instead, Heidegger defines discourse as, “to make manifest what 
one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse.”94 Discourse, “lets something be seen” 
(phainesthai) or “lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is 
about.”95 Importantly for Heidegger, there is an emphasis upon the fact that what is said 
is “drawn from (apo-) what the talk is about.”96 Discourse thus corresponds to the Greek 
sense of ἀπόφανσις or apophansis: “letting an entity be seen from itself”.97 As Lewis 
explains, Heidegger’s account of the role of the logos is not akin to a Husserlian notion 
of a consciousness, which is considered to be actively constitutive of the world. For 
Heidegger, things are “presented to us, we do not make them present.”98 
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6. Truth as Aletheia 
Heidegger claims that because logos means “letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore 
be true or false.”99 As Dermot Moran explains, this means that logos, is a central notion 
in the concept of truth as aletheia, which thus creates an important link between 
phenomenology and truth.100 By ‘truth’, Heidegger does not mean any 
“philosophical”101 conception, whereby the ‘locus’ of truth is an ‘assertion’—
understood specifically to mean ‘judgement’—and the ‘essence’ of truth lies in that 
judgement being in ‘agreement’ or ‘correspondence’ with an object.102 Such a 
conception renders truth to be a mere “relation”103 of ‘agreement’ between a subject and 
object, an adequatio or ‘correspondence’. Heidegger thinks that for such a 
correspondence between a judgement and an entity to be at all possible, an entity must 
first show itself. For Heidegger assertion is not locus of truth; on the contrary, the 
assertion is grounded in and already dependent upon a prior operation of 
disclosedness.104 This means that the traditional conception of truth is ontologically 
“derivative” upon a more “primordial conception”,105 wherein truth comes closer to 
‘disclosure’. This notion is aletheia. If we return to Heidegger’s notion of the 
‘distinctive’ sense of the phenomenon, it seems to me that aletheia describes the 
‘double-play’ through which the phenomenon operates both ‘formally’—as that which 
shows itself—and ‘phenomenologically’—as that which is self-concealing.    
A more precise definition of what Heidegger means by truth can be arrived at by 
looking at his etymological analysis of the Ancient Greek word. Aletheia means ‘truth’, 
‘sincerity’, ‘frankness’, or ‘truthfulness’. Etymologically, it derives from an older root 
form, lethein, which means to be ‘hidden’ ‘unseen’ or ‘unnoticed’, which in turn is 
related to lethe, which means ‘forgetting’, ‘forgetfulness’.106 Aletheia thus implies 
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something ‘hidden’ in the particular sense of ‘forgotten’. For Heidegger, the 
composition of the word aletheia is crucial. Aletheia is commonly accepted as a-letheia, 
where the a- is privative prefix. What this means is that truth as aletheia is that which is 
un-concealed. By placing the emphasis upon the privative operation of the prefix, 
Heidegger consolidates a form of phenomenology underpinned by the premise of the 
logical and ontological primordial character of the ‘concealed’. As we will see later in 
this chapter, Heidegger’s concept for explaining this ontologically primordial character 
of concealedness, as it appears specifically within the artwork, will be Earth. The 
‘concealed’ element is central to ‘truth’ for Heidegger, because without the uncovering 
of that which is hidden but demands to come to light, truth does not occur. This will 
position the artwork as the significant site in which truth as aletheia happens. 
Because truth as aletheia is understood as the dis-closing or the un-concealment of the 
Being of entities, truth is the central drive of phenomenology. However, for the early 
Heidegger, the uncovering of the Being of a particular entity is a kind of secondary 
level of truth disclosing itself. In Being and Time Heidegger claims that, “what makes 
this uncovering possible must necessarily be called ‘true’ in a still more primordial 
sense. The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-
ontological foundations of uncovering.”107 The highest or most primordial notion of 
truth is the process of disclosure or uncovering itself. This leads us back to the concept 
of the true ‘phenomenon’, as disclosure itself is that which does not typically show 
itself, yet stands as the grounds of possibility for all other individual disclosures.  
Heidegger’s concept of aletheia becomes increasingly central in his later work, in 
particular, ‘Origin of the Work of Art’. This is because, as we shall see, through his 
specifically ontological account of the artwork Heidegger wishes to stress that the 
central function of the work is not representational, i.e., the role of the artwork is not 
most essentially to correspond to or to depict reality, but to instead reconstitute reality, 
by setting up a new world of meaningful references. On my understanding, the aletheia 
at work in the artwork is characterised precisely as a kind of struggle between the 
formal and phenomenological aspects of the phenomenon, reformulated as World and 
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Earth. Due to Heidegger’s decentralisation of the individual human logos as the lever of 
discourse in his later work, aletheia is explicitly thematised as the ‘happening’ of truth, 
i.e., the ‘double play’ or struggle between the ‘self-showing’ and ‘self-concealing’, 
which constitutes a specifically historical delineation of the intelligible. World and 
Earth thus can, I believe, be understood as the historical dimensions or versions of the 
elements of the ‘double-play’ of unconcealment, which emerge specifically through the 
artwork. 
Part Two: ‘Thingliness’ in the Symbolic Notion of the Artwork 
In Chapter One, several distinct formulations of the ontology of the artwork were 
considered in turn, in order to assess whether they might be capable of capturing what is 
unique about conceptual art. Whilst each account presented an entirely distinct theory, 
there is also a way in which all three could be considered as analogous to each other, 
i.e., that central to each account was the attempt to describe the specific relation of 
priority between the ideational and the material elements of the artwork. Each account 
predominantly analysed their proposed ontology within the framework of what 
Heidegger calls the ‘symbolic’ notion of artwork. By ‘symbolic’—and Heidegger here 
refers to the Greek συµβάλλειν, or symballein108—Heidegger means a formulation 
whereby the artwork is understood to be most essentially composed of two main 
elements: a material ‘object’ or ‘thing’ and a meaning. On this account, the artwork is a 
relation between ‘thingness’, in the sense of a physical, effected ‘object’ of some kind, 
and a non-physical realm, a “something other” alongside it.109 Philosophers of art often 
notate this relation thus: an artwork is a material object X + Y.110 The philosophical 
project is then conceived, firstly, as the discovery of what precisely this enigmatic ‘Y’ 
is, and secondly, as the explanation of how it impacts upon or transforms the material 
object X.111 Due to the fact that it is this “something other”, which is perceived as that 
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which distinguishes the artwork from any other commonplace object, it is the realm of 
the symbolic, the allegorical, the signified, which constitutes the “proper element” of art 
in most traditional aesthetic theories.112  
The result of this is that the ‘thingly’ or material element is often reduced to a 
“substructure into and upon which the proper element is built.”113 Through such a 
dichotomy, the ‘thingly’ element is conceived as an underlying material base or support 
whose role is to function as the mere vehicle or container for its worldly, symbolic or 
allegorical meaning. As we have seen, in their theoretical writings, some conceptual 
artists themselves emphasise this perceived dichotomy between a material ‘thing’ and 
‘something other’—which, in the case of conceptual art, is most typically thought to be 
an idea or a concept, or else an intention, which is easily identifiable and can be 
paraphrased. Such theoretical declarations stress the sheer passivity and, often as a 
result, the arbitrariness of the material ‘substructure’. If we take certain conceptual 
artists at their word, then conceptual art might be seen as the attempt to demonstrate that 
it is in fact only ‘Y’ which constitutes the work proper; the material ‘substructure’ being 
a mere remnant or leftover of the real art.114 The first half of ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ 
challenges the very foundation of this symbolic notion of art upon which such a 
valorisation of the ideational component is possible and it does so through critically 
analysing its inherent presuppositions. Whilst initially assuming this dichotomy, 
Heidegger takes the ‘symbolic’ notion of the artwork—with its implications of 
rendering the material a passive ‘substructure’—as his most critical point of departure. 
Heidegger’s investigation will not concern itself straightforwardly with what ‘Y’ is or 
how it can impact upon or transform the material object X. Instead, the artwork is the 
indivisible phenomenological relation between these elements—which Heidegger will 
rename World and Earth—which is constituted by the dominant formative power of the 
material element to delineate the intelligible. 
                                                
112 Heidegger. (1936). P146. The distinction of the artwork from the commonplace object is the central 
concern in Arthur Danto’s theory about Pop Art and the ‘Readymade’. However, for Danto, the 
“something other” is an extremely complex set of factors including theory and art-history. See Danto. 
(1981).  
113 Heidegger. (1936) P146 
114 See Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, (Artforum, 5:10 (Summer 1967), reprinted in (ed.) 
Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, Art Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, (Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford, 1992) 
  
94 
For Heidegger, the material entity or object of the artwork—which Heidegger calls its 
‘thingliness’—is by definition to some extent, and in some manner, “irremovably 
present in the artwork”115 and constitutes that which cannot be circumvented in any 
philosophical analysis. It is thus with the ‘thingliness’ that he begins his investigation. 
However, the problem of trying to think the ‘thingly’—either in itself, or in the manner 
in which it belongs to or constitutes an artwork—hits a constant blockage in 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic logic. With the ‘thing’, claims Heidegger, thought meets with 
its “greatest resistance” in trying to think it,116 a resistance that turns out to be resistance 
to a certain kind of thinking. ‘Thingliness’ is a kind of impasse, the presence of which 
can neither be rendered immediately intelligible nor simply ‘got around’, in order to 
reach the so-called “proper element” exclusively.117 Rather than try to positively define 
what ‘thingliness’ is, Heidegger pursues a destructive retrieve of three ‘thing-concepts’, 
which he considers to have gained dominance at different moments and in distinct 
disciplines throughout the history of ontology.118 I consider it beyond the focus of this 
chapter to engage explicitly with this part of Heidegger’s analysis. However, I 
understand Heidegger’s implicit objective to be a demonstration of how each concept, 
though seemingly distinct, in fact reduces the ‘thing’, either to something ‘present-at-
hand’ or to something ‘ready-at-hand’. In doing so, Heidegger reveals the inadequacy of 
each concept to an articulation of the unique manner in which materiality is present in 
the artwork specifically as a phenomenological element. As a consequence of this, he 
demonstrates that to focus an inquiry exclusively on the nature of the thingly element of 
the work as an isolatable unit of analysis is in fact superfluous:119 the material element 
of the artwork is not in fact a material ‘substructure’ or ‘object’, but must be grasped in 
its phenomenological character through its active relations within the work itself. The 
‘work’ is thus ontologically prior to the art-object.  
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Part Three: The Relation of World and Earth in Heidegger’s 
Artwork 
The aim of this section is to give a close analysis of Heidegger’s alternative conceptual 
schema of World and Earth, to draw out the specific ontology of the artwork that it 
establishes and to critically asses whether such an ontology might be relevant to 
thinking about conceptual art in a manner which overcomes some of the problems of the 
texts presented in Chapter One. Whilst it is my contention that the two terms World [die 
Welt] and Earth [die Erde] cannot be fully understood when taken individually and in 
isolation from their mutual relation, it is nevertheless necessary to clarify these terms to 
a certain extent before embarking upon the central analysis of how they operate 
together. This seems especially true for the term World because it constitutes a central 
concept that runs throughout Heidegger’s philosophy, beginning with its initial 
exposition in Being and Time. To fully understand what Heidegger means by the World 
of the artwork requires an account of the way in which the significance of this term 
develops from Being and Time to ‘Origin of the Work of Art’. Whilst Heidegger 
dedicates the whole of Part Three of Being and Time to a lengthy exposition of the 
World and whilst a vast amount of literature exists on the topic, my specific focus will 
be the manner in which the concept of World develops in two distinct yet related ways. 
(1) The development of the World specifically from a referential totality or system of 
rather generic, useful things, to a more historical and thus particularised context of 
meaning and significance. (2) The implicit shift from the World as something revealed 
to the World in its most ontological character as constitutive of revelation. I anticipate 
that to take the concept of World in the full extension of its meaning—i.e., the way in 
which Heidegger describes the power of the Greek Temple to provide the openness of a 
World that can deliver an historical people to the “fulfilment of its vocation”120—would 
be problematic for conceptual art, and perhaps any contemporary art form for that 
matter. However, it is my contention that despite this, an understanding of the 
intelligible aspect set up by the conceptual artwork based, which is based around 
Heidegger’s conception of an open relational context of the World—as opposed to 
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merely an intention, idea or concept—can still be helpful for thinking about such art. 
Conceptual art might not be ‘world founding’ in the fundamental sense of the Greek 
Temple, but it might still be capable of setting up a World in the way that the Van Gogh 
painting or the Meyer poem are. However, first we need to understand what World is. 
1. The World in Being and Time 
It is important to emphasise that in Being and Time, Heidegger’s investigation takes 
place specifically “within the horizon of average everydayness”.121 He is concerned 
with revealing that ‘pre-ontological’ structure of relations “closest” to us on an 
everyday level and which we take for granted. He calls this structure the “environment” 
[Umwelt].122 In §14 of Being and Time, Heidegger claims that whilst the Greeks had 
captured something significant about the term ‘thing’ through their concept πρᾶξις—
i.e., ‘praxis’ or “that which one has to do with in their concernful dealings”123—
ontologically speaking, they obscured its specifically ‘pragmatic’ character,124 taking 
‘things’ to be ‘mere things’ or ‘presence-at-hand’.125 For Heidegger as we have already 
seen, when entities appear ‘present-at-hand’, they appear as abstractions of the 
theoretical or perceptual gaze. Such relations necessarily presuppose an ontologically 
prior mode of relation: the ‘ready-to-hand’.126 When immersed in everyday activities, 
our primary engagement with ‘things’ is not as the mere ‘objects’ of our theoretical or 
perceptual “interpretive tendencies”,127 but as equipmental items of use.128 In Being and 
Time Heidegger thus defines ‘concern’ [besorgen] as the manipulation and putting to 
use of things,129 a practical immersion in the world through a fluid engagement with our 
surroundings. To treat ‘things’ as ‘present-at-hand’ is thus to conceal both what those 
‘things’ really are in our everyday relation to them and to simultaneously conceal the 
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very structure of ‘concern’ itself.130 The World of Being and Time therefore, constitutes 
the structure of the relational context—what Heidegger calls the “wherein”131—within 
which such primary concernful dealings occur. In Heideggerian terminology, the 
“wherein” constitutes a “pre-ontologico-existentiell signification,”132 which means that 
it describes the ‘concern’ of the individual self, as to its selfhood, whilst immersed 
within practical relations with the world.133 To emphasise the pragmatic and engaged 
character of this World, Heidegger uses the term ‘work-world’ [Werk-welt].134 
For Heidegger, it is only by virtue of this relational context that we can understand what 
entities truly are and can thus find them meaningful. The very essence of the ‘ready-to-
hand’ is that it necessarily exists and finds its meaning within a relational totality of 
intelligibility because equipment can only be equipmental in relation to other 
equipment. As Heidegger explains, it does not make sense to speak of equipment in the 
singular. For example, Heidegger lays out four basic ways135 in which equipment refers 
to or ‘turns away from itself’ and ‘points’ [deuten] towards something else. Firstly, 
equipment is used, it is what Heidegger calls a “something-in-order-to” [um-zu].136 This 
constitutes the action of purposeful using. Secondly, equipment has a “towards-which” 
[Wozu], the work is to ‘produce’ something.137 Thirdly, equipment has a “whereof” 
[Woraus], material or that from which it is constituted.138 Finally, equipment has a “for-
the-sake-of-which” [Worumwillen], or ‘final purpose’.139 The World is thus what 
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Stulburg describes as the “unified fabric of relationships”,140 which individuate entities 
as meaningful within their relations. It is only through this referential context that 
‘things’ in our everyday mode of relation can be meaningful. In Being and Time, World 
thus constitutes the condition of possibility of the appearance of ‘things’ as individuated 
and meaningful.  As such, Lewis explains, the World of Being and Time is effectively 
synonymous with Being141 because, as we have seen, Being for Heidegger at this point 
constitutes that which always shows up alongside entities: its condition of possibility. 
Whilst Heidegger’s central metaphor here seems to be that of the craft industry, I agree 
with Graham Harman that this should not be taken too literally as a theory of ‘tools’ per 
se.142 Heidegger’s ‘work-world’ describes not only the “domestic world of the 
workshop” but encompasses also the “public world”.143 The World of Being and Time 
describes ‘pre-ontological’ relations. It designates, first and foremost, the mode of 
relation which can be described as a concernful, ‘pragmatic’ absorption in the world. 
Thus ‘tools’ could designate any entity that we relate to in an instrumental manner. It 
could then—in theory at least—designate an artwork. 
Heidegger thinks that on a certain implicit or ‘pre-ontological’144 level, we are always 
already aware of the World. When we walk into a room, we do not merely encounter 
individual pieces of equipment, but a total environment.145 Heidegger calls this 
“circumspection” [Umsicht].146 The World of Being and Time—i.e., the referential 
context of the ‘ready-to-hand’—is that structure which ‘shows up alongside’ equipment, 
which is “lit up for it, along with those entities themselves.”147 However, due to the fact 
that our everyday mode of engagement in the World is to be immersed within it, its 
structure cannot be grasped thematically, neither whilst immersed, nor through detached 
theoretical observation. As Dahlstrom explains, “the world does not announce itself, 
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holding itself back,’148 and this ‘holding back’ cannot appear. The fact that we are 
immersed within a context of interdependent relations can present itself to us only when 
an element of that context breaks down.  
What I consider to be crucial in Heidegger’s theory is that it is specifically the 
phenomenological state of presence of materiality that seems to differentiate the 
ontological character of an artwork from that of equipment, and is thus the marker for 
instrumentalisation. The fact that equipment has a logic of reliability, which we 
experience as “usefulness”, is made palpable to us—Heidegger implies—through the 
specific manner in which it facilitates the coming into presence of its materiality. In 
simultaneity with the subordination of the material to utility in the production of 
equipment, it has the character of being phenomenologically invisible, so to speak, 
when in use. For a hammer to function fluidly and efficiently, it must become an 
extension of the arm that is doing the hammering action. This entails, for Heidegger, 
that the sheer fact of its materiality must drop out of immediate phenomenological 
presence and cease to be an issue for us. Material is “used up” in the use of equipment 
and only appears when the equipment breaks down and ceases to be useful, i.e., when 
its reliability is no longer actively propelled towards its contextual surroundings. 
However, even in this situation, what comes forth as material, is the equipment’s having 
sunk into being “mere stuff”. Judged in relation to its former reliability, when 
equipment breaks, it is reduced to a detraction of its former self; matter denuded of its 
teleological vibrancy and thus of its practical use for the subject. On my interpretation, 
what this suggests is that nowhere in the piece of equipment lay the potential for any 
degree of phenomenological encounter with materiality in its positive ontological 
determination: in the first instance because, when working, materiality is of necessity 
invisible, in the second because, when not working, materiality sinks into “mere stuff”.  
So we can see that this problem with the World relates very closely to Heidegger’s 
observations about the fate of materiality in equipmental beings, i.e., that it can never 
truly show itself as itself. The materiality of equipment can never truly ‘appear’ as that 
which holds itself back. This is because what we encounter when equipment doesn’t 
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work, is not the recalcitrance or withdrawal unique to equipment. Rather, it is the 
“conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy”149 of such equipment when it has sunk 
into being mere stuff, i.e., a characteristic of the ‘present-at-hand’ that shows itself 
through the ‘ready-to-hand’. As Lewis explains, it is as though the fact of ‘readiness-to-
hand’ makes itself ‘present-at-hand’150 and thus brings itself into the light as a possible 
object of thematic study. Presumably, in simultaneity to this, our structure of ‘concern’ 
with which we relate to the World also appears in some manner. 
It might be tempting to claim at this point that an analogy can be made between 
Heidegger’s account of the World in Being and Time, as appearing through the rupture 
in equipmental everydayness, and the operations of conceptual art. After all, conceptual 
art often takes entities or pieces of equipment, which already exist within the referential 
totality of the ‘work-world’151 and places them into the gallery. In this case, perhaps 
conceptual art is best understood, not with recourse to Heidegger’s ontology of the 
artwork, but to Heidegger’s ontology of equipment. The most obvious example would 
be one of Duchamp’s Readymades, such as Fountain, but this applies equally, as we 
saw in Chapter One, to a whole range of other, more precisely periodised conceptual 
works such as Joseph Kosuth’s A Two Metre Square Sheet of Glass to Lean Against the 
Wall. 
However, I will now demonstrate why this analogy is inadequate and why we instead 
require a specific definition of how Fountain operates as an artwork, and why such a 
definition benefits from the presence of a phenomenological mechanism, such as World 
and Earth. In support of this analogy, one might argue that through the de-
contextualisation of the urinal from its typical worldly relations, the ‘Readymade’ as an 
artwork is encountered as a piece of equipment which is ‘unusable’ and that within this 
‘unusability’ we come up against the “conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and 
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151 In most cases, the objects used in conceptual art—such as Duchamp’s urinal or Kosuth’s sheet of 
glass—were newly produced and thus had not strictly been wrenched from their full immersion within 
this totality. However, their very ontological character as products still places them within this totality. 
For Heidegger, even the ‘product’ carries the trace of these references.   
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obstinacy,”152 of the equipmental entity within its quality of appearing as merely 
‘present-at-hand’. However, already this explanation feels rather inaccurate. When we 
encounter Fountain in a gallery we are not already immersed in a practical, relational 
context wherein we project the expectation to use the urinal.153 Without this prior 
immersion within a context of specifically pragmatic relations, we cannot encounter that 
de-contextualisation or ‘rupture’, which characterises for the early Heidegger, the 
World appearing. Such a rupture must necessarily result from the equipment breaking 
down when we are taking it for granted in its functioning as equipment. Does this then 
mean that Fountain is more accurately understood as an art-object, or the presentation 
of a mere thing? One might argue that first and foremost, Fountain is the presentation of 
a formerly functional entity, already decontextualised from its relational context and 
thus ‘reduced’ to an object, specifically for our theoretical or perceptual “interpretive 
tendencies.”154 If this were the case then Fountain, of course, would still not be simply a 
‘mere thing’, entirely devoid of its equipmental character. Instead, as an object, it would 
necessarily ‘turn away’ from itself and ‘point’ towards the contextual relational totality 
of the equipmental World to which it typically belongs.155 
If either of these descriptions could be said to constitute a convincing account of the 
ontology of Fountain, then two central, yet related consequences would emerge. Firstly, 
we could not say that the phenomenon of the World as the specifically “pre-ontological” 
context of references was capable of appearing to us through an encounter with it. 
Secondly, we could have no encounter with materiality as itself. The artwork would 
either yield entirely to a precise and fluid instrumental project, or it would simply lay 
there, as mere stuff. If we are not formerly immersed within the contextual relations that 
we think are revealed, then we cannot encounter the “rupture” but instead can only 
experience the urinal predominantly through the theoretical and perceptual gaze. 
Fountain, though in some sense, both a piece of equipment and an object ‘present-at-
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153 There have been many cases of artists or members of the public actually urinating into Fountain as a 
way of interacting with the equipmental nature of the work and reversing the expectation of 
‘circumspection’. 
154 Heidegger. (1927) §15, P95, 67 
155 As Lewis suggests, it might in fact be the case that for Heidegger, such thing as an entirely pure 
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hand’, specifically by virtue of its displacement from the equipmental totality, is not 
denoted adequately by either of these ontological descriptions. This is because Fountain 
is primarily an artwork: it is an artwork before it is anything else. Uniquely as an 
artwork, Fountain sets itself up in a relational space of ‘concern’, which neither reduces 
it to mere object, nor allows it to stand in an equipmental relation to us, though it, in 
some sense, gives us access to the ‘truth’ of both of these possible phenomenological 
structures of entities and an awareness of the manner in which they operate, not as 
utterly discrete kinds of beings, but as varying ways in which things can appear.  
It seems to me that the ‘environment’ within which we engage with artworks—the ‘art-
world’156—would have to have its own distinct mode of ‘circumspection’, which carried 
with it a particular structure of ‘concern’. This structure would presumably be 
considerably different from that mode of ‘circumspection’ we have when immersed, 
‘pre-ontologically’, within what Heidegger refers to broadly as the ‘work-world’ of the 
‘ready-to-hand’. Instead, the ‘circumspection’ would need to be ontological, in the 
sense that it would involve a certain kind of attentiveness or alertness to the constitution 
of what is or, in Heidegger’s terminology, to Being. As we do not typically enter into an 
art gallery with the expectation or purpose of using the artworks for a specific 
‘practical’ task—at least not in the way that we might walk into a workshop full of 
tools, which we expect to use to build a table, for example—we cannot experience the 
‘rupture’ that Heidegger describes when our fluid engagement in the ‘work-world’ 
breaks down. Whilst an everyday, commonplace urinal might present itself to some as 
‘obstinate’ or irritating within a gallery setting, it is not because we are unable to use the 
urinal to urinate in whilst in the gallery.  
However, another line of argument might be pursued at this point. One might claim that 
what is ruptured through an encounter with Fountain is that mode of ‘circumspection’ 
typical to the environment specific to the art gallery or artworld more generally. After 
all, to a large degree conceptual art did attempt to quite fundamentally rupture what 
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some of its protagonists felt to have become habitual within that ‘circumspection’, i.e., a 
predominantly visual encounter of entities whose status as artworks were thought to be 
too based upon their morphological continuity with the totality of entities in the history 
of art.157 In this sense, the motivating objectives of the conceptual art movement might 
be seen as the attempt to challenge a mode of relation to artworks as ‘present-at-hand’, 
as objects of contemplation. One could argue that conceptual art does this partly by 
developing an environment of the art World from a space constituted by what 
Heidegger would refer to as the mere collection of countable and familiar entities at 
hand,158 into a more phenomenological site in which we gain some sense of the manner 
in which entities come to individuate themselves. The ‘phenomenon’ that is brought to 
light by artworks more accurately on this account would be the ‘art-world’, with all of 
the specificities of its implicitly understood ‘circumspection’. If this were an adequate 
interpretation of what is at stake with works of a conceptual nature such as Fountain, 
what would have been revealed is that, despite the tendency which runs through the 
history of a Romantic style aesthetic theory to valorise the artwork above such 
functional pieces of equipment, that the artwork was, after all, equipmental, in the 
extended Heideggerian sense of having an ontological structure founded upon relations 
that are essentially instrumental. The artwork, one might say, has come to be fully 
expected to perform a certain function within a particular World of circumspection, in 
this case, the function of providing an object for the contemplative gaze. If this were an 
adequate reading of conceptual art, what we would encounter with Fountain would not 
be the obstinacy of the urinal as equipment, but the obstinacy of the urinal as art.  
However, there is one central problem with this account. Even if the artworld and the 
gallery system can be identified as generally having its own form of ‘circumspection’, 
and even if this can become rather habitual—as it seems almost definitive of more 
avant-garde art to assume and to fear that it has—it does not seem convincing that this 
can be akin to the ‘immersion’ that we experience in our daily equipmental dealings. It 
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seems to me that the central point of the art gallery is that it is a place within which each 
particular artwork is presented such that it might potentially both open up a unique 
perspective, and help constitute the relational totality of the gallery environment. To be 
attentive to the particularity of each work is central to the structure of art’s 
‘circumspection’. To me this seems true not merely of discrete traditional art-objects, 
such as sculptures and paintings—wherein the particularity is literally inscribed within 
the work’s internal detail, or within the signature of the artist-subject—but also, and 
more fundamentally, for Heidegger’s thought, I believe, works such as Readymades.  
I interpret the most essential characteristic of the artwork for Heidegger to be this: that 
the work is not an entity amongst entities, it is not simply a piece of equipment or an 
object of theoretical or perceptual gaze, but a place, which facilitates the achievement of 
a distinct kind of proximity to other entities. The artwork is the site in which we can 
encounter the true nature of entities, but without anything breaking down, as it were. 
For Heidegger, the artwork is unique in that it is able to create a certain contemplative 
distance without reducing the work to the perceptual or theoretical object of gaze. 
Through the artwork then, Heidegger is able to retain the emphasis upon ‘concern’, 
whilst decentralising the pragmatic or practical character of everyday involvement in 
things. The artwork is not something everyday, yet it is that which allows us to both see 
the ‘truth’ of the everyday and also, we shall see, to set it up or construct it. 
2. World and Earth in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ 
In footnote 55 of The Essence of Reasons, Heidegger states that his characterisation of 
the World in Being and Time as a “system of useful things” is a mere preliminary 
sketch.159 Indeed, the World that appears in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ has been rather 
significantly developed. This development can be attributed to the fact that Heidegger 
posits a counterpole to his concept World: the Earth. The artwork, for Heidegger, 
simultaneously “sets up” [Aufstellen] the World and “sets forth” [Herstellen] the Earth, 
setting them into “intimate strife”160 with one another. They are in ‘strife’ because they 
constitute opposing tendencies: ‘the World tends towards and strives for intelligibility, 
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whilst the Earth is the self-secluding element, which resists ever being brought into full 
intelligibility. However, their ‘strife’ is ‘intimate’ precisely because their respective 
characters—as the drive for intelligibility and as the self-secluding—are constituted 
only in their relation of opposition to one another. Neither pole can be thought 
individually, but are instead, mutually constitutive. The World needs the Earth precisely 
because it needs to ground itself in something substantial, and the Earth needs the 
World to bring it into the light as the self-secluding. However, the ‘strife’ or struggle is 
not to be understood as a visual or aesthetic dimension of the work itself. Instead, as 
Michael Haar points out, it remains “latent, intimate, preliminary to the appearance of 
the work and thus invisible in it.”161 It seems that this is in part what Heidegger implies 
when he claims that, “the repose of the work that rests in itself thus has its essence in 
the intimacy of strife.”162 This seems important because if it were the case that only 
those artworks that somehow visually encapsulated strife could be relevant to 
Heidegger’s theory, one might argue that it ruled out a considerable amount of 
conceptual art, which some might identify as be having a rather cool or calm aesthetic. 
Instead, the relation between these poles describes the process of disclosure through 
which the artwork phenomenologically and ontologically reconfigures and reconstitutes 
the delineation of that which is brought to light as the intelligible at any historical 
moment. It is thus the logical extension of Heidegger’s phenomenological project. The 
artwork is, for Heidegger, the most proper site of the ‘phenomenon’. 
To understand both the transition of Heideggerian phenomenology from Being and 
Time to ‘Origin of the Work of Art’, and the central significance of the concept Earth 
within this transition is, I think, to grasp the logical extension of Heidegger’s 
deformalisation of phenomenology. As we saw, Heidegger sought to delineate the 
distinctive ‘phenomenon’ of phenomenology as that which proximally and for the most 
part does not show itself, yet nevertheless demands to be brought to light. This 
distinctive phenomenon is thus involved in a ‘double-play’: it is both formal, i.e., it both 
shows itself in itself and phenomenological, i.e., it is that which lies hidden and has the 
greatest demand to be brought to light. For the Heidegger of Being and Time, the 
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‘phenomenon’ in this distinctive sense just is what Heidegger calls the World, i.e., the 
pre-ontological context of references, which gives entities their meaning. Due to the fact 
that the World is Being at this point in Heidegger’s thinking, as discussed previously, 
then the ‘phenomenon’ is ‘Being’, i.e., it is the implicit condition of possibility, which 
can be brought thematically to light. The self-concealing aspect of Being and Time 
constituted the tendency of the world to not show itself as “obstinate” when we are 
immersed within it through our practical relation to tools, but to instead withdraw into 
invisibility.  
Robert Stulberg is an example of a scholar who interprets World and Earth as concepts 
that predominantly emerge from, and are a development of, Heidegger’s basic 
framework of the ‘ontological difference’. World and Earth, says Stulberg, “clearly 
reflect” the way in which, in Being and Time, Dasein exists on two distinct levels of 
reality, “existing reality” [das Seiende]—i.e., entities in the real world—and “the being 
of existing reality” [das Sein des Seienden]—i.e., the unified fabric of the relationships 
which gives meaning to the world.163 As we saw, in Being and Time, Heidegger thinks 
that to arrive at an understanding of what “existing reality” is, Dasein must transcend 
reality and relate to it within a context, within a realm of ‘being’. This leads Stulberg to 
draw a parallel between the Dasein of Being and Time and the artwork, in that the 
artwork also “exists on two levels.” These levels are World and Earth.  The Earth, or the 
material aspect of the work corresponds to the “existing reality” in Being and Time, 
whilst the World is the “being of existing reality”, the “context of higher relationships 
which gives meaning to the artwork.” Just like entities in Being and Time, the Earth of 
the artwork, claims Stulberg, is ‘self-concealing’ and withdrawn. To describe the 
tendency of withdrawal, Heidegger takes an example of a boulder. Even if we try to 
smash the boulder into parts, in order to examine its contents and measure its mass, we 
can never lay hold of its true character. For Stulberg then, whilst we can never fully 
‘reveal’ the Earth by way of rendering it intelligible, the artwork operates as that unique 
site within which Earth can appear or come to light.164 
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I identify the introduction of Earth, as the counterpole to World to significantly develop 
Heideggerian phenomenology in three main ways. Firstly, the World is no longer 
synonymous with the whole ‘phenomenon’, but constitutes only its intelligible side. 
Heidegger posits Earth to designate the self-concealing aspect of the ‘phenomenon’. As 
the self-concealing aspect, Earth—and more specifically, materiality—is now 
synonymous to Being, and thus Being is no longer that which cannot appear whilst 
things are functioning. Rather, Being can appear and can do so without anything 
breaking down. However, Being must appear specifically as that which cannot be 
rendered fully intelligible, i.e., that which cannot be fully exhausted. In this sense, it 
seems to me that the concept of Earth functions for Heidegger to describe how there can 
be a continuum from Being to beings, thus bridging, without entirely eradicating, the 
ontological difference, i.e., the difference between Being and beings. Secondly, due to 
the fact that Earth or materiality is the concealed aspect, materiality is ontologically 
primordial. Indeed, for Heidegger, Earth as the self-concealing tendency of materiality 
constitutes that from which the ‘worldly’ or intelligible arises, that which grounds and 
substantiates the intelligible and that which demonstrates resistance and recalcitrance to 
being rendered fully intelligible. Thirdly, because Heidegger posits the mechanism of 
the World and the Earth as the disclosive logic of the artwork itself, phenomenology is 
specifically less dependent upon the individual logos165 and thus Heidegger can explain 
how different particularised or historical ‘worlds’ emerge. World is no longer a system 
of generic166 and practical relations, but instead, takes on a particular and historical 
dimension. Through the artwork it is not that an everyday, yet typically concealed 
World can ‘unconceal’ itself through a rupture in the generic and pragmatic relations 
between man and tools. Rather, the artwork “sets up” a space in which the disclosure of 
a specific and particularised World is fought out between the struggle of World as the 
intelligible face of the phenomenon, and Earth, as the unintelligible aspect. This is why, 
I think, Lewis claims that ‘Being’ for Heidegger at this stage of his writing refers to the 
‘particular’. Fourthly, in the most ontological sense, World also comes to mean, not 
merely the intelligible, but the ontological striving towards intelligibility and likewise, 
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Earth comes to mean the striving against intelligibility. In ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ 
then, Heidegger’s delineation of phenomenology reaches its logical extension.  
To my mind, these distinct developments within Heidegger’s phenomenology help to 
explain the distinct levels on which the artwork can operate. It is useful, I think, to turn 
to the recent work of Iain Thompson on this topic,167 as I consider it to provide a very 
clear account of these distinct levels of operation. Thompson claims that for Heidegger, 
the artwork is an “ontological paradigm”,168 in that it provides a model of, and indeed 
sometimes for, reality. This ontological functioning, claims Thompson, operates on at 
least three different levels: as “micro-paradigmatic”, “paradigmatic” and “macro-
paradigmatic”.169 The Van Gogh painting that Heidegger discusses functions in at least 
the first two ways. Firstly, it reveals to us what a pair of shoes are ‘in truth’,170 i.e., how 
shoes function within a referential totality with which we have ‘concernful dealings’. 
However, the painting reveals this specifically through opening a unique space in which 
an imaginative encounter with the representation of the shoes can occur. What this 
artistic space allows, claims Heidegger—distinct from either real shoes, lying in the 
hallway, or the representation of shoes simply in the imagination—is an understanding 
of their equipmental character, and their relation to a specific human context. We 
encounter their true character for the peasant woman, who in turn is defined through her 
‘concernful’ dealings with their character of reliability. It seems to me that the example 
of the Van Gogh painting is primarily supposed to demonstrate that the artwork 
facilitates a unique kind of proximity, wherein the World can appear, without the 
necessity of either a former immersion or a rupture. As a consequence of this, both the 
World and the structure of ‘concern’ itself can appear without either withdrawing or 
sinking into mere stuff. This revelation is what Thompson terms “micro-paradigmatic”: 
what it reveals is the “thing thinging”,171 i.e., it shows entities emerging as what they 
are with their own significant meaning. However, this stands in immediate distinction 
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from a non-artistic encounter with an object. Through an encounter with the 
dependencies of the peasant woman with the shoes, the painting also reveals the 
character of things to be truly constituted within a context in which things matter to us, 
within a context of ‘concern’. Secondly, by way of this “micro-paradigmatic” process of 
disclosure, it has been revealed to us—“unwittingly”, Heidegger rather disingenuously 
claims172—the manner in which art itself works: art just is this rather unique process of 
disclosure, through which it is revealed to us what entities ‘in truth’ are. What the 
artwork discloses is how art itself works, and art itself works by disclosing. This 
disclosure is what Thompson called “paradigmatic”.173 This constitutes a kind of meta-
level or a certain notable self-reflexivity.174 Finally, in its most “macro-paradigmatic” 
functioning, the artwork not only reveals a familiar, yet typically hidden World of 
meaning or reveals itself to be a site of revelation, but rather “sets up” or establishes a 
new World or context of significance. 
Whilst this is not identified in Thompson’s categorisation, it is my contention that the 
third “macro-paradigmatic” operation can again be divided into two instances. First of 
all, we might say that an artwork can “set up” a new World of significance around it—
an ‘art-world’175 perhaps—or could even operate as a blueprint for a new realm of 
relations or a new configuration of relations that we might take on with regards to 
aspects of the wider world surrounding us. However, there is yet another, even more 
fundamental sense in which Heidegger thinks that the truly great artwork should be 
capable of “setting up” a World, and that is by “governing” the basic self-understanding 
of an historical community. On my interpretation, the strong or extended sense of this 
“macro-paradigmatic” functioning of the artwork seems to be reserved by Heidegger for 
the Greek Temple only. Whilst the Van Gogh painting seems to operate as a bridge 
from representation, to World revelation, to World constitution, it does not in any clear 
sense seem to designate fundamental and historical World foundation. It is my 
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contention that to attempt to attribute the “macro-paradigmatic” functioning, in its 
strongest and most extended sense to artworks such as conceptual art is quite 
implausible. Whilst conceptual artworks might very well be capable of setting up and 
re-organising the self-understanding of a particular art community, or art-world, or 
even, as Santiago Zabalar has suggested, to reorganise the system of meanings of the 
world of entities or equipment,176 it does not seem convincing to claim that art still 
holds the power and capability of reorganising the historical understanding of man, on 
this deeper and more fundamental level. We will have to forego this strongest sense of 
Heidegger’s conceptualisation if we want to talk about conceptual artworks in a 
convincing manner. However, this need not necessarily be a major problem. Through 
this extended “macro-paradigmatic” notion of World foundation, Heidegger is 
obviously appealing to a quasi-Hegelian notion of the artwork as constituting the 
highest significance and fulfilment of human existence. Whilst Hegel had proclaimed 
the end of art, to point to the fact that art no longer has this significance, Heidegger 
poses it as an open question.177 It is my contention that it is possible to relate to such a 
questioning of the significance of art, which Heidegger significantly reserves for the 
Epilogue, as a kind of ideal, yet one that functions specifically to open up a way of 
thinking about and relating to the art of our times, to find resonances of the significance 
of art, which are more particular to our age. In this sense, it is about finding what 
Heidegger had previously called the “positive possibilities” of contemporary art. 
Through its development into ‘Origin of the Work of Art’, the World comes to 
constitute, not the whole ‘phenomenon’, which demands to be brought to light, but only 
its intelligible aspect or face. Heidegger introduces the counterpole Earth, to operate as 
that through which the “double play” of phenomenology can occur. In ‘Origin of the 
Work of Art’, the World constitutes the formal drive or tendency of the phenomenon, 
whilst Earth is reserved for the self-concealing and recalcitrant element, i.e., the truly 
‘phenomenological’ drive of the ‘phenomenon’. Earth is that which resists and can 
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never be fully rendered intelligible by the World. As such, the Earth, explains 
Dahlstrom, seems to replace the aspect of concealment and withdrawal characteristic of 
all the various senses of what it means “to be”, which are elaborated in Being and 
Time.178 In my interpretation, positing the Earth as the ‘self-concealing’ aspect or face 
of the phenomenon, has two main functions: (1) it operates as a ‘mechanism’ for how 
the world can reveal itself through phenomenological presencing without anything 
breaking down, and (ii) it explains how a new world of meaning can be “set up”, by 
way of the self-disclosive capacities of the artwork itself.  As a result of these two 
things, the artwork constructs a reflective, meditative distance in which Earth, as the 
self-concealing aspect of the phenomenon can, for the first time in Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, ‘appear’ as the self-concealing, i.e., it can announce itself as that 
which does not appear. 
Part Four: A Phenomenological Rethinking of Materiality 
We have given considerable attention to Heidegger’s concept of the World, and how it 
develops through Heidegger’s work, a more deeply phenomenological and ontological 
sense. To understand better precisely how Heidegger thinks that materiality can have a 
primordial role in the ontological determination of the artwork and, as a result, cannot 
be reduced merely to the material object or substructure of the artwork, a more detailed 
analysis of Heidegger’s conception of Earth is required. Through introducing the 
concept of physis, Heidegger’s terminology and imagery conjure up a sense of the 
natural or the organic—to both compliment his particular discussion of the Greek 
Temple, but also, I think, to emphasise the ‘self-contained’ recalcitrance to the cognitive 
and calculative—which initially feels inappropriate to a discussion of a lot of artworks, 
in particular conceptual works. However, I will attempt to focus upon and to draw out 
the phenomenological implications, which I feel to be central to Heidegger’s thought.        
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1. Earth and Physis 
Heidegger’s introduction of the notion of φύσις or physis in his discussion of the Greek 
Temple, provides an interesting way into understanding the operations of “earth” in its 
wider and more ontological sense, and, as a result, Heidegger’s re-thinking of the 
“thingly” or “ontically” material character of the artwork, as the “earthly.” I will 
therefore be focusing mostly upon the Greek Temple as an example. Physis is derived 
from the root, φύω, which means, “I grow”. Heidegger defines physis as “the emerging 
and rising in itself and in all things”.179 In ‘The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics’, 
Heidegger articulates what he considers to be the inherent ambiguity of physis: it 
designates both that which “prevails” and “holds sway” [das Waltende], and the holding 
sway or “prevailing as such” [das Walten]180, i.e., like the notion of Earth, physis also 
operates as both an ontological and an ontic category. However, as we shall see, the 
ontic character of both physis and Earth, do not, for Heidegger, describe “states” of 
being, separable from their ontological character: the ontic is not the frozen, static 
remnant of the ontological. They are instead moments in a continuum. I interpret this 
continuum to designate, what I have referred to before as the bridging, without wholly 
eradicating, of the ontological difference. Both aspects of physis are fundamentally 
‘active’ characterisations and thus in distinct opposition to the notion of vorhandenheit. 
It is my contention that “earth” can be rendered more comprehensive through its 
relation to physis. But what is physis, more specifically in relation to the artwork? If we 
look at Heidegger’s description of the Greek Temple: “Standing there, the building rests 
on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the obscurity of 
the rock’s bulky yet spontaneous support.”181 He continues: the stone, “though itself 
apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, first brings to radiance the light of 
day”182 and “the temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air.”183 
Physis describes the reciprocal manner in which distinct things bring each other into 
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appearance within a relational totality or ‘environment’. It is specifically through and 
within this totality or World opened up by the artwork that all things “enter into their 
distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are”.184 For Heidegger then, the 
disclosive logic of the artwork is thoroughly co-dependent with, and operates in a 
continual relation to, its specific, surrounding context and environment. The artwork, it 
seems, both draws from and “sets up” a unique ‘circumspection’.  
It is the fact that this disclosive logic is fully relational which secures for the artwork a 
significance that is self-contained and somewhat independent of the intentions of the 
subject-artist: since the artwork’s essential character must arise somewhat 
spontaneously out of the context it opens up, its significance can never be fully 
prescribed beforehand. The artwork, Heidegger tells us, is not an object or an entity 
merely added to an existing environment, neither is it something that reflects or 
represents that environment. Both of these characterisations designate a mere 
supplementation to what already is. Rather, as an ‘originary’ event, the artwork opens 
up what “is”, by setting up an entire phenomenological context in which, through a 
holistic set of relations, a multiplicity of elements are responsible for bringing each 
other into appearance. The artwork thus has a positive and primordial role in that it 
literally facilitates a phenomenologically radical space in which a new set of relations 
can be configured. The Temple, Heidegger claims, “first gives to things their looks, and 
to men their outlook on themselves.”185 It seems to me that physis is invoked by 
Heidegger mainly to posit a capacity for contextually specific phenomenological 
reconstitution, which is prior to the concrete artwork and which runs through the entire 
process of concretisation or, in a more specifically Heideggerian formulation, the 
delineation of what is.  
2. Earth as Support and Shelter 
In relation to physis, the necessity of the “thingly” or material aspect of the artwork lay 
in the fact that for such emerging and rising to prevail and hold sway at all, a world 
must not merely be “set up” by the work, but must crucially be “kept abidingly in 
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force”.186 This requires an “earthly” substance of some sort, a form of support and 
substantiation, which can provide enough grounding for the emergent elements. 
“Earth”, Heidegger claims, constitutes “ that whence the arising brings back and 
shelters all that arises as such”.187 He continues: “in the things that arise, Earth occurs 
essentially as the sheltering agent.”188 If physis is the “emerging and rising in itself and 
in all things”, then earth is both the (negative) source from which emergence and 
phenomenality as such is possible, but simultaneously, it is the substantiating process 
through which whatever comes into appearance is supported and sheltered and thus 
made “actual”, i.e., given the bounds within which it can be “kept abidingly in force”. 
As that which “shelters all that arises as such”, Earth—on this ontological level—is 
operative prior to the artwork and is, in a sense, its condition of possibility: it is Being. 
Ontologically, Earth expands the concept of “material” out beyond its ontic sense, in 
terms of the sheer presence of an object, or the matter of a substructure, to encompass 
that which enables and supports and shelters every aspect of the context that the artwork 
will open up, and which will ultimately come to stand as resonant and meaningful.  
The artwork, as a bringing into prominence of the ontological operations by which what 
arises can come to appear and to resonate as meaningful, is thus always already within a 
materialising logic. This is why Michael Haar argues: “there is no purely ‘worldy’ 
work, that is, one wholly detached from the earth”.189 Whilst Haar is referring more 
particularly here to the Pop Art of Andy Warhol, this logic can be extended to 
conceptual artworks. Even those conceptual artworks, which insist upon minimum 
material presentation, are, in their ‘work-being’ material because ‘material’ no longer 
simply means substructure or object, but a kind of gathering or coalescence, through 
which a world of meaning is constituted. Beginning from the widest domain of physis, 
we can see that the “earthly” character of the artwork is not reducible to something 
substructural. If we were to take the more organic example of a plant, as Foltz suggests, 
the “earthly” is not merely “the soil from which the plant emerges and into which it 
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fixes its roots,”190 but is also “that which shelters and supports the appearing191 of the 
plant within the open – the resistant, fibrousness of the stalk and the moist suppleness of 
the smooth petals”.192 Earth is very much at work within every aspect of the plant’s 
specific logic, and thus every aspect of the plant is of Earth. In opposition to “matter” 
then, the “earthly” aspect of the artwork does not describe the artwork in its material 
state—e.g., as a material artistic object—but designates the continual support of the 
unfolding and the substantiation, i.e., Being.   
To move away from examples of nature, for which such descriptions seem effortlessly 
apt, but for which a discussion of conceptual art feels less convincing, “even in 
speaking”, Foltz suggests, the earth is the “integral self-containment that allows sound 
to carry a meaning.”193 This would indicate that the “earthly” aspect of speech is not 
reducible merely to sound itself, nor to sonority, as it might, under a more substructural 
definition: sound is not the seat of, or the vehicle for, meaning. Instead, the “earthly” 
aspect would somehow incorporate the entire substantiating process of language, which 
supports it to come forth and hold sway as language that is resonant and meaningful. 
For Foltz, the material elements involved in this can include not merely the sounds 
made or the words used but also “the mouth and body themselves, by which we 
speak.”194 The resonance or meaning of language, i.e., that which defines it in its 
working, is not supported merely by sound, but also by that which makes sound 
possible, such as the body and its auditory and gestural capabilities. By introducing 
physis into his discussion of the Greek temple then, Heidegger suggests that Earth is 
necessarily existent as a support in all aspects of emergence.  
By beginning from the operation of Earth on the widest and most expansive, ontological 
scale, in its relation of support to physis, we get a better sense of what Heidegger calls 
the ‘earthly’ element, understood as that which comes forth specifically through and in 
the artwork. The ‘earthly’ aspect of the work is not reducible to the material vehicle or 
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art-object, which contains the idea, concept, emotion or gesture. The ‘earthly’ aspect of 
a work is that which facilitates, substantiates, supports and shelters the emergence of 
those things, within the logic of the artwork’s unitary being. Earth, as that which 
substantiates “all that arises as such”, thus unfolds, immanently within the totality of the 
meaningful phenomenal realm, i.e., not merely the “environment”, but also the world; 
that entire context of relations, meanings and beliefs that the artwork opens up. This 
suggests to me that earth is not to be understood as a category with a definite meaning, 
which can then simply be applied to this or that artwork. The earth unfolds as the 
supportive capacity of the work, within its particular working, not in the actuality or 
concretion of its objecthood. Earth in the artwork, Heidegger states clearly, is not “a 
mass of matter deposited here or there.”195 For Heidegger, this “support” or 
“substantiation” is specifically not synonymous with the conventional aesthetic 
concepts of the artistic object, vehicle or material substructure. Indeed, it is part of its 
working, part of its inner logic. What shows itself, and can come to count as the 
“earthly” within each individual artwork, is dependent upon the logic of that particular 
work, and its development through and within its relational entirety. It is this reasoning, 
which permits Heidegger to claim that there is something necessarily “unpredictable” 
and “irreducibly spontaneous”196 about the earth. Earth does not ‘appear’ outside of the 
relational context that the work sets up. The artwork “moves the earth into the open 
region of a world and keeps it there. The work lets the earth be an earth.”197 The 
artwork creates the earth, in the Heideggerian sense: it sets up the “actual” bounds 
within which it can achieve “self-assertion” of its essence. The “earthly”, one might 
argue then, is always necessarily particular to each artwork’s unfolding and thus “site-
specific”.   
Another notable consequence of the expanded notion of materiality, put forward by the 
concept of earth as the support “of all that arises”, is that Heidegger posits a mode of 
“bringing-forth” [Her-vor-bringen], which is ontologically prior to, and independent of, 
the decisive shaping and production of the artist-subject, and of which the latter always 
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responds to and speaks. In short, Being itself has a specific logic, despite the fact that it 
requires man to bring it forth into concrete “actuality”. The artist-subject cannot simply 
“decide” the specific configurations of her artwork ex nihilo. Rather, she is 
simultaneously informed and restricted by whatever brings itself forth as meaningful in 
any given historical and cultural context. Even before the artistic procedure of 
concretisation, there appears to exist, for Heidegger, a more natural drive towards 
substantiation into the perceptible and the meaningful. In ‘Origin of the Work of Art’, 
he refers to this as Dichtung, or the “poetic project of truth”. Dichtung describes how, 
ontologically prior to the artist’s actualisation, a thickening process occurs, through 
which meaning gathers, condenses and pre-discloses itself in specific ways, within 
particular historical and contextual circumstances. The Dichter, though indeed a 
composer in the true sense, can compose only “what of itself gathers together and 
composes itself”.198 As Mozart claimed “I find notes that love one another”.199 The role 
of the artist is to recognise the gathering of this natural configuration or teleology, to 
work alongside it and to give it definite shape. For Heidegger, to “actualise”, is not to 
“produce” or to “make”, but to provide the bounds necessary for something to be 
capable of becoming what it will be: a work that is vibrant and resonant within its 
specific phenomenological and historical environment. To “actualise” is another mode 
of bringing forth. As Heidegger definitely does not equate the “actual” with “object”, 
his account of the “earthly” material element of the work must be applicable to 
artworks, which lack conventionally materialised art “objects”.   
3. Earth as the Self-concealing 
As Heidegger attributes a self-disclosive capacity to the artwork, which he claims is 
independent of human “decision”, and as he also emphasises—so crucially, I think, for 
the uniqueness of his theory—that the “earthly”, as a new way of talking about 
materiality, is in fact operative in this self-disclosive capacity, he must explain more 
precisely earth’s mechanistic operations. How does the self-disclosive drive of the 
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“man-made” artwork remain grounded in “something decisive”200, and thus resist 
becoming the entirely accidental distributor, as in the concept of the “mere” thing? 
Without the capacity to resist such a fate, the conventional dichotomy of the “natural” 
and the “man-made” would merely be reproduced within the logic of the artwork itself, 
a dichotomy that Heidegger has already claimed to ultimately hinge upon, and thus 
imply, the centralisation of instrumental utility for the human subject. As Heidegger 
posits the artwork as that which has the capacity to escape such instrumentalisation, the 
question must be answered as to how earth can truly operate, “decisively” within the 
artwork’s logic? 
The answer to this lay in Heidegger’s characterisation of the Earth as that which is 
essentially “self-secluding”. “The earth”, Heidegger states, “is the spontaneous 
forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and 
concealing.”201 This quote demonstrates very clearly that for Heidegger, the capacity for 
earth to shelter, support and substantiate, is a direct result of its being essentially “self-
secluding”. But what precisely does this mean? Heidegger tells us that the work-being 
of an artwork can be characterised as that which “sets up” a world and “sets forth” the 
earth. This is not to be understood as a single event, following which the relation 
withers away into “the empty unit of opposites unconcerned with one another”202, but 
describes an ongoing relation of “intimate strife”. The specific character of the relation 
is that the World—as designating the dimension of phenomenality, transparency and 
meaning—“wants nothing closed” and strives to surmount and open the earth, whilst 
the earth acts both as a support and as a recalcitrance, simultaneously grounding and 
delineating the possibilities of the World at any given time. The two are necessarily 
related, not merely as distinct competing opposites, but because they are essentially two 
inseparable dimensions of a unity. Through the relation, the opponents raise each other, 
not merely “into the self-assertion of their natural essences”, but also “beyond 
themselves”.203 Thus “self-assertion” is never a “rigid insistence upon some contingent 
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state”. Earth is not the passive substructure, but is actively engaged in ensuring 
corporeality to World, which facilitates its substantiation.   
Rejecting what he considered to be the optimism of a Hegelian style notion of a 
dialectical synthesis, Heidegger has to posit a further operation, which facilitates the 
continual interaction of the two elements, in a manner that ensures the level of 
decisiveness, independent of the subject, which he wishes to posit. This is the earth’s 
“self-concealing” drive. Through its self-secluding drive—its drive to withdrawal back 
into itself—the earth, which is always already in constant relation to the world, “tends 
always to draw the world into itself and keep it there.”204 In ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ 
however, Heidegger goes further with this idea, focusing upon this mechanism of 
withdrawal almost as though it were an independent mechanism, oblivious to its role as 
the substantiation of World. Earth is the essentially undisclosable, that which “shrinks 
from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up.”205“A stone”, Heidegger 
explains, “presses downward and manifests its heaviness. But while this heaviness 
exerts an opposing pressure on us it denies us any penetration into it. If we attempt such 
a penetration by breaking open the rock, it still does not display in its fragments 
anything inward that has been opened up. The stone has instantly withdrawn again into 
the dull pressure of its fragments.”206 Whilst we can encounter a certain dull pressure 
about the rock, this pressure has the character of evading analysis. There is a certain 
asymetricality, it seems, in our relation to earth, one, which cannot be ironed out 
through our attempts at techno-scientific mastery, but is instead exacerbated by it. The 
self-seclusion of the “earthly” element then—in this case the “dull pressure”—is 
essentially its resistance or recalcitrance to calculative thought or analysis, i.e., 
instrumentalism. The fact that nothing “inward”, like an essence, can be opened up 
when the rock is approached in this scientific manner is that the “dull pressure” is not a 
property of the rock to be positively identified and defined, but an elusive and 
specifically relational characteristic. Heidegger wants to insist that the impenetrable 
character of the earth, is not reducible to some kind of error or incapacity of the intellect 
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itself, but instead, is part of the earth’s very logic and character. “Colour shines and 
wants only to shine”,207 he claims and it is only through the artwork, Heidegger thinks, 
that an encounter with this positive ontological determination of materiality is a 
possibility. 
4. The Earth as Ontic Materiality 
An understanding of the unique character of the “earthly” element, as it appears in the 
artwork, requires an understanding of two central ideas: that earth is a continuum from 
the ontological to the ontic, and that earth is that which appears as the self-secluding. 
Unlike “matter”, which has come to describe a material state of something present-at-
hand, Earth is, essentially, both an ontological and an ontic category. Despite the fact 
that Heidegger posits a prior ontological dimension to the Earth, it is the artwork, which 
first, “moves the earth itself into the open region of a world and keeps it there”; the 
work “lets the earth be an earth,”208 rather than instrumentalising it. In fact, we do not 
encounter “earth” whatsoever outside of the workings of the artwork. If, however, as we 
have shown, the “work-being” of the artwork can be defined as a kind of relational 
teleological vibrancy, then this means that even in its ontic character, the “earthly” 
aspect of the artwork remains connected, through the inner logic of the work’s working, 
to its ontological character. The fact that the ontic and the ontological, Heidegger tells 
us: “flow into reciprocal accord” means that in the artwork, the ontic “earthly” aspect, 
ceases to be a separate state, and instead must be seen as a moment of the ontological—
and vice versa.  
Materiality, or the “earthly”, then, operates as a continuum from its ontological to its 
ontic character. In opposition to “matter”—which refers to the passive, material state of 
an effected artistic substructure—the “earthly” aspect of the artwork is a moment of the 
ontological operation of Earth, in its capacity to bring forth. What is unique about an 
encounter with an artwork, as opposed to equipment, is that somehow the fact of this 
capacity is contained within, and resonates from, its ontic presence. The Being of the 
particular artwork—the unitary phenomenon composed of a totality of co-dependent 
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ontological determinants—emanates within and through that work. The artwork thus 
contains, within that moment of “shine”, the totality of the movement from the 
ontological to the ontic.  The “earthly” element of the artwork is thus not to be 
understood as a “work material,” but as its “shine”: it is not the paint used, for example, 
or the colour chosen, but the coming forth, the “arising”, “emerging” or “shine” of the 
colour into its essential self-assertion and prominence. As Heidegger describes, “The 
temple-work, in setting-up a world, does not cause it to disappear, but to come forth for 
the first time and to come into the open region of the work’s world. The rock comes to 
bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colours to 
glow, tones to sing, the word to say. All this comes forth as the work sets itself back 
into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into 
the hardness and luster of metal, into the brightening and darkening of colour, into the 
clang of tone and into the naming power of the word.”209 What is captured within the 
“shine” of the colour is not the intention or the decision of the artist-subject, as in the 
case of “matter”, but the peculiar directedness of the work itself. 
However, as the earth is not merely the supporting and the sheltering agent, but the 
essentially “self-secluding”, to encounter earth in its prominence and “shine”, is to 
encounter it specifically as the self-secluding. Earth appears as itself “only when it is 
perceived and preserved as that which is essentially undisclosable”210 and is “brought 
into the open region as the self-secluding.”211 Sticking to the idea of an inner logic, as 
Jameson explains, paraphrasing Heidegger, “The absent is also present, and, qua absent, 
absenting itself from the realm of the unfolding, it is present in that very unfolding or 
deconcealment.”212 What this means is that Earth appears, not as an identifiable unit or 
deposit of tightly bound up matter, but as that which is secluding itself through the 
unfolding of the work. This insistence upon a form of presence for that which cannot 
show itself, could potentially constitute one of the most distinctive, yet controversial 
aspects of Heidegger’s theory. The “earthly” ontic character of the artwork is that which 
lets earth appear for the first time, yet, in doing so, announces a dimension to earth, 
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which can never be brought into or appear fully in the actual: its ontological role of self-
seclusion and the resistance of penetration. This ‘excess’ is a moment of the actual, 
which announces potentiality. The actual is not a sign however, it does not symbolise 
the potential, the two belong together and are nothing without each other, i.e., material 
must be in this special state of “shine” for the potential to be recognised. Potentiality 
appears as nothing but a positive moment of the actual. This tension, in which 
actualisation appears, yet is denied an object-type status, might perhaps correspond to 
what Heidegger describes as the “agitation” of the artwork in its repose.  
Julian Young has argued that through his description of the “shine” of the “earthly” 
element of the artwork, Heidegger lapses back into aesthetics and metaphysics. Young 
argues that the attention to the “earthly” aspect of the artwork, as a necessary marker of 
its being a work, appears in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ as a “disinterested” awe and 
wonder at its “sensuous”, “tactile” and “formal” qualities. For Young, as the 
announcement of what cannot show itself must necessarily appear through the “shine” 
of the artwork’s “earthly” element, what is prominent and characteristic of Heidegger’s 
art encounter is not the “conceptual inscrutability” of the earth, but its distinctly 
“aesthetic” qualities.213 If this were true, then the application of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological account to conceptual art would turn out to be very limited, if not 
non-existent. However, as I have attempted to show, the concept “Earth”, demonstrates 
Heidegger’s attempt to radicalise “matter”, in a way that is physical, yet not 
metaphysical, i.e., not an abstraction away from physicality, as in the case of the first 
two thing-concepts. For Heidegger, the radicalisation takes the form of a reconnection 
of the ontic to the ontological. By describing the categories of World and Earth, as they 
operate aletheiacally on an ontological level, he is trying to catch a glimpse of physis in 
its moment of inception and substantiation prior to the bifurcation into the reflective and 
reified categories of matter and form. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The “relations” that the work sets up and holds together are not reducible to anything 
that could be considered crudely phenomenological—as too often understood by certain 
art theorists or critics, for example. The kinds of relations brought forth in Heidegger’s 
example of the Greek temple, are not only the way in which, for example, light brings 
out the colour of the stone, or the temple’s specifically physical towering makes us feel 
small in our own bodies. Heidegger’s theory is not one of a purely sensuous aesthetic 
contemplation. Instead, Heidegger’s “relations”—very crucially, I think—encompass 
the belief systems, ideas and understanding of a community, which the Temple gathers 
together and actualises. “The temple”, says Heidegger, “first gives things their looks, 
and214 to men their outlook on themselves”. The Temple, understood in a non-reductive 
manner, is not the stone-based object of architecture, but the entirety of the relations, 
which give the temple its meaning and thus allow it to resonate. What is distinct about 
the artwork for Heidegger, is that the condition of its being kept “kept abidingly in 
force”, within the self-contained “bounds”, which the work itself sets up, is the coming 
forth into prominence of, not only its material quality—understood reductively as mere 
sensuous appearance—but of a more ideational and conceptual component too. Indeed, 
due to the way in which Heidegger emphatically foregrounds the significance of the 
relation between “earth” and “world”, it is simultaneous [Or, not merely simultaneous, 
but is a condition of] to the earth being able to appear for the first time, that the “God” is 
also present in the Temple, i.e., that the relations set up by the work are held together as 
meaningful. The concept of the “earthly” element of the artwork then, as Heidegger’s 
new mechanism for discussing the role of material specifically as operative within the 
totality of these relations, constitutes that which, on the ontological level, grounds and 
sustains these relations, physical and ideational or conceptual, as a self-contained 
whole, within their relation to each other and, on the ontic level, appears, through its 
“shine” to designate the vibrancy and resonance of such relations. It is in this sense that 
“earth”, in its ontological capacity, by both grounding and binding together ideas and 
materials, specifically in a manner which disallows the mere caprice of the subject’s 
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“decisions” to stand accredited as fully responsible for how things appear, works as a 
kind of historicising operation in Heidegger’s phenomenology. Earth is that which 
clears the way for new phenomena to come forth in new configurations, and which 
substantiates and supports it as meaningful in a spatial and temporal specificity. This is 
beyond man, so to speak, or perhaps more accurately, is prior to man: it occurs through 
and within the very logic of the artwork, which “sets up” and brings forth a new 
actuality, only in so far as a possibility pre-exists for its potential meaningfulness.       
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Chapter 3: A Phenomenological-Ontological 
Rethinking of Conceptual Art 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Heidegger’s account of the artwork has certain 
advantages for the particular interpretation of conceptual art that I wish to put 
forward. Through its ‘thematisation’ of the relation between phenomenology and 
ontology, it can offer a detailed account of how distinct artworks operate to set up and 
to delineate a unique context of intelligibility and phenomenological vibrancy, 
through and within which things gain individuation and meaning in their relation to 
the environment as a whole. This account can help us to make sense of a tendency 
that I identify to be central to conceptual art, i.e. the tendency to disallow the primacy 
of a conventional art-object, and to instead open up an investigation into what might 
be included within the physical ‘bounds’ of the artwork.1 By ‘bounds’ I do not simply 
mean the visible outline of an artwork; the line of the frame or the canvas for 
example. Rather, as John Sallis explains, “the boundary or limit is not a line where 
something stops but rather is that by which something is gathered into its propriety in 
order from there to appear in its fullness.”2 For Sallis, as for Heidegger, it is this 
boundary or limit “which we must look to bring forth into the work”.3 One of the 
main forms that this ontological investigation takes is conceptual art is the 
examination of the relationship between the work and its immediate surroundings, i.e. 
the gallery space. As Mike Sperlinger argues, if anything connects the often 
seemingly heterogeneous practices of the 1960s and 1970s, it is “the desire to put 
under pressure the distinction between work and context.”4 It is this “pressure” or 
tension in particular which interest me. Whilst in a few rare cases, the particular 
investigation that I am identifying has led some artists—the best example might be 
the Situationist International—to attempt to dissolve the ‘bounds’ of the artwork 
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entirely and thus to collapse ‘art into life’, so to speak, most forms of conceptual art 
practice, especially in Europe and North America, remained tied to the gallery in 
some way.5 In my opinion, what is in fact particularly interesting about conceptual art 
is precisely the various ways in which it explores what I consider to be an antagonism 
or friction between art and its material ‘ground’ or foundation. For this, art had to 
remain close to the gallery, for antagonism and friction imply proximity or intimacy, 
as well as resistance. 
By way of concrete analysis of artworks, this chapter will develop my contention that 
the ontology of the conceptual artwork, contrary to the proposal of some recent 
literature, is not best understood as consisting of a largely passive material substrate 
that either simply prompts an engagement with an idea, as Schellekens suggests or 
gains its semantic and perceptual particularity through its being directed by an idea, 
concept or intention, as Lamarque argued. Rather, conceptual art is the setting up of a 
specifically ontological investigation or proposal within a material context, through 
which that context is not simply reconfigured, but has a central role in such 
reconfiguration. In the attempt to bring to light its own context of ontological and 
phenomenological support or ‘ground’, such that it might delineate its true ‘bounds’, 
what the conceptual artwork reveals is that an antagonism exists between the modes 
of presentation proper to the gallery and the attempt of the artwork to render apparent 
certain things. Through an examination of several distinct conceptual artworks, I will 
explore the manner in which such art experimented with the self-externalisation of the 
artwork into the World, in an attempt to open up an exploration as to how far the true 
‘ground’ of art could be delineated. However, as I will demonstrate, this exploration 
should not be considered in any straightforward sense as an attempt to eradicate or 
reject materiality per se, but rather as an attempt to shake off the limitations of 
conventional object-based art practice and in doing so, to bring to light the more 
fundamental relations between the intelligible and the material. 
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If we are to avoid an account of conceptual art that renders the particularity of each 
individual artwork merely subservient to an idea, a concept or an intention, then there 
must be some conceptual schema through which we are able to think this recalcitrance 
to intelligibility.6 As we saw, to this end, Heidegger introduces the relation between 
World and Earth. Due to the fact that the recalcitrance of Earth to intelligibility is for 
Heidegger a particularising movement of ontological determination, avoids the 
problem of Costello’s account, i.e. the characterisation of recalcitrance as a kind of 
‘expression’ of the artist-subject. In addition to this, by introducing the 
phenomenological concept of the ‘earthly’ element of the artwork, Heidegger 
provides an alternative account of materiality, which extends the concept beyond any 
notion of substrate or objecthood to all stages in the process of the consolidation of 
meaning. 
A Note on Methodology 
So far, the investigation of this thesis has taken a rather theoretical form. To take this 
idea of an ontological investigation—specifically as a practical artistic project—
seriously, requires a careful attention to the materialised artworks exhibited. The aim 
of Chapter Three will be to flesh out in more concrete detail—and as a result, to 
confront—the ideas raised in Chapter Two. There is of course an obvious and 
inherent methodological difficulty in attempting to discuss actual and particular 
artworks through the framework of an already expounded philosophical theory. To 
approach the work already armed with a set of criteria that one wishes it to fulfil, is to 
relate to the work as the mere empirical correspondence to, or else concrete fulfilment 
of, such theory. As Heidegger might say, such an approach is not to ask the artwork 
‘what it is’, but instead to tell it what you require it to be. Of course, this is not a 
concern attributable only to phenomenology, but rather constitutes the most 
significant problematic for any theoretician who wishes to be properly attentive to 
artworks. However, the fact that phenomenology specifically claims to be concerned 
with the ‘things themselves’ would appear to render this problematic particularly 
                                                
6As discussed in Chapter Two, as recalcitrance to the intelligible, ‘earth’ cannot be thought directly. 
Thus ‘earth’ is not to be related to as a ‘content’ that we must try to discover or to think, but as a 
conceptual schema through which to unconceal that content, which is unique and specific to each work.   
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prominent for the phenomenological project. The invariable yielding to a 
preconceived conceptual framework is precisely that against which phenomenological 
theory can be seen to struggle. In the face of this initial ostensible problem, it is my 
contention that phenomenology should not be considered first and foremost as a 
theory, but as an ongoing method. To reach the particularity of such works, the 
relationship between philosophical theory and empirical analysis of the artworks 
should not be one of correspondence or fulfilment, but of mutual engagement, tension 
and ultimately, of mutual delineation. 
In line with this idea, I identify in Heidegger’s work a potential answer to this 
problem. As I described in Chapter Two, Heidegger’s aim is to ‘deformalise’ 
phenomenology through a more precise delineation of the ‘phenomenon’ as that 
aspect typically ‘concealed’. In ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ this is the Earth. 
However, whilst positing the Earth as that hidden ground which must be brought to 
light, and whilst suggesting a conceptual structure through which to think this 
operation, Heidegger’s theory does not, I believe, prescribe a definite content. World 
and Earth operate as a conceptual schema for and thus constitute relatively open 
categories. However, we must not use them to achieve a precise pre-conceived goal 
by way of a too consciously controlled argumentation,7 but must instead engage with 
them actively and critically throughout all stages of the analysis. 
To avoid, as much as is possible, having a too clear account of what we wish to 
discover and thus assigning meaning to the works in advance, I will not begin with a 
list of precise questions. Rather, my only anchor will be to remain within the central 
and most phenomenological aspect of Heidegger’s thought. What we seek—in the 
most general Heideggerian sense—is what each distinct work reveals, i.e., that which 
is typically concealed through the manner in which the work is presented. Whilst 
there may exist certain tendencies within the art of a specific historical period, the 
particularity of what each work reveals will be rendered unique through the precise 
way in which it reveals it. Through the process of relating to the works in this way, 
                                                
7 This notion of “instrumental” is influenced by Collingwood’s conception of craft. He describes it as 
“the power to produce a preconceived result by means of consciously controlled and directed action.” 
See R.G.Collingwood, The Principles of Art, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1938, 1958). P15 
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we shall meet various resistances to thinking them. However, as we continue it will be 
revealed in each case how through such delineation, we gain a sense of what 
conceptual art is.  
Chapter Breakdown 
In Part One of this chapter, I will give a detailed analysis of Duchamp’s Fountain 
(1917). It is my contention that through the manner in which conceptual artists 
rediscovered and claimed Duchamp’s work in the 1960s,8 Fountain, can 
retrospectively be considered to mark the beginning of the distinct ontological 
investigation into art, of which I consider conceptual art to be a continuation and 
development. In my interpretation, conceptual art is most comprehensively 
understood as an ongoing response to the way in which the work of Marcel Duchamp, 
in particular Fountain, brought into phenomenological light the conditions and 
grounds of art in a specific historical period. Following this, conceptual practice 
becomes the attempt to further delineate its true material ‘grounds’. In Part Two, I 
will revisit Lawrence Weiner’s A 36” Square Removal to the Lathing or Support Wall 
or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, 1969, (1969). First of all, I will discuss a 
significant factor that Costello appears to leave out of his account, i.e. that the specific 
material artwork he describes is for Weiner but one potential instantiation of a work, 
which may or may not ever be materialised. However, I will argue that even such 
text-based works evoke materiality and cannot be isolated from the material 
investigation being made in conceptual art more generally. I will then attempt to 
develop Costello’s reading of the work, which focuses upon the particular material 
element of the work, understood as the “sensuous, affective and intuitive response”9 
of the artist as providing recalcitrance to the cognitive. In particular, I will examine 
this work through the manner in which I consider it to be a development of Fountain, 
to the extent that it is engaged within a more Heideggerian notion of a fundamental 
ontological struggle with the delineation of the artwork, through the attempt to bring 
                                                
8 As discussed in Chapter One, it is well documented that Duchamp’s Fountain became a central point 
of reference for conceptual art, the various responses of which to an extent framed the conceptual art 
project of the 1960s and 1970s. See Peter Osborne. (2002). P42  
9 Costello. (2007). P87 
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to light its ‘ground’. To develop this line of argumentation even further, I will also 
look at two similar works by Michael Asher, Untitled, (1973) and Untitled, (1974). 
On my interpretation, what each of these works demonstrates is the precise manner in 
which this investigation into the supporting ground of art became increasingly 
delineated with conceptual art practice. Finally, in Part Three, I will consider a work 
that seems to be rarely discussed in literature on conceptual art: Dennis Oppenheim’s 
Oakland Wedge, (1969). Whilst such so-called ‘Earthworks’ are typically discussed in 
quite different terms to conceptual art and are not usually included in most definitions 
of such art,10 it is my belief that Oakland Wedge is in interesting continuity with the 
particular tendencies and concerns of conceptual art that I wish to focus on. What is 
more, appealing to such works can, I think, help to develop an account of conceptual 
art along the lines pursued by this thesis. I will now look at these artworks in turn. 
Part One: Marcel Duchamp 
In Part Two of Chapter One, I critically examined Peter Lamarque’s account of 
conceptual art, which we can now see in some ways and to some extent parallels 
Heidegger’s notion of the ontological role of the artwork. For both thinkers, inherent 
within an encounter with art is a certain awareness of the kind of thing being 
encountered;11 encountering artworks requires a distinctly ontological differentiation. 
At the same time, for both thinkers, through such a process we encounter not just 
what things are, but what art itself is. The self-establishment of an artwork as an 
artwork necessitates that a process of differentiation occurs from a constitutive 
material base or ‘thing’ and that such differentiation results in a reconfigured material. 
What is unique about conceptual art for Lamarque is that it “trades upon” and brings 
to the fore the fundamental ontological distinction between artworks and mere 
things,12 conceptual art renders this distinction explicit. It seems that the central result 
of this is not simply that we learn what mere things are, but that we learn what art is. 
                                                
10 The exception to this is Patricia Norvell’s interview with Oppenheim in Recording Conceptual Art, 
(2001). PP21-30 
11 See Lamarque. (2007) P11 
12 Lamarque. (2007). P11 
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In this sense, conceptual art might also prove to exemplify what Thompson calls a 
‘paradigmatic’ notion of the Heideggerian artwork. 
However, the question which was not unanswered satisfactorily by Lamarque, was 
precisely how the conceptual artwork establishes itself as ontologically distinguished 
and thus what its operations are specifically as an artwork. In Chapter One, I 
suggested that the reason for this is that Lamarque characterises the Readymade 
through a reductive formulation of its character and its significance as an artwork, i.e. 
he conceptualises it merely as the relation between a ‘commonplace’ object of 
perception and a concept or idea that is directed towards the object by way of the title. 
Lamarque characterises Fountain by simply reversing the priority of what is 
essentially a rather and conventional conceptual schema. What is unique about the 
conceptual work, claims Lamarque, is that its perceptual aspects are rendered 
“subservient to the conceptual.”13 On Lamarque’s account, in the first instance, we 
encounter an everyday object already pre-formed and having a certain use in a non-art 
context, i.e. a urinal. In the second instance, the title must pick out or bring to light 
certain “saliences and significances”14 of that object: it must give it “a new 
thought”.15 For Lamarque, unlike Danto, there is a third instance in that this thought 
must be somehow recognised perceptually. However, as I argued in Chapter One, 
despite Lamarque’s insistence upon there being a necessary perceptual and thus 
material aspect to this so-called “transfiguration”, his account fails to draw out with 
adequate complexity the role of materiality within the relational totality of the work. 
On Lamarque’s account the material “invites”16 the directive power of the title and 
allows such “saliences and significations” to be picked out. The material for 
Lamarque is a rather passive substrate, subservient to the direction of the conceptual.      
 
                                                
13 Lamarque. (2007) P9 
14 Lamarque. (2007) P13 
15 This was the claim made by the anonymous writer of the defence of Fountain, which occurred in the 
magazine, The Blind Man. Vol. 2. P5. 
16 Lamarque. (2007) P14  
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Whilst it is my contention that Fountain is an incredibly significant artwork for the 
conceptual art movement, I feel that Lamarque’s overly simplistic definition fails to 
capture precisely why it was so significant. It was and it continues to be significant 
primarily because through the gesture of presenting a urinal as an art-object, 
Duchamp revealed the very foundations of support of the contemporary art world 
itself. He did so not merely by forcing an “enfranchising theory”17 or discourse to 
justify the legitimacy of his rather simple gesture as art, but also through opening up a 
unique phenomenological environment wherein the relational whole of the gallery 
context was brought to light as though for the first time. The ontological significance 
of Fountain is not that a ‘commonplace’ object is exalted to the status of art, but that 
through this process the entire phenomenological environment of the gallery is 
significantly reconstituted. As a result, in a manner potentially more explicit than the 
artworld had ever witnessed before, an investigation was opened up into art’s 
function, in terms of both how art is or should be received within the environment of 
the artworld or the gallery. Fountain achieved this objective specifically through 
setting up a proposal through which the question of its own ontological status—and 
by extension, the ontological truth of art per se—could reveal itself. In his 
introduction to Gianni Vattimo’s book Art’s Claim to Truth—which seems to imply 
that an actual homology exists between Heidegger’s ontological account of art, and 
the theoretical and practical tendencies of artistic avant-gardism to question the very 
fact of art—Santiago Zabalar expresses this point directly. He claims that Duchamp’s 
Fountain proposed that the function of art is not to “fulfil, perform or entertain the 
public”, but to “require from the public an interpretation that allows the work’s 
ontological truth to come out.”18 I will attempt to give an interpretation of Fountain 
according to this contention, specifically by way of an analysis of the 
phenomenological disclosure through which this ontological truth of art is disclosed. 
In describing the operations of the Van Gogh painting in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ 
Heidegger claims that, “as long as we only imagine the pair of shoes in general,19 or 
                                                
17 This is a reference to Arthur Danto. (1981) 
18 Zabalar, in Vattimo. (1985). xiii 
19 My italics. 
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simply look at the empty, unused shoes as they merely stand there in the picture, we 
shall never discover what the equipmental being of the equipment in truth is”.20 What 
Heidegger means by this is that a certain ‘meditative’ distance or space is required for 
art to function as ontologically dis-closive, i.e. to be able to ‘set up’ a World and ‘set 
forth’ the Earth. It is in fact the artwork itself that opens up that unique space and 
which keeps it open. In the case of the Van Gogh painting, Heidegger chooses not to 
point to those conventional aspects that might rather instantly and habitually put us in 
the mind to look at a painting—e.g. its hanging on the wall inside a frame—and 
instead appeals to the “undefined space”21 surrounding the ostensibly suspended 
shoes to signify this ‘meditative’ distance. It might be tempting at this point to argue 
that Fountain cannot be accurately considered through the lens of a Heideggerian 
artwork precisely because it does not have such a space—it is not a representation 
through which we imagine another world, nor is it an historical monument around 
which we constitute an historical world, it simply is a common piece of familiar and 
generic equipment presented as an artwork in the gallery. There certainly appears to 
be very little to imagine in terms of the World of the person who typically uses this 
kind of equipment; we all do—well, most Western men at least. The question then 
emerges as to how an actual piece of everyday equipment can achieve the meditative 
space necessary for the dis-closive capacities that distinguish the artwork from entities 
that have an equipmental being. 
However, there is a sense in which this already seems like a false problematic. Whilst 
it is true that a press release was issued the day after Fountain was submitted to the 
Salon des Independents exhibition in 1917 stating, “the Fountain may be a very 
useful object in its place, but its place is not an art exhibition and it is, by no 
definition, a work of art,”22 and whilst it might also be true that Fountain is able to 
evoke similar responses or sentiments from some people even today, this work has 
generally come to be accepted by most people as an artwork. The fact that some 
philosophers still insist upon discussing the ontological peculiarity of Fountain—and 
                                                
20 Heidegger. (1936). P159 
21 Heidegger. (1936). P159 
22 Quoted in Francis Nauman, “The Big Show, The First Exhibition of the Society of Independent 
Artists, Part I,” Artforum, 17 (February 1979). P38. 
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of the Readymade more generally—as though, lacking the necessary instructional 
theory, we are in danger of mistaking it for an everyday commonplace urinal23 is 
misleading. Whilst Fountain always seems to open up much post facto discourse as to 
why it is art, the work is not primarily encountered as a ‘commonplace’ object 
elevated to the status of an artwork; it is an artwork and is almost always encountered 
as such.24 Fountain as an artwork, constitutes a relational whole: it is a urinal, which 
has been tilted, signed ‘R.Mutt’ and placed on a plinth next to its title ‘Fountain’ and 
positioned in a gallery alongside a whole range of other artworks. 
The anonymous article in the The Blind Man, a publication associated with the New 
York Dadaists, printed a defence of Fountain that has become responsible for its 
notoriety. A claim was made—one that has become a central problematic for 
contemporary art: “Whether Mr Mutt made the fountain with his own hands or not 
has no importance. He CHOSE it. He took an article of life, placed it so that its useful 
significance disappeared under the new title and point of view—created a new 
thought for that object”.25 This implies two main points which I consider central to the 
conceptual project. Firstly, it is not the ‘object-being’ that defines art, as though art 
could be defined by reference to the collection of countable and pre-defined entities 
present in the gallery—i.e. art should not be defined “morphologically”. Rather, an 
artwork is individuated through the manner in which it “works” in relation to a 
specific context. Artworks have a contextual extension, even when they are 
instantiated in a central object. Secondly, through presenting Fountain as an artwork 
                                                
23 The implication is that if we do not know that the urinal is an artwork, we can only consider it on 
formal grounds and such formal considerations would not be capable of distinguishing it from any 
other urinal. However, firstly, if we didn’t know it were a work of art, why would we even admire a 
urinal on formal grounds? Secondly, if we thought it were just a “graffitied urinal”, surely we would 
admire the graffiti, not the “gleaming white curves” or “biomorphic abstraction”. If one wanted to 
bring formal qualities into this example, surely the point is that with its insertion into the gallery 
initiates the occasion for admiring the formal qualities of a urinal. Thirdly, it seems that too much is 
made of this example. Fountain is a work in a gallery. It is not a mere urinal. Arthur Danto makes this 
kind of argument. See Danto, (1981). Diarmuid Costello then repeats Danto’s point. See Costello, 
(2007), P89. 
24 There are, of course, some rare cases in which artworks have failed to be recognised as artworks. In 
2004 a cleaner at the Tate Gallery accidently threw away a work by Gustav Metzer, which 
incorporated, as one of its elements, a bag of rubbish. Metzer has an ongoing artistic concern with 
producing what he called ‘Auto-Destructive Art’, i.e. art that accentuates the finite character of the 
artwork.    
25 The Blind Man, Vol. 2, P5. 
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and thus inserting it into an art-historical narrative of signification, the urinal as an 
“object” is altered or, as Heidegger would say, through its “work-being”—which 
implies the operation of the artwork within and its “setting-up” of, a distinct relational 
context—the artwork brings the object forth as individuated in a distinct way, to be 
related to in a distinct manner. Whilst some conceptual art would take this idea of a 
textual verification as an important material of the artwork, as far as I know, this text 
has never been exhibited alongside Fountain: this work is presented as being a 
standalone sculpture. 
As it is not simply the object and a title, but rather the relational whole of these 
elements that constitute Fountain as the artwork that it is, even as a description of its 
‘thingly’ character, it is from here that we must start. What this means is that in 
encountering the work in its whole, we have already presumably assumed a somewhat 
‘meditative distance’; we have assumed the attentiveness which is proper to the art 
gallery. This starting point is, I think, crucial to explaining a work such as Fountain 
specifically because it is precisely these various forms of instantly recognisable 
institutional support of the artwork, together with the ‘circumspection’ typical to art, 
which this particular work brings forth as the object of phenomenological 
thematisation. Beginning from Fountain as an artwork then, what is it that this 
specific work opens up, how does it accomplish this opening and what is the 
significance of its being, or as Heidegger might say, ‘pointing to’, the wider system of 
references an everyday piece of equipment? 
Through placing the urinal in the gallery, Duchamp threw light upon precisely that 
aspect that we typically and tacitly agree not to see,26 or that which we take for 
granted, i.e., the relational totality of the contextual support of the institution itself. It 
is worth noting that the vast majority of Readymades are three-dimensional objects 
which, if displayed in a gallery, are most typically displayed on a plinth in a manner 
that invokes the history of sculpture as well as the exhibitions of historical displays in 
museums. Just as the Van Gogh painting had revealed the shoes in their equipmental 
                                                
26 Brian O’Doherty, (Inside the White Cube: the Ideology of the Gallery Space, (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1976, 1986).)  P66 
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being, by placing the urinal on a plinth it is as though we become aware of the plinth 
for the first time; the plinth becomes conspicuous to us precisely in the fact that it is 
supporting the work. In a sense, it is as though it appears as supportive for the first 
time, in that it is being asked to work in supporting an object that would not 
conventionally be on display. The fact that it is a urinal that Duchamp places on a 
plinth is of course crucial. It is the audacity of this particular choice of object that 
achieves the effect of bringing to light the fact of its support. To this extent, the 
support of the plinth might seem “spontaneous” in that it might convey the sense that 
radical new art is possible or that new ontological potentials for art are non-
exhaustative: anything can be supported as art might be the proposal. 
Importantly, if the urinal, the plinth, the signature and the title did not appear as 
prominent specifically through their relational functioning, then Fountain would fail 
to present itself convincingly as an artwork due to the fact that the surroundings of its 
contextual whole had failed to support it. As a result of this, what is revealed is not 
merely the particular plinth that is supporting Duchamp’s ostensibly radical art-object, 
but the functioning of the institutional support per se. This leads us to examine in a 
whole new light the entire space of the gallery and all of the other artworks displayed 
within the gallery in a manner that specifically demonstrates that the art gallery is not 
a neutral space full of discrete entities but a fully relational context. The other 
artworks in the gallery do not simply constitute discrete entities that are coloured 
through Fountain’s unique logic. Rather, they operate as part of the relational context 
from which Fountain can work. Whilst Brian O’Doherty claims that Duchamp 
managed to bring to light an entire gallery in a single gesture, “and managed to do so 
while it was full of other art,”27 it seems more accurate to say that it is precisely 
because the gallery was full of other art that Duchamp managed to achieve this. 
One might then claim that through the introduction of such a groundbreaking artwork 
such as Fountain into a formerly rather conventional institutional setting that 
Duchamp reconstitutes what is. This might also be a convincing description of the 
motivations of the conceptual project. After all, to a large degree conceptual art did 
                                                
27 Brian O’Doherty. (1976) P69 
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attempt to quite fundamentally rupture what some of its protagonists felt to have 
become habitual within that ‘circumspection’, i.e. a predominantly visual encounter 
with entities whose status as artworks were thought to be based too heavily upon their 
morphological continuity with the totality of entities in the history of art.28 In this 
sense, the motivating objectives of the conceptual art movement might be seen as the 
attempt to challenge a mode of relation to artworks as ‘present-at-hand’, i.e. as 
discrete objects of the theoretical or contemplative gaze. One could argue that 
Fountain does this partly by developing an environment of the art World from a space 
constituted by what Heidegger would refer to as the mere collection of countable and 
familiar entities at hand,29 into a more phenomenological site in which we gain some 
sense of the manner in which entities come to individuate themselves. The 
‘phenomenon’ that is brought to light by artworks more accurately on this account 
would be the ‘art-world’, with all of the specificities of its implicitly understood 
‘circumspection’. 
One might argue that in drawing attention to the fact that there is a relational context 
in which artworks are able to function as artworks, Fountain thus rejects the idea of 
the self-containment and particularity of the work of art and instead presents artworks 
as essentially equipmental. The fact that Duchamp chose to present a specifically 
equipmental entity to display as art could then be considered to represent this idea. If 
this interpretation were convincing then what would have been revealed is that, 
despite the tendency which runs through the history of a Romantic style aesthetic 
theory to valorise the artwork above such functional pieces of equipment, that the 
artwork was after all equipmental, in the extended Heideggerian sense of having an 
ontological structure founded upon relations which are essentially ‘instrumental’. We 
might then say that Duchamp, through presenting an actual piece of equipment, is first 
of all opening up a critique as to the sheer functionality that art has come to assume in 
contemporary society. The artwork, one might say, has come to be fully expected to 
perform a certain function and to evoke a particular mode of ‘circumspection’—in 
                                                
28 Charles Harrison criticised traditional art thus, “the authentic experience of art is a disinterested 
response to the work of art in its phenomenological and morphological aspects—a purely 'optical' 
response, that is, to the works appearance.” See Harrison, (2001). P41  
29 Heidegger, (1936). P170 
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this case perhaps, the manner in which the artwork has come to function as an object 
for the contemplative gaze or, as Heidegger himself once said, “a matter for pastry 
cooks”,30 i.e. a cultural product of ‘taste’. Second of all, through presenting the work 
as an equipmental being which has been wrenched from its usual set of worldly 
relations, the equipment appears as not functioning and thus as ‘conspicuous’ and 
‘obstinate’. One might then interpret this in a slightly different manner, as a comment 
upon the fact that art is no longer functioning and that through the presentation of its 
non-function it is brought to light that the artwork in fact has this character of 
functionality, i.e. that it is essentially equipmental. We might then say that Fountain 
acts to ‘point’ towards the equipmental, specifically with the result of showing that art 
no longer functions. If this were an adequate reading of conceptual art, what we 
would encounter with Fountain would not be the obstinacy of the urinal as 
equipment, but the obstinacy of the urinal as art. 
However, even if these descriptions could be said to capture distinct and momentary 
ways of relating to this work, it seems to me that there is something more instinctive 
and more substantial that we can say about this work. Through taking an object that 
appears at first glance to be an unlikely candidate for the exalted status of the artwork 
and by transplanting it into a new set of relations—i.e. the relations of the gallery, 
which include the title, signature, plinth, the other artworks and every aspect of 
institutional framing—the central question that thrusts itself to the fore is the extent to 
which those institutional relations, and thus the system as a whole, is still working. 
The question becomes whether or not the system can incorporate these other forms of 
art. It turns out in fact that it can incorporate them, but that it becomes a different 
place in doing so. However, this does not necessarily imply that the gallery system is 
a relentlessly functioning machine, which can incorporate anything and everything 
into its relational totality: one does not need to take flight into an overly crude version 
of an institutional theory. It is still up to each discrete and particular artwork to 
constitute itself as more than a mere object amongst objects, to set itself up as 
constitutive within that totality. 
                                                
30 Heidegger. Introduction to Metaphysics (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000) P132 
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To my mind, Fountain fulfils, albeit it in a distinct manner, two of the paradigmatic 
operations of Heidegger’s ontologically determinative artwork identified by Iain 
Thompson and discussed in Chapter Two. It is first and foremost “paradigmatic” 
because in presenting an actual urinal as an artwork it both illuminates the relational 
context of the gallery space and creates an instantaneous reflection back upon its own 
ontology as an artwork. It does so specifically in a manner which demands a renewed 
interpretation as to what art is. However, it is my contention that in doing so 
Duchamp’s Fountain is also “macro-paradigmatic” in that it ‘sets up’ and ‘sets forth’ 
a unique reconstitution of the art ‘environment’ per se, through delineating the 
intelligible and the meaningful.31 What is brought to light, as the intelligible and the 
meaningful context of relations through such an artwork are the very conditions for 
art itself. However, one might argue that what we might have learnt about conceptual 
works per se through this analysis of Fountain is that the questioning of art’s 
function, which appears as a central tendency in such art, is achieved through the by-
passing of the necessity for any kind of conventionally representational space in 
which we encounter ‘concern’ for what non-art ‘things’ are in their distinct being, or 
through which we encounter what particular imaginary non-art worlds are like. In 
short, Fountain does not seem to function “micro-paradigmatically” as an artwork in 
any clear sense. Whilst using an equipmental Readymade object to pose—or at least 
to ‘point’ or refer to—questions of the systems of relations which appear to constitute 
the ontological foundations of our human engagements in the wider world, the only 
system of relations that it seems to be genuinely concerned with, that which it brings 
forth in the emphatic sense, is the relational context of the art-world. In the process of 
doing so, it poses the very question of the fact of art itself, its function and its 
meaning, in a way that is still acting to stimulate a lot of interpretation. However, to 
by-pass this “micro-paradigmatic” or representational function of the artwork and to 
do so in a way which renders this explicit or apparent, does not place the work at odds 
                                                
31 Whilst it might even be the case—though perhaps only as a specifically historical attribution—that 
Fountain, through reconstituting so significantly what art is, could be said to have been “macro-
paradigmatic” in the even stronger sense, to the extent that through opening up the question as to the 
wider, social significance of art, it acts to effectively reconfigure our relations to other related ‘worlds’, 
I will not be concerning my investigation with this question. Rather, I shall adhere to my own argument 
made in Chapter Two, as to the general inapplicability of this idea, specifically in the strong sense 
attributed it by Heidegger. 
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with Heidegger’s theory. What we learnt through Heidegger’s example of the 
representational Van Gogh painting was precisely that representation is not the most 
essential operation of the artwork at all. This means that it possible that our analysis 
of Fountain offers a way of Heidegger’s theory being thought in its more essential, 
yet contemporary significance. 
Through opening up an ontological investigation, Fountain demonstrated very clearly 
and directly that an artwork does not necessarily need to be a particular kind of object 
and neither does it need to be most centrally representational. Rather, Fountain 
demonstrated that art is a process of phenomenological and ontological delineation, 
the process through which things gain their distinctive shape and meaning and are 
constituted within a contextual whole. Fountain achieved this specifically by 
presenting an unlikely object for consideration as art and thus by throwing new light 
upon the various supporting elements of institutional support. Duchamp, in my 
opinion, was the pioneer of such a tendency, but it is my contention that this tendency 
gets significantly developed through the practice of many conceptual works. 
Potential Objections 
In opposition to my interpretation, it might be argued that Fountain is not 
ontologically rich and significant enough to resemble a Heideggerian artwork. First of 
all, as the presentation of a urinal as an artwork, it could be argued that Fountain is a 
declaration that art has ceased to be a unique entity with a significant role to play 
within contemporary social and cultural life.32 However, even if this were a correct 
interpretation of one of the ways in which Fountain functions, this need not be in 
contradiction with my interpretation. This is because whilst an artwork might appear 
to state something, there is no necessary correspondence between the artistic gesture 
made and the results that the artwork has. An artistic gesture as to the lack of 
                                                
32 Jean Baudrillard interprets such conceptual works as a declaration as to what he calls the ‘nullity’ of 
art. However, as Sylvère Lotringer points out in his introduction to Baudrillard’s book, The Conspiracy 
of Art, to declare nullity might be the first stage required in order that we are enabled to break through 
the habitual sense of awe we have for art and to see it for what it is. Whilst Baudrillard, in opposition to 
my contention, decided that what art is, is a mere ‘conspiracy’, the important point remains that 
through Duchamp’s gesture, is the opening up of an ontological inquiry into art. See Jean Baudrillard, 
The Conspiracy of Art, (semiotext(e), New York, 2005) 
  
141 
significance of art might just as well act to open up a lively ontological inquiry into 
art, in a manner, which positively reinvigorates it. However, as an extension of this 
objection, one might appeal directly to the intentions of the artist. One might claim 
that Duchamp himself is in fact explicitly satirising any claims to the ontological 
significance of art. After all, in his interview with Pierre Cabanne, Duchamp claims, 
“I don’t believe in the word “being”. The idea of being is a human invention… it’s an 
essential concept that doesn’t exist at all in reality.”33 However, to take this fragment 
in isolation slightly obscures its meaning. This statement in fact follows on from 
Cabanne asking Duchamp whether he believes in anything. Duchamp replies: 
“Nothing of course. The word “belief” is an error”. Cabanne then responds: 
“Nevertheless, you believe in yourself?” Duchamp replies: “No, not even that.” The 
main emphasis of this passage for Duchamp is in fact on the fact that: “Nobody ever 
thinks of not believing in “I am”.34 First of all then, it seems then that the central 
notion that Duchamp wants to question is ‘belief’, rather than a specifically 
philosophical notion of ‘Being’. Now, an in-depth analysis of the philosophical 
problems surrounding intentionalism would be beyond the bounds of this particular 
discussion. However, second of all, even if it were the case that intentionalism was 
correct—i.e. that the optimal way of interpreting an artwork is to somehow ‘discover’ 
the intentions of the artist—there might be many cases wherein the artist is not 
necessarily the best judge, not merely of what they have created, but of what they 
intended. This to me seems particularly true of an artist such as Duchamp, who 
notoriously based his entire career on being a provocative and interventionist 
wordsmith and trickster. 
A second objection might question whether conceptual works such as Fountain are 
most adequately understood by focusing on the encounter that the spectator has in the 
gallery. One might argue that Fountain is more precisely constituted by a simple 
artistic gesture, i.e. the mere fact that Duchamp placed a urinal in a gallery, turned it 
upside down and signed it pseudonymously “R.Mutt”. Certain kinds of popular 
                                                
33 See Pierre Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, (Da Capo Press, Thames and Hudson, 1971). 
P88-89  
34 Cabanne, (1971) P88-89 
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discourse around Duchamp often seem to reduce its significance more or less to this 
gesture,35 and some have proceeded to construct a comprehensive definition of 
conceptual art per se, which emphasises this more ‘gestural’ aspect.36 Whilst I have 
already demonstrated throughout the course of this thesis that to reduce the 
conceptual work in this manner is inappropriate, I do not consider the observation 
itself that Fountain was in part constituted through a simple artistic gesture to be 
contradictory to my ontological reading of conceptual art. In fact, it might even act to 
embellish it. This is because, to my mind, the sheer simplicity of the gesture, together 
with the minimal pragmatic artistic involvement, merely seems to simply throw more 
emphasis upon the rich and complex World that the work manages to set up.  As 
Brian O’ Doherty describes, whilst Duchamp “never stays long”, after he leaves “the 
house is never quite the same.”37 
Part Two: Lawrence Weiner 
As we saw in Chapter One, Diarmuid Costello offered a reading of this particular 
conceptual artwork, which took the form of a response to Arthur Danto. Costello’s 
aim was to offer a corrective to what he considered to be Danto’s overemphasis on the 
meaning of the artwork as accessible through an interpretation of the artist’s intention. 
For Costello, Danto “extracts meaning from its material host in such a way as to make 
whatever meaning they are held to embody amenable to paraphrase.”38 Costello 
thinks that works of art are “rendered diaphanous”39 by Danto. However, Costello 
thinks that in so far as art practice remains a domain within which particular material 
objects, entities, or events are produced or presented, then materiality must be 
afforded a more positive and constitutive role in the ontology of the artwork. So long 
as artworks display a material particularity, claims Costello, it is important to consider 
how such materiality can rebound and impact upon intention and interpretation.40 
                                                
35 The emphasis on gesture is seemingly influenced by the anonymous letter of defence for the artwork, 
published in The Blind Man, Vol 5.  
36 See David Davies, Art as Performance, (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004) 
37 O’ Doherty, (1976) P66 
38 Costello. (2007) P88 
39 Costello. (2007) P88 
40 Costello. (2007) P83 
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Works of art are not “meaning-intentions” of the artist.41 Rather, a distinguishing 
feature of art is that its meaning exceeds any determinate intention that motivated it.42 
This excess is explicable through recourse to the particular material recalcitrance of 
the artwork. However, for Costello, material particularity and recalcitrance are a 
result of the “sensuous, affective and intuitive responses of the artist to the process of 
making itself – to how the resulting work looks, sounds or reads as it is being 
made.”43 These responses then come to “impact upon and, as a result, to come to be 
sedimented in, the thing made.”44 
As I argued in Chapter One, whilst I find Costello’s insistence that, in so far as 
particular artworks are materialised, there is likely to be recalcitrance to the cognitive, 
the specific description of material recalcitrance which Costello seems to be 
presenting, cannot provide an adequate account of conceptual art in particular. 
However, it is my contention that in following the trajectory which was opened up 
through our discussion of Duchamp’s Fountain in Part One of this chapter, that a 
more adequate reading can be given of the role of materiality in this work, one which 
positions itself within conceptual art’s central problematic of delineating itself in 
relation to its ground. As we saw, Fountain reconstituted our phenomenological 
relationship to the gallery. But what happens once this is revealed? How does art 
continue this development once the gallery has been made to entirely “stand on its 
head”,45 as it were? These are the questions I will have in mind when re-analysing this 
particular work. 
Before I begin with an analysis of this work as a phenomenological and ontological 
investigation of its surrounding contextual and institutional supports, it seems to me 
that there is one very significant factor that Costello appears to omit from the main 
body of his description of the work, despite referring to it as a potential objection 
                                                
41 Costello. (2007) P88 
42 Costello. (2007) P88 
43 Costello. (2007) P87 
44 Costello. (2007) P87 
45 Cited in O’Doherty. (1976). P69 
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elsewhere in the text through a footnote.46 This is that this particular artwork was 
often presented simply as a text on the wall, i.e. the sentence, A 36”by 36”Square 
Removal to the Lathing or Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall.47 
Weiner in fact leaves it open as to whether the work is ‘materialised’ or not, by which 
he means whether or not the removal is actually carried out.48 The artwork thus has 
various quite distinct possibilities, in terms of exhibition; either Weiner himself could 
materialise the work by excavating into the wall, it could be left to somebody else to 
do the excavating, or the mere idea for the work could simply be presented in textual 
form as a sentence on the gallery wall.49 In addition to this, ‘ownership’ of Weiner’s 
pieces can amount to whatever the buyer wants, i.e. Weiner can build it for them, they 
can build it themselves, or they can simply discuss it together.50 Built into the very 
structure of Weiner’s artworks is the play between the general and the specific, in 
which it appears that the general, in this case the title or text on the wall, has primacy. 
51 Whilst I do not consider this to be a problem for Costello’s argument per se—his 
claim extends only in so far as such particular materialisations are carried out52—the 
fact that Costello does not explore this relation could at least potentially entail that he 
has missed something important, even if thought with regards to only this particular 
materialised version of the work. 
The fact that Weiner appears to present the text as primary, may lead one to argue that 
to focus a discussion of this work too heavily upon its specifically material qualities is 
misleading. One might say that conceptual art of this sort is not in fact about an 
ongoing ontological exploration of the ‘bounds’ of the artwork with particular 
                                                
46 In footnote 10 of his article, Costello suggests that the fact that one might claim that there are ‘non-
material artistic vehicles’ need not be problematic for his re-emphasis upon the recalcitrance of 
materiality per se. This is because Costello thinks that, “one can, after all, understand the materiality of 
thought itself as an artistic vehicle in such a way that it is at least not obvious that what has been said 
here would not apply.” Costello. (2007) P93   
47 Weiner himself considers this particular artwork to most essentially consist only in the art “idea”. 
Weiner, in (ed.) Norvell, Recording Conceptual Art, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001) 
P102  
48 Lawrence Weiner. (ed.) Norvell. (2001) P105 
49 Weiner. (2001) P105 
50 Norvell. (2001). P102 
51 Martha Buskirk, The Contingent Object of Contemporary Art, (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2003) 
P227 
52 Costello. (2007) P83 
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attention to its relation to its phenomenological context at all. Instead, one might think 
that Weiner’s work is more accurately the attempt to completely escape the ‘bounds’ 
of not only the conventional art-‘object’, but to reject the significance and necessity of 
the material elements of the artwork per se, and to instead take flight in the more 
‘worldy’ realm of ideas. If this were indeed the case then Weiner’s language based 
conceptual works might be considered to exemplify that which Michael Haar claims 
is an impossibility for Heidegger, i.e., a purely ‘worldly’ work.53 However, to my 
mind, even in the cases where Weiner’s texts are displayed simply as texts on the 
gallery wall, this appears to be a far too simplistic reading of such linguistic forms of 
conceptual art. 
First of all, as we saw, on Heidegger’s account of the artwork, language itself can 
amount to what Heidegger calls a “projective saying”, the “saying of world and 
earth”.54 To achieve this, language must not be merely communicative of a precise 
message or an agreement,55 but must be capable of setting up strife between the 
unfamiliar and the ordinary.56 It strikes me as interesting that Weiner’s ‘ideas’, whilst 
ostensibly very simple sentence descriptions, often already display a certain degree of 
inherent poetic resonance. Take for example, Weiner’s slightly later work, An 
Accumulation of Sufficient Abrasion to Remove Enough of an Opaque Surface to Let 
Light Through with More Intensity, (1981). The language used here demonstrates an 
ambiguous linguistic status. Whilst on one level it seems to be an almost mechanical 
description of an industrial type operation—alluding to the actual removal of the 
gallery wall—its rhythm, and the ending in particular, “to let light through with more 
intensity”, contribute to its evoking the sense of a kind of poetic elevation. The 
ambiguity of this sentence, which is in part brought about by the presence of both 
elevated and commonplace or banal language, sets up an interesting tension. This 
analogy with the poetic is rendered even more emphatic if situated within the 
concerns of contemporary UK and US avant-garde poetry since the 1960s in 
particular, wherein poets quite often incorporate seemingly unlikely jargon, such as 
                                                
53 Haar. (1993). P109 
54 Heidegger. (1936). P198 
55 Heidegger. (1936). P198 
56 Heidegger. (1936). P198 
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technical or industrial language into their work.57 This was part of an ongoing debate 
in poetry as to what kinds of objects or words it was appropriate to use in a poem, of 
what kind of material and conceptual resonances were proper to poetry.58 One might 
argue that the text based work of conceptual art, should be considered as concerned 
with this same question, yet experiment with exploring this ambiguity at a point 
somewhere between painting, poetry and the ‘Readymade’ form. 
Second of all, exhibiting this rather small text specifically against the ‘opaque 
surface’ of the white gallery wall creates a minimalist aesthetic, which seems to 
construct a kind of ‘meditative space’ within which we are encouraged to engage with 
the poetic resonance of the words. When placed in this context, it seems to me that the 
texts appear more akin to the concerns of a poet such as Ezra Pound, whose central 
objective was to explore what he termed ‘Imagism’, i.e. the capacity for minimal 
poetic description to evoke a discrete, instantaneous image.59 Pound explored this idea 
even further through his more substantial poetic work The Cantos, a poem of great 
length, which contained within itself, distinct, minimal images. Pound’s objective, 
one might claim, was to explore the relationship between the minimal and the 
maximal, between the particular and the discrete, and the general and contextual. For 
this reason, Pound became obsessed with using Chinese characters in his poems, 
which are both often literal visual representations of their meaning and also highly 
contextual, in that they more often than not, gain their individuation and meaning 
through entering into contextual combinations with other characters. 
To my mind, we might say that something similar is happening with Weiner’s text. 
On the one hand, they use short minimal sentences, which occupy an ambiguous 
position somewhere between the banal or the merely descriptive, and the poetic: the 
                                                
57 JH Prynne can be considered to be pioneering of this tendency. Prynne incorporates various forms of 
jargon into his poems, including industrial objects or materials. See Prynne, Poems, (Bloodaxe Books 
Ltd, London, 1982). Keston Sutherland is another example of a contemporary poet who does this. For 
example, Sutherland often transplants entire patents into his poems. See Hot White Andy, (2007) Stress 
Position (2009) and The Stats on Infinity, (2010).    
58 William Wordsworth and Alexander Pope are examples of poets who were particularly interested in 
this question.  
59 The most obvious encapsulation of this is Pound’s famous poem In the Station of the Metro, 1913, 
which reads: “The apparition of these faces in the crowd, petals on a wet, black bough.” See Ezra 
Pound, Selected Poems, 1908-1969, (Faber & Faber, London, 1975). P53.   
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sentence feels as though it is permanently on the verge of ‘gestalt’ between art and 
non-art or, more accurately, it is in a tension or strife between the two. On the other 
hand, being both ‘about’ the wall and being on the wall, the text very clearly refers to 
its immediate surrounding context, it ‘points’, both to the wall and to the possible 
materialisation of the work; the wall’s removal. Thirdly, through the actual words 
used in both of these texts—i.e. “plaster”, “wallboard”, “wall”, “opaque”, “abrasion”, 
“light”—the text obviously encourages an imaginative engagement with a range of 
typically poetic and non-poetic forms of materiality. What is more, in combination, 
the words seem to additionally evoke the specifically material sense out of each other, 
e.g. take for example, the way in which the word “plaster” acts to evoke the 
specifically material sense of “wall”, whose character as either ‘earthly’ or ‘worldy’ 
seems ambiguous. However, in addition to this, through the tension that the text sets 
up, both through the opposing content of these words—i.e. “light” and “opaque”—
and between the distinct kinds of language this sentence is capable of appearing as, it 
is as though, one might argue, the ‘setting up’ of the artwork, by way of a kind of 
gestalt, is supposed to occur in the imagination of the spectator. To my mind, this 
brings to light a gap between the subjective spectator and the manner in which the 
gallery presents materialised artworks. 
In both of these works, A 36”by 36”Square Removal to the Lathing or Support Wall 
or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, and An Accumulation of Sufficient Abrasion to 
Remove Enough of an Opaque Surface to Let Light Through with More Intensity, 
Weiner seems to be evoking works, which are in tension between being ‘present’ and 
being ‘possible’. On one level, the work is the sentence or, as Costello says, “The 
work consists of exactly what the title describes.”60 On another level, the work exists 
through our being led to imagine its possible materialisation. However, one might 
argue that such an imaginative projection in the specific context of the art gallery 
involves not simply an imaginative projection of a removal per se, i.e., we do not 
simply imagine just any kind of removal, one which might take place in the everyday 
world of industrial decorating or architectural work, for example. Rather, what we 
                                                
60 Costello. (2007). P89 
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imagine is likely to evoke the particular objects and entities which have been 
presented in galleries through the history of art. As Costello points out, what the work 
evokes in particular is “the history of monochrome painting.”61 On yet another level, 
the work consists in actually being made. Additionally, and perhaps in part due to this 
temporal dimension to the work, there is a sense in which these sentences can be read 
either as descriptions or as instructions; they suggest both the description of the 
absence of an artwork, and an instruction for the bringing forth of a possible one. In a 
similar manner to the way in which Fountain set up what Crowther termed a “poetic 
reversal”62—i.e. a kind of turning inside out—of the typical relations between the 
artwork and its surrounding context, Weiner’s work acts to bring to light the very fact 
of such relations. To my mind, Weiner’s text-based works can only be grasped in 
their full complexity and implication by considering all these dimensions of the work 
together. 
I have attempted to demonstrate that even those ostensibly ‘dematerialised’ text-based 
conceptual artworks are in no way reducible to mere conceptual propositions or 
statements, which we can simply ‘get’ in some conceptual sense. Instead, there is 
recalcitrance in the process of trying to render them fully intelligible. This 
recalcitrance has to do with the capacity of such minimal ‘conceptual’ texts to evoke 
materiality, as well as their character of being rooted in the material history of art. 
However, in addition to this I want to argue that such works are ultimately better 
understood through positioning them within the ontological examination which I have 
attributed to conceptual art, as to the relation between art and its ‘ground’, which, I 
have been arguing, at this point of the conceptual art movement, was largely 
considered to be the institution or the gallery. In leaving it open to the gallery as to 
how they present the work, Weiner’s artworks in a sense force the gallery to literally 
enact their role as the illuminators of how we relate to art, whilst encouraging the 
spectator to imaginatively create their own work. This enforcement results in the 
rendering conspicuous of the fact of illumination, i.e. the fact that the gallery space is 
                                                
61 Costello. (2007). P89 
62 Paul Crowther, Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame), (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 2007) P120 
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not neutral. There exists a plethora of literature to suggest that this is indeed a central 
tendency of conceptual art, especially in the case of those artists who, it is claimed, 
are predominantly concerned with ‘imperceptibility’ such as Lawrence Weiner, 
Dennis Oppenheim and Robert Barry. 63 Central to Weiner’s artistic project is that he 
asks that we step forward and be active in constructing the significance of the 
artwork. In this sense, Weiner’s work could be considered to be a kind of recalling to 
the human logos. 
Whilst there are numerous examples of conceptual artworks that primarily use the 
presentation of text in this manner, I consider it wrong to interpret them simply as 
being about ideas and to thus claim that conceptual art per se is not concerned with 
materiality. It is my contention that such examples are better understood as ‘gestures’ 
or as moments within a broader tendency which I have already identified. However, 
these gestures should not be interpreted as a straightforward rejection of the gallery. 
Rather, they are part of the tendency of conceptual art to open up, and to keep open, a 
fundamental investigation into how the ontology of the artwork might be properly 
delineated and, as part of that same investigation, what the relation between the work 
and the gallery might be. This investigation was predominantly focused on the 
relation between what is typically ‘presented’, and its proper context of support or 
most significant ‘ground’, i.e. perceived at this point to be the art-world, gallery and 
institution. 
I would now like to look at the cases in which Weiner’s work has been materialised. I 
will concentrate on the piece referenced by Costello, which I presume from the date is 
the 1969 removal at the Kunsthalle exhibition in Bern. This work sidesteps the 
presentation of any object whatsoever and instead quite literally opens up a space, 
both out of and within that aspect which is supposed to support the artwork, i.e. the 
gallery wall. Weiner’s gallery removals emerged from out of his former art practice of 
making craters in a field with TNT and to this extent can be considered as an attempt 
                                                
63 During interviews with Patricia Norvell, each of these artists express an antagonism with the 
restrictive mode of presentation of the gallery, which results in them handing over ultimate authority 
for presentation to the institution, as a way of rendering the fact explicit. Through doing so, what is 
revealed is the fact of presentation as such. See Norvell. (2001).     
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to bring these practices back to the gallery.64  In this sense, like Fountain, Weiner’s 
piece cannot be said to be concerned with the character of a specific non-art object or 
entity in the World, except perhaps the artwork itself. Instead, its subtractive 
techniques of excavation or removal fit into a sculptural concern—a concern which is 
fully contemporaneous to this piece—of specifically disallowing the embellishment or 
ornamentation of space, by simply filling it with more objects.65 In Heideggerian 
terms, the ‘environment’ of art was no longer to be considered metaphysically, i.e. as 
the collection of familiar and unchangeable objects, or as a fitting context for the 
introduction of new objects, but rather it was to be thought “in reverse order.”66 The 
site of art was to become first and foremost a phenomenological site in which the 
artwork was to find its proper delineation and meaning only through an examination 
of its contextual relations. 
If we were to compare Weiner’s piece to the Van Gogh painting which Heidegger 
discusses, we would say that Weiner bypasses the pair of shoes entirely—he neither 
straightforwardly represents any particular kind of entity, nor literally presents us with 
one—but rather presents us with only the “undefined space,”67 which Heidegger 
describes as surrounding the shoes. In this sense, the work can be considered 
reminiscent of, and responding to, earlier pioneering works such as Kasimir 
Malevich’s Black Square, (1915)68 and Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning 
Drawing, (1953).69 However, in distinction from these earlier works, Weiner forgoes 
the most obvious and conventional forms of institutional support such as a frame or 
the simple act of hanging an object on the gallery wall, or placing one on a plinth. 
Instead Weiner opens up and interrogates what is inside the wall itself. This work, 
like many conceptual pieces, is highly site-specific. In fact, it would perhaps be more 
accurate to say that the work is inextricable from its context. As the artwork is 
                                                
64 Weiner in interview with Norvell. (2002) P101 
65 Thomas Crow, (1996). P131 
66 Heidegger. (1936) P168 
67 Heidegger, (1936). P159  
68 Malevich’s Black Square, whilst commonly thought to have opened up the possibility for a truly 
abstract art, left the artwork fundamentally still tied to the associated traditions of painting, such as 
landscape, portraiture and still life. See Paul Wood, Conceptual Art, P11  
69 As Peter Osborne describes, Rauschenberg’s objective with Erased de Kooning was to make an 
artwork “in reverse”. See Peter Osborne, Conceptual Art, (Phaiden Press London, 2002) 
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literally constructed from the gallery wall itself, it is ultimately inseparable from it. 
However, by this I do not mean to argue that there ceases to be a delineated artwork at 
all and that instead the work simply gives way to a context. Rather, the work is a 
delineated site. Again, by ‘site’, I do not mean a specific geographical or spatial 
location, but a phenomenological context that the work opens up. 
Weiner’s wall removals designate a further abstraction away from the conventions of 
painting. I think that Diarmuid Costello is right to draw attention to the fact that this 
removal “invokes the history of monochrome painting.”70 In fact, I think that this 
work invokes the history of painting per se. Notably, Weiner himself was formerly a 
painter and had turned his back on painting specifically because he disliked its 
physical limitations and ‘bounds’.71 However, to my mind, these removal pieces are 
firmly embedded within painting as an art form. It seems that specifically through the 
subtractive process of excavating from the wall, the work ‘sets up’ an “undefined 
space” which, due to the history of monochrome painting, can be encountered to a 
certain extent as determinate or defined. The black space is capable of appearing as 
though it were a canvas. It is specifically because the work, through its technique of 
removal, brings to light the manner in which paintings would conventionally be 
objects—i.e. items which are added to a space and which hang on the wall—that the 
work is able to open up an examination into, not only the ontology of objecthood, but 
also this support structure itself. Without the specifically art-historical association the 
work would not function as ontologically dis-closive.72 Whilst deliberately forgoing 
any actual frame or other conventional markers of the delineation of the artwork, 
Costello rightly emphasises, “the rough edges of the removal operate like a kind of 
negative after-image of the paint encrusted edges of the canvas.”73 They also in a 
sense, act like its frame. It is as though, by way of the opening up of the “undefined 
space” of the removal, all conventional traces of art-hood, i.e. art’s specifically 
                                                
70 Costello, (2007). P89 
71 “The painting stopped at that edge. When you are dealing with language, there is no edge that the 
picture drops over or off. You are dealing with something completely infinite. Language, because it is 
the most objective thing we have ever developed in this world, never stops.” Art Without Space, 
Reprinted in Lawrence Weiner, (London, Phaiden, 1998). P98 
72 Paul Crowther describes the meaning of abstract art as “parasitic for its artistic status on expectations 
grounded in more traditional idioms.” Crowther. (2007) P120    
73 Costello. (2007). P89 
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material identification, have been pushed to the periphery of the work. This seems to 
give primacy to the ‘undefined space’, yet also presents the material elements as the 
visual validation of the undefined space as artwork. The conventional markers act to 
literally delineate the work, so to speak: they operate as its material frame. 
One might argue that this is dis-closive of the manner in which, through a process of 
historical ontological unfolding, there has been a re-delineation of the ‘worldy’ and 
the ‘earthly’ elements of the work, i.e. between its actuality and its support. Or rather, 
the ‘environment’ of art has, we might say, been turned inside out, as it were. What 
we find through revealing the ‘inners’ of that which is perceived to be the support or 
the ‘ground’ of art, is in fact art itself and this is shown figuratively by Weiner’s piece 
through the emptying out of its specifically ontic traces. What we grasp through this 
work is that those aspects typically revealed by Duchamp to constitute the ground or 
support of the artwork have their own intelligible or perceptible face. By excavating 
into the supporting wall, the ‘earthly’ face of the wall is revealed, but this ‘earthly’ 
element is presented as always already delineated by art itself. In my interpretation, 
this work proposes that artworks in general are an ongoing relation of ‘intimate strife’ 
between these two elements. As a result, this work can be considered as the attempt to 
delineate, to an even greater extent than Fountain had, the supposed ground of art, so 
to speak. This artwork demonstrates that once something has been brought to light—
in the way that Duchamp had brought to light the various supporting elements of the 
institution—these very aspects present themselves in turn, as the material from which 
new configurations of the intelligible can be delineated. This work cannot be seen in 
any straightforward sense to be simply bringing to light the institutional support of the 
gallery. Rather, it appears to be questioning the now ostensible simplicity of 
Duchamp’s former revelation that the gallery itself is the very ground of art, and 
simultaneously, to be questioning the distinction between art and its specifically 
contextual support. In a sense, it could be argued that this is precisely what art is: art 
is the ongoing process of the re-delineation of the phenomenon by way of the 
phenomenological examination of that which has been recently brought forth. This 
makes art history important, but it is important as material history, as well as 
theoretical history. 
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Part Three: Michael Asher 
As we have seen, the question of the relation between what is presented and its true 
foundation or ‘ground’ is the question of presentation as such. In my interpretation, 
this concern—pioneered by Duchamp and revisited by Weiner—can be considered as 
one of the central hallmarks of conceptual art. To my mind, the trajectory set out by 
Weiner’s wall excavations are logically extended in the work of Michael Asher. In an 
untitled work of 1973, Michael Asher sandblasted the walls of Galleria Toselli in 
Milan until every single trace of the white painted surface—which we so tacitly 
identify as a trademark of the gallery space—was removed. Asher then exhibited the 
empty sandblasted room itself as an artwork. Asher chose not to use any typical 
institutional lighting, but instead allowed only natural light to fall across the room and 
illuminate it. This natural light created the striking effect of bringing into appearance 
the material depth of its rough textual surface. 
Untitled 1973,follows the trajectory of both Duchamp’s Fountain and Weiner’s A 
36”by 36”Square Removal to the Lathing or Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard 
from a Wall, 1969, to the extent that, through avoiding any conventional or simplistic 
formula of object-based art, it acts to turn the gallery inside out, so to speak. In the 
case of Fountain, what was brought to light was the fact that the artwork gained its 
individuation and meaning through a relational totality of the gallery context and the 
art-world; and vice versa. In the case of A 36”by 36”Square Removal to the Lathing 
or Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, 1969, Weiner had implemented 
a combination of text based imaginative pieces and materialised removal pieces to 
further reveal the conditions under which we encounter art. Asher’s work side steps 
the primacy of any ‘object’ or entity per se, there is of course a title but it is not given 
primacy, and instead embarks upon a direct material analysis of the whole gallery 
space in an attempt to interrogate more physically and inclusively the entire ‘ground’ 
or foundation of art.  
In a similar manner to Weiner’s A 36”by 36”Square Removal to the Lathing or 
Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, 1969, through a subtractive 
artistic practice, Asher’s Untitled 1973, brings to light the inner material depth of the 
gallery wall, through revealing the diverse textures of its layers. Through a 
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combination of abstracting away the reflective white surface of the wall and allowing 
only natural light into the room, we become aware of the fact that even the most basic 
and foundational elements which we have come to completely take for granted about 
the gallery system—i.e. the seemingly neutral white walls against which discrete 
artworks are typically exhibited—illuminate and present things in a very particular 
manner. What this work reveals is the fact of institutional illumination itself. As 
Asher explains, “Traditionally, the white interior of a commercial gallery presented an 
artist’s production within an architectural setting of false autonomy. If, through its 
absence, the viewer was reminded of the white paint, an interesting question was then 
raised: How does the white ‘partition’ of paint affect the context of art usually seen on 
that support surface.”74 The particular manner of illumination proper to the art gallery 
is not simply a neutral backdrop against which discrete art-objects can appear 
autonomously as themselves. Rather, it underwrites and constitutes an entire mode of 
what Heidegger calls ‘circumspection’. Through the process of disclosing this fact, 
we are made to question the manner and the extent to which distinct modes of 
illumination can act as ‘partitions’ to a more primordial relation to things around us. 
In doing so, it reveals to us the possibility for other forms of illumination or modes of 
relation. 
In fact, one might even argue that such possibilities are inscribed figuratively into the 
work itself, even at the level of its material mode of presentation. For example, one of 
the effects of the technique of sandblasting is that it makes the gallery space look a 
little like a derelict warehouse. An obvious interpretation of this would be to claim 
that the work represents the decay of the art world, the loss of its significance. Around 
this time many artists were beginning to form antagonisms with, and to attempt to cut 
ties with the conventional studio and gallery-based system. As a result, many artists 
moved out to alternative work and exhibition spaces. One of the main objectives in 
                                                
74 Michael Asher, Writings 1973-1983 on Works 1969-1979, (1983) P92. In art-historical terms one 
could interpret conceptual art’s interrogation of the white gallery wall as a critique of the specifically 
Modernist trait of presenting artworks as though they were discrete objects of contemplation. This trait, 
though prevalent in 1920s architectural theory of people like Courbusier, didn’t reach art museums 
until around 1939. Daniel Birnbaum claims that the first genuine so-called ‘white cube’ gallery did not 
emerge until the 1960s. See Mark Wigley, Olafur Eliasson, Daniel Birnbaum, ‘The Hegemony of 
TiO2: A Discussion on the Colour White’, in (ed.) Olafur Eliasson, Olafur Eliasson: Your Engagement 
has Consequences; on relativity of your reality, (Lars Muller Publishers, 2006) PP241-251      
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this move appears to have been the attempt to ‘free up’ the perceived constraints that 
the studio and gallery imposed upon their artistic thought processes and practices. As 
Michael Heizer put it, “the museums and collections are stuffed, the floors are 
sagging, but real space still exists.”75 The aesthetic created by the sandblasting would 
have thus been reminiscent of those alternative warehouse spaces or exhibition sites 
that were beginning to be occupied in Manhattan at that time. One might then argue 
that Asher is ‘setting up’ a proposal for the institution: he is suggesting at least that 
the ground of art can no longer be revealed through the ‘bounds’ of the institution, i.e. 
in this case, within the four walls of the gallery, but that art has instead extended out 
beyond the gallery to find new forms of shelter. However, by opening this proposal 
up specifically within the institution, Asher creates a continuum from the possibilities 
of these new alternative spaces back into the gallery. This to me seems incredibly 
significant and constitutes what is particularly interesting about this kind of 
conceptual art. If artists had simply evacuated the institution entirely, if they had 
abandoned the conventional art space in favour of unique spaces modified and 
customised specifically for the carrying out of wholly distinct art practices, the 
antagonism between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, or between art and its ‘ground’ would not 
have been set up. To examine the radical possibilities of art requires not a fleeing 
away from its centre to extremities, but rather, an investigation as to its proper 
delineation in relation to its ground. What makes conceptual art so rich in my 
interpretation is precisely that it holds this antagonism in force through a series of 
distinct experiments, the objective of which is to delineate the phenomenon of art. In 
this work Asher reveals that the space of the institution, whilst typically encountered 
as a kind of unchanging, neutral ‘container’ for artworks, or else an insignificant 
backdrop to which art-objects are merely added, in fact has both a phenomenological 
and an institutional history of its own: its history is the history of the illumination and 
the presentation of entities as art. This phenomenological history of presentation is 
responsible for the way in which art ‘objects’ or entities appear. Through 
‘materialising’ the ‘worldly’ exhibition wall, so to speak, Asher reveals the gallery to 
be a phenomenological site which has a material history of its own. The lack of any 
                                                
75 Michael Heizer, cited in (ed.) Selz Theories and Documents in Contemporary Art, (California Press, 
Berkeley, 1996). P534 
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conventional form of delineation, except for the capacity of the room itself, prevents 
the artwork from being rendered ‘present-at-hand’ in any simplistic sense, as a 
definite ‘object’ to be looked at. Rather, the work both sets up and is continuous with 
a phenomenological site. 
The following year in 1974, Asher set up another ‘untitled’ piece at the Claire Copley 
Gallery in Los Angeles, which, though similar in its logic and its specific form of 
revelation, brought to light a slightly different aspect of the foundation of art. As such, 
it can be considered as part of Asher’s ongoing attempt to delineate what Heidegger 
terms the World and the Earth of the artwork. Asher removed a partition that was 
typically used to divide the exhibition space, in which the spectators encountered 
artworks, from the gallery’s administration office. After he had taken down the 
partition, Asher placed it so that its smooth side—the side that would typically 
constitute one of the four walls of the gallery space—was facing the wall at the back 
of the room. This is a small detail that people often miss about this work, but it is 
important because it adds an extra level of operation to the artwork, in that the 
partition itself is made to show its own characteristics of structural support as an 
object. However, the partition does not appear as an entity that is wholly equipmental 
or instrumental. It instead looks like the back of a large canvas, which again—as in 
the case of the previous works examined—points to there being a continuum between 
the artwork and its context, the precise delineation of which presents itself as the 
ontological question of art. The association of the canvas stored against the wall 
might also be seen to refer to the fact that the conventional art-objects of the 
exhibition have become, or are on their way to becoming obsolete. The conventional 
artwork, one might argue, is temporarily bracketed or suspended, awaiting a verdict as 
to its fate.76 
The banality affected by the revelation of the administrative functioning of the gallery 
is emphasised by how small-scale the office is: it is composed of two people crammed 
                                                
76 A very interesting parallel to this occurs in Duchamp’s Bôite-en-Valise. In this work Duchamp 
reproduces miniature versions of every artwork he has ever made, arranges them into a miniature 
exhibition and places the exhibition into a suitcase. In my interpretation, this work is in part a 
commentary on the ambiguous position of art objects, following the introduction of photography into 
the gallery.   
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into the corner of the room with the entire office forced into a very minimal space. 
This acts to accentuate the manner in which the gallery attempts to present the 
exhibition space as dominant and all enclosing, or, as Asher himself says, an “abstract 
aesthetic context, creating a situation where the viewer could mystify its actual and 
historical meaning.”77 In doing so, it brings to light the particular character of self-
presentation of the gallery. Directly next to the office a door is open, allowing a 
natural ray of light to fall across the gallery floor and illuminate the office area only. 
Whilst there is a row of spotlights on the ceiling, each pointing in various directions 
against what would typically operate as the two main exhibition walls, none of them 
are on. Instead, like his other untitled work, Asher relies upon natural light to 
illuminate only that aspect of the gallery setting which would typically not be seen. In 
the case of this specific work, the aspect illuminated—i.e. the administrative office—
is quite literally that which is typically hidden, in the emphatic sense of the word. 
Asher does not make any attempt to arrange the office artistically so as to make it 
more aesthetically interesting; he simply shows it as it is in its banal truth. However, 
this ‘truth’ is not the same as any encounter that we might have by actually walking 
into a normal work space of this kind. Instead, the particular character of this truth can 
only come to light through the work and its specific attempt to unearth the foundation 
of art. It is only through the particular revelation that the gallery typically conceals its 
administrative and financial foundation that we gain a particular sense of what the 
gallery is. This artwork is not simply about revealing another layer of the supporting 
structure of art, i.e. the administrative system. Rather, in doing so, what is brought to 
light is the particular manner in which galleries and institutions present themselves. 
The artwork brings into appearance this presentation as such and again, represents this 
process figuratively through the ray of natural light. In revealing the banal workspace 
of the institution, Asher not merely demonstrates that the ostensibly self-contained 
and often thought to be almost magical and ‘transformative’ white space of the gallery 
has a commercial foundation, much like any other business. Instead, through the very 
process of revealing this, Asher’s work manages to bring into appearance the fact of 
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presentation itself. What is brought to light is more precisely that the gallery space is 
not neutral but presents both things and itself in a specific manner. 
However, there is another dimension to Asher’s untitled work of 1974, which 
distinguishes it in an interesting manner from his earlier piece. The 1974 artwork is 
not composed of an empty room, but actually includes within itself and as part of its 
content, the administrative staff working in the office answering the phones and 
conducting their daily business. These people immersed in their world of work 
literally become part of the exhibition. If we compare this to Heidegger’s description 
of the revelation particular to the Van Gogh painting then what we encounter in 
Asher’s work is the literal World of the gallery workers. We do not have to have an 
imaginative engagement with what that world might be like. Rather, we encounter 
what it is like because we encounter the day-to-day issues and concerns of this world. 
However, we of course do not encounter it by way of experiencing their world as they 
do. Instead, the meditative distance set up by the now admittedly less conventional 
ensemble of framing techniques of the artwork allows us to encounter this world in a 
particular way: we experience the world of the office staff and of the art world per se, 
as functioning and through its functioning it appears as what it truly is. 
This strikes up an obvious parallel with the work of John Cage, a precursor to the 
specifically periodised conceptual art movement. In his notorious work of 1952 
entitled 4” 33”, Cage composed a musical score which specified that it was for a 
three movement composition to be performed by any instrument or combination of 
instruments. However, the instructions on the score were specifically that the 
musicians should not play any music whatsoever. Whilst the piece is commonly 
conceived as 4” 33” of silence, the main point of the piece is that through the 
withdrawal of any actual involvement on the part of the artist-subjects, the artwork is 
constituted by the ‘accidental’ or uncontrolled sounds in the environment at the 
moment of any given performance. Like Asher’s Untitled 1974, through a minimal 
gesture of artistic framing, this work brings to light the ‘truth’ of the environment 
which is typically hidden whilst we are involved in encountering art. In doing so, both 
artists experiment with what brought into the ‘bounds’ of the artwork, in addition to 
revealing the very fact of that framing or illumination itself. However, whilst Cage 
strives to eradicate any inherent social standards that he might impose on the work 
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through composing it,78 attempting to instead bring out a more natural social buzz, as 
it were, it could be argued that what Asher reveals is specifically those social 
standards and values which are hidden through the particular modes of presentation, 
and of self-presentation, of cultural institutions. 
Part Four: Dennis Oppenheim 
As we have seen, conceptual art had at its centre an antagonism with the institutional 
world of art, an antagonism that was often played out and explored through the 
relationship between the artwork and its immediate surroundings, i.e. the gallery 
space. This antagonism was in part due to an increasingly prominent realisation that 
there are specific forms of presentation and illumination inherent to that space, ones 
which impose seemingly artificial limits or restrictions on the ontological possibilities 
of art. During the 1960s and 1970s, a series of artworks were being made which 
involved artists leaving the familiar surroundings of their conventional studio spaces 
altogether—at least temporarily—and venturing outdoors into natural settings. These 
works are commonly referred to as ‘Earthworks’ or, ‘Land Art’ in the UK. The 
central character of such works is often thought to reside in two simple factors, i.e., a 
rejection of both the studio and the gallery system per se, and a preference for loose 
‘earthy’ materials, such as soil or grass.79 
On this interpretation, it feels compelling and would ostensibly facilitate a neat 
theoretical move to draw an analogy between Heidegger’s emphasis upon the Earth as 
constituting the ontological role of materiality in the artwork on the one hand, and the 
way in which so-called Earthworks use the earth or the soil as the materials for their 
artworks on the other. However, as I have already argued in chapter two of this thesis, 
such an analogy would end up reducing the phenomenological significance of 
Heidegger’s conceptual schema down into something literal or representational. If 
                                                
78 Taruskin, Richard, Oxford History of Western Music: Volume 5. (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2009) P55 
79 Dennis Oppenheim does in fact claim to understand his own work in this way. He says, “I just liked 
the idea of loose matter, just residue from solid form, as being part of the piece. That’s really very 
much a part of my work, just loosely bound matter, just raw material, pulverized, granular matter.” See 
Norvell. (2001) P26 
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what we seek is a development of the line of interpretation this thesis has been 
arguing for so far, an account of Earthworks must be given in which such a reduction 
is avoided. In my interpretation, such works can be considered as examples—albeit 
rather distinct and particular—of the tendency I have already identified as central to 
conceptual art. That is to say, they display a further experimentation with the 
delineation of the ontology of the artwork—of what kind of thing the artwork is—one 
which is specifically characterised through its relation to its most fundamental 
foundation or ‘ground’. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, something akin to this phenomenological interpretation 
already exists in relation to the particular case of Earthworks. An example is Ed 
Casey’s discussion of the Earthworks of Robert Smithson in ‘Earth-Mapping: Artists 
Reshaping Landscape’.80 In this monograph, Casey explains how Smithson had to 
“get out of the studio and museum to re-establish contact with the earth”.81 However, 
to my mind, this should not be understood too literally as Smithson abandoning the 
artworld to retreat to nature and neither is it a simple valorisation of the natural 
landscape, a kind of return to Romantic values or to the charm of the landscape 
painting. Smithson, a notoriously sophisticated philosophical theoretician of his own 
artistic practices, devised a conceptual apparatus which he called the ‘dialectic’ 
between ‘site’ and ‘non-site’. By ‘site’, Smithson means, “the physical, raw reality—
the earth or the ground that we are really not aware of when we are in an interior 
room or studio or something like that.”82 By ‘non-site’, Smithson means roughly the 
gallery, which he describes as an “an abstract container.”83 It seems that Smithson’s 
central preoccupation was with the distinct manner in which certain environments act 
to ‘circumscribe’ things, to give them particular “limits”.84 However, it seems to me 
that Smithson did not believe that by simply moving outdoors into a natural space he 
could achieve a limitless or boundless setting for art. As Smithson himself confesses, 
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82 Robert Smithson, (ed.) Jack Flam, The Collected Writings, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
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“there’s no escape from limits”.85 Rather, as Casey puts it, Smithson was concerned 
with the “containment within the containment of the room”,86 i.e. the specific manner 
in which the phenomenological “place” of the gallery, acted to artificially limit the 
‘bounds’ of the artwork.87 As Casey explains, Smithson later came to reject the 
neatness of the distinction between these two realms and began exploring how the two 
material worlds—the ‘site’ and the ‘non-site’—are “intimately correlated.”88 Whilst 
much literature already exists on the work of Robert Smithson—perhaps largely due 
to his impressive capability of explicating the theoretical complexity of his own 
work—comparatively little has been written about certain other Earthwork artists 
such as Dennis Oppenheim. For this reason, it is to one of Oppenheim’s works that I 
now wish to turn. 
Dennis Oppenheim’s Oakland Wedge, 1967 is an interesting piece because it seems to 
enact a more extreme “escape attempt”89 from the gallery space than the other works 
examined in this chapter. This work is not concerned in any clear sense with enacting 
a material interrogation of the gallery space. Rather, it ostensibly takes art away from 
the containment of the gallery and releases it, as it were, into the open space of the 
outdoors. Oakland Wedge was made during what could be considered an intermediary 
period for Oppenheim between his MFA graduation from Stanford University in 1965 
and his debut solo exhibition in the New York art-world in 1968. Interestingly, this 
was a period when the artist himself occupied a temporarily peripheral position in the 
artworld, much akin to how Duchamp’s more experimental gestures took place when 
he supposedly dropped out of the artworld and instead posed as a mere interventionist 
and provocateur on the sidelines.90 In 1967, Oppenheim cut a five-foot wedge into the 
side of a mountain in Oakland, California and lined it with sheets of translucent plexi-
                                                
85 Robert Smithson, (ed.) Norvell (1969) P126 
86 Casey. (2005) P7 
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88 Smithson. (1979) P8 
89 This phrase is Lucy Lippard’s. See Lippard. (1973) Vii 
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glass.91 As far as I have been able to discern through my research, Oakland Wedge 
was never exhibited as such in any gallery—you had to actually visit the work in, or 
rather as, a unique and specific ‘site’ in itself—and surprisingly, neither do there seem 
to be any traceable photographs of the work at all, only discussions of it and 
references to it in interviews and articles.92 One might be tempted to argue at this 
point that Oakland Wedge represents an ultimate departure from or break with the 
specific trajectory of conceptual art that I have identified up to this point. One might 
argue that this work represents the ultimate opting out of the radical investigation of 
conceptual art in its relation to the gallery as its fundamental ground and has rather 
fled to find a new ground, the true ground perhaps, i.e., the Earth itself. Such an 
interpretation might also lend itself to a reading whereby Oakland Wedge is seen to 
designate a kind of performed reversion to what Walter Benjamin describes as the 
“ritualistic” artwork, i.e., an artwork whose unique value is to be found only in “the 
location of its original use-value.”93 To this extent, Oppenheim could then be seen as 
severing all ties with the gallery and institution, specifically by setting up an entire 
context which is completely resistant to being re-appropriated or commodified by the 
institution. What Oakland Wedge sets up is in fact a whole, indivisible natural 
environment.94 Due to the lack of any gallery exhibition to either promote the work or 
house it, Oppenheim refuses to take anything from or to give anything back, at least 
directly, to the gallery, as it were. Whilst Smithson brought heaps of rubble, rocks and 
gravel back to the gallery for exhibition, in the attempt to open up an awareness of 
“the elemental” within the containment of the gallery,95 this work could be interpreted 
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as unconcerned with this relation. However, this kind of reading would of course be 
overly simplistic. In my interpretation, Oakland Wedge can be seen to be within the 
same intimate tension between the World and the Earth and between art and its true 
‘ground’ as the previous works discussed. However, what is particularly interesting 
about this work is that it is both a performance of and experimentation with a specific 
vanishing point within the conceptual art tradition. 
As Oakland Wedge had to be visited in or as its own unique site then the primary and 
dominant experience in the encounter with this work would at least initially be the 
total relational context of the natural setting. Lacking the mode of “containment” 
common to the gallery space, one would have to approach the work as though it were 
some kind of natural landmark or monument. The work might even appear boundless 
at first, or else its ‘bounds’ would be ambiguous, i.e., one might not know what one is 
looking for. In a similar manner to both the Asher and the Cage pieces, the work 
incorporates into itself all manner of spontaneous contextual elements. This 
environmental context constitutes what Oppenheim calls the “origin” of those 
material forms of presentation that are placed on galleries walls, such as photographs 
or paintings, for example. Whilst it seems that Oakland Wedge in particular was never 
documented in a gallery, Oppenheim did document his subsequent works. For 
Oppenheim, the photograph in the gallery reduces the relational totality involved in a 
sculptural enactment, in a manner that delivers it back to the simple realm of the 
visual. The photograph does this by ‘presenting’ just one static moment of a work 
which within its original context exists organically as an ongoing process of 
movement and modification. Oppenheim says: “I think the documentation of these 
terrestrial pieces is the weakest part of the aesthetic. I don’t really focus on the 
abstracting of the idea from the origin.”96 The “origin” for Oppenheim is the 
specifically located piece, both spatially and temporally. To “solidify” what is a 
holistic and relational modifying process into a “photographic abstraction”, claims 
Oppenheim, is “ripping a thing that’s going with a certain force out and throwing it 
back to the dormancy of a rigid form of communication”97 It seems that for 
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Oppenheim, the rigidity of the communication afforded by such static and solidified 
art-objects, is partly due to the fact that it “cuts out an incredible amount of things that 
don’t qualify, that just can’t enter into these bounds.”98 At a more representational 
level, what the photograph cuts out could be characterised with recourse to 
Heidegger’s notion of the supportive role of earth in its relation to physis—the way in 
which phenomenological modification and the establishing of what appears involves 
inherently within itself the act of sheltering. For Oppenheim, the visual abstraction of 
the photograph does not constitute a positive moment, from which one can traverse, 
through a kind of bridge of imagination, into a meaningful engagement with the 
totality. Instead it “weakens” and “reduces” the enactment of the sculptural force, 
merely to “extend the idea to other people”99 It seems for Oppenheim then, that the 
artistic act of presenting and exhibiting a work to another person necessarily involves 
a reduction. The crucial point is that it is not just any reduction, but specifically, the 
necessary removal, abstraction or cutting out of a whole range of phenomena. It is 
thus the very “bounds” of the conventional art-object presented in the gallery—in this 
case a photograph—which comes with its already rigidly prescribed boundaries of 
what can and what cannot—literally what has the capacity to—come forth as 
phenomena. In conceptual sculpture, Oppenheim sees a form of art that engages “a 
larger arena or activity”.100 His dislike of the photograph is that it signifies how, 
despite this expansion, due to the nature of “presentation”, “it has to be reduced back 
into symbols and such rather than be allowed to live in its own context.”101 
However, whilst Oakland Wedge sets itself up as an environment or a context other 
than the institution, it is clearly a work that does in fact incorporate a range of 
sculptural tendencies and concerns that are astutely contemporaneous with the 
artworks of the New York art scene at this time. As Suzaan Boettger identifies, 
Oakland Wedge incorporates “minimalist geometricity, open environmental form, 
plastic and earthern materials, and excavation procedures”102 Much like some of the 
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other works examined in this chapter, Oakland Wedge is not representational or 
depictive in any straightforward sense. Rather, it presents a ‘negative space’ as the 
initial central point of focus of the work. However, this time, there is no direct contact 
or association with the gallery space at all. Oakland Wedge presents a three-
dimensional excavation, as opposed to a relatively two-dimensional removal. As we 
have seen, a removal is a procedure that occurs mostly within a more industrial 
setting. It implies most centrally the removal of structural components of buildings, 
such as walls. As such, when used in artistic practices, it evokes the artistic form of 
painting, in particular. In distinction from this, an excavation is the specifically 
outdoor practice of digging straight into the ground. Its three-dimensionality locates it 
in the history, not of painting, but of sculpture. Excavation is a kind of negative 
sculptural procedure; it is sculpture for those who wish not to add more objects to the 
world. 
Despite the fact that an excavation is a negative space, it carries with it various 
distinct connotations. First of all, it is a procedure used in archaeology. Archaeology 
is the study of human history through the excavation of ‘sites’, by way of bringing to 
the surface and subsequently analysing the remains of human artefacts. Archaeology 
thus uncovers those aspects of the human world and of human culture that lay buried 
or hidden under layers of sedimentation. By analogy, the excavated ‘site’ of Oakland 
Wedge is empty. What this brings to light is an absence of any historical human 
artefacts for our analysis. In my interpretation, what is brought into appearance 
through the negative space of the excavation is the absence of the conventional art-
object. However, significantly, the negative space of this excavation is held open by 
the plexi-glass lining it, thus disallowing the space to collapse in on itself, as it were. 
In this sense, the ephemeral character that is centrally characteristic to many 
Earthworks—due in part to the ‘loose’ nature of the work’s materials—is disallowed 
within the negative space of this work. The movement of the loose material is thus 
rendered static. In a similar manner to the way in which the rough material edges of 
Weiner’s removal piece seemed to act as a kind of frame for the negative space of the 
removal, the plexi-glass of Oakland Wedge presents itself as that which is holding the 
space open, that which is supporting its openness. What is presented is a kind of 
“container”. If we were to follow Smithson’s schema, this could be considered to 
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represent the gallery itself, i.e. to represent the specific kind of containment that acts 
to “limit” the manner in which things can appear in the gallery space. 
Second of all, excavation into the ground also has the connotations of a grave. In fact, 
the advent of specifically natural, outdoor excavations into earth and soil—a practice 
that became popular in the contemporary New York art scene in the late 1960s—is 
typically accredited to Claes Oldenburg, who dug a grave shaped hole in Central Park 
in 1967. Oldenberg’s excavation was in part a protest against the Vietnam War that 
was ensuing at that time. Following Oldenberg’s lead, other New York artists 
subsequently took up this technique of outdoor excavation. However, excavation 
became used not merely to artistically enact specifically political protests against the 
war, but also to refer to formal and institutional concerns of the 1960s and 1970s. In 
my interpretation, Oakland Wedge is more concerned with this latter point and its 
excavation represents the anticipated death of conventional gallery-based institutional 
art. However, the fact that the plexi-glass is holding the grave open suggests that the 
art-object has not yet been buried, which leaves it ambiguous as to what its final fate 
will be. Rather than investigating the ground of art by way of an interrogation of the 
material and phenomenological space of the gallery, this work can be seen to focus 
upon the absent art-object. Through the negative space of the excavation, the absent 
art-object or sculpture comes into appearance and, along with it, the associations of its 
entire historical institutional context, support and practices. The intelligible world of 
the institution is inscribed, so to speak, on the environment. 
Through the excavation the work sets up an intelligible space in which the absent art-
object and institution can appear. In setting up the World of the gallery within this 
new space, the world is thus supported, so to speak, by the surrounding context such 
that one might claim that it becomes inscribed within it. By posing the question of 
where precisely the artwork ends—i.e. the hole, the cliff or the entire world103—the 
presence of the absent art-object sustains the environmental and contextual whole of 
the work as a specifically artistic environment; it endows it with an institutional 
significance and meaning. If the absent art-object can be said to be the negative figure 
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into which the ideational and conceptual associations and beliefs about the ontology 
of art are shaped, it is only by way of the artwork that this intelligible is given what 
Heidegger terms “extension” and “delimitation”.104 This extended and delimited 
space of the intelligible however, does not exist completely externally to or outside of 
the space which the artwork itself sets up. 
Now of course, this does not set up a realm of “consecration” and “praise” or effect a 
straightforward endowment of the environment with positive meaning, as it does in 
the case of the Temple, but is something rather more akin to a phenomenological 
demonstration of the manner in which outside spaces can come to be coloured by and 
endowed with a phenomenology similar to the institution or can be inscribed with a 
new intelligibility.105 The institution is present, not by revealing itself in full to the 
direct senses, but through its inscription upon the surrounding context or environment. 
The spectre of the absent—perhaps represented by the dead art-object—is conjured up 
and brought “invisibly close”,106 as its absence is announced through and thus is 
inscribed within the negative space that we are to imagine encloses it.107 What this 
means is that it is in fact the absent world of the institution, its entire meaning, ideas 
and beliefs, announced or declared by the work itself as half visible, through the use 
of translucent plexi-glass, but brought forth into a kind of perceptual visibility, 
through its colouring of and inscription in the whole natural environment, which 
sustains both the ‘work’ and or as its context as meaningful. However, the point of 
Oakland Wedge is not merely the ‘transfiguration’ of a natural setting, through the 
bringing of the institution into its realm. Rather, the work poses the question about the 
possibilities for the future of the art world. 
                                                
104 Heidegger. (1936) P168 
105 For an intriguing exploration of a similar idea, i.e., how the institutional space can endow everyday 
objects with a new phenomenological disposition, see Arthur Danto, Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1981) 
106 John Sallis, Stone, P93 
107 John Sallis, Stone, P92 
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Concluding Remarks 
What I hope to have demonstrated in this chapter is that conceptual art was a radical 
and transformative practice which reconstituted what art is through an ontological 
investigation into its ground. To my mind, this argument can be seen to have a certain 
parallel with a point that I consider to have been made very clearly by the October 
writer Benjamin Buchloh. In his text ‘The Aesthetics of Administration’, Buchloh 
claims that from its very moment of inception, one of the central tendencies of 
conceptual art was a “critical devotion to the factual conditions of artistic production 
and reception without ever aspiring to overcome the mere facticity of these 
conditions”.108 I have attempted to demonstrate that such a “critical devotion” 
occurred not simply at the level of actual theory, but also through the manner in 
which the works themselves had the specifically radical and transformative potential 
to reconstitute the artistic context or environment per se. Conceptual art was most 
centrally an ontological examination into how the artwork might be further delineated 
in relation to what Buchloh describes as the “facticity” of the conditions of art. 
However, in addition to this, I have argued throughout this chapter that this process of 
investigation specifically required that such facticity not be overcome; the project of 
such delineation requires both intimacy as well as resistance. 
Through following a trajectory wherein each artwork discussed brought to light a 
slightly new aspect of this investigation, I have attempted to capture something of its 
movement or development. Whilst each work demonstrated the particularity of its 
own revelation, a tendency was discovered as running through each example. This 
was the tendency for conceptual art to function “paradigmatically”, as Thompson 
describes. At the centre of the workings of the conceptual artwork is the capacity for 
art to bring to light what art itself is. To this extent, conceptual art might be 
considered to be the quintessential ‘paradigmatic’ kind of artwork for Heidegger. 
Whether or not Gianni Vattimo’s ostensible implications are correct—i.e., that there 
is a real homology between Heidegger’s insistence on the ontological bearing of art 
                                                
108 Benjamin Buchloh, ‘Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the 
Critique of Institutions’ in October, Vol. 55. (Winter, 1990), pp. 105-143. 
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and the desire inherent within avant-garde practices of the 1960s to inspire people to 
defend the fact of art—is a question that would require more attention than this thesis 
is capable of. However, it is my contention that this question is certainly worth 
pursuing. 
It is important to note that this exploration of ontological delineation through the 
conceptual artwork was not an exploration made by artists only. Rather, it developed 
into an ongoing and shifting relation between the institution and the artists. Through 
the prevalent tendency in conceptual art practices to move ‘behind’ the art-object 
presented, conceptual artists undertook an examination of the ‘ground’ from which 
objects can emerge and be sustained within a contextual whole, such that their 
individuated meaning can appear. As a necessary response to this, and as a way of 
being capable of continuing to play the role of accommodating and housing such 
changeable and increasingly unconventional work, galleries had to reconstitute 
themselves and this occurred most centrally both through a re-conceptualisation of 
their specifically spatial character as well as their structure. In this sense, the gallery 
space had to interrogate its own material character and it had to pursue its own kind of 
ontological project. An examination into the complexities of this relation would no 
doubt reveal even more about the ontological project of conceptual art. 
A Possible ‘Weak Conceptualist’ Response 
In chapter 1 I identified a position vis-à-vis the role of the idea in the conceptual 
artwork which I termed ‘weak conceptualism’; Paul Wood was cited as an 
representative of this position, due to his claim that in conceptual art “the idea is 
king”.109 ‘Weak conceptualism’ involves the claim that, while the conceptual artwork 
may be realised in material form, what is most important about it is the ‘idea’. It may 
be possible for a weak conceptualist to accept the interpretation given in this chapter 
of conceptual art as involving an ontological probing of the artwork’s own conditions, 
and to also accept the necessary role played by the material within works which 
involve such an ontological probing. A weak conceptualist response might be to argue 
                                                
109 Paul Wood, 2002, P33. Quoted in Schellekens. (2007) P72 
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that the idea which is ‘king’ in conceptual art is exemplified in precisely such 
ontological examinations; that the ‘idea’ in each of these cases is exactly that which is 
communicated through each work’s particular relational structure. 
Nothing in my interpretation of conceptual art necessarily entails a dethroning of the 
‘idea’ per se. To argue against reductive, ‘strong conceptualist’ claims that the idea is 
the only thing—or the only thing of any importance—in the conceptual artwork is not 
to deny that there is any ideational aspect in the production and experience of 
conceptual art. It has largely been the burden of this thesis to redress an imbalance in 
the philosophical interpretation of conceptual art by focusing on the role of the 
material in the experience of conceptual art, but this of course should not involve a 
simple inversion of the strong conceptualist position into one which gives the material 
sole importance. If we were, however, to make a positive claim about the role of the 
idea in such works, we would first have to specify what is meant by ‘idea’, something 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
  
171 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have attempted to offer a unique way of thinking about conceptual art 
which situates the more commonly conceived notions of such art within a wider context 
of conceptual art theory and practice. Since, with conceptual art, materialised objects or 
entities largely continue to be produced and exhibited in the gallery space, I have 
insisted that conceptual art must be examined in its specifically phenomenological 
operations. As we have seen, even those works that do not involve exhibition in a 
gallery, such as Dennis Oppenheim’s Oakland Wedge, should be considered continuous 
with that gallery-based investigation. To conclude this thesis, I will offer a brief review 
of each of its chapters before indicating a further possible line of enquiry that has been 
suggested through the development of this project. 
In the first chapter, I sought to critically analyse several distinct approaches to the 
conceptual artwork that have emerged from recent philosophical literature. The aim was 
that by bringing to light the various strengths and weaknesses that emerge from the 
attempt to hold on to certain positions as to the ontology of the conceptual work, a more 
stable and convincing account could be attained. I selected the three articles assessed in 
this chapter because I considered them to represent what I identified to be distinct 
positions with regards to the role of the material in the ontology of the conceptual work. 
In part one of this chapter, by way of a thorough critical engagement with Schellekens’ 
model—on which the material is conceived as a ‘prompt’ by which we, albeit it 
‘experientially’, access the idea—my central aim was to demonstrate the difficulty in 
writing about a concrete artwork whilst attempting to marginalise the significance of its 
material. As I identify Schellekens as attempting to take as seriously as possible the 
claims of a small, yet influential group of conceptual artists, my objective in part was a 
simultaneous critique of such claims. In an attempt to lend credence to what I termed a 
‘strong conceptualism’, Schellekens’ argument ultimately confessed its own untenable 
nature. 
In part two of this chapter I examined Lamarque’s essay ‘On Perceiving Conceptual 
Art’. This account ostensibly sought to avoid the dichotomy of the idea and the 
material. By holding that the unique character of conceptual art is that it renders the 
perceptual ‘subservient to the conceptual’, yet nevertheless insisting that central to such 
  
172 
work is a perceptual ‘transfiguration’, Lamarque reinstated the material element of the 
artwork as a significant component of the work’s ontology. The virtue of Lamarque’s 
account is its insistence that a perceptual encounter with the material presentation of the 
conceptual work remains constitutive of that work. This account can thus speak to the 
fact that conceptual art is still mostly a visual or perceptual form of art, which 
predominantly continues to produce objects for artistic presentation in the gallery. 
Whilst this overcomes the problems that emerged for Schellekens, Lamarque’s account 
was also problematic in that it overemphasised the role of the cognitive in 
‘transfiguring’ the material object. Lamarque offered no adequate account of the 
interaction of these two elements, or of particular material properties, in formulating 
and providing recalcitrance to the concept or idea of the work. 
In the third part of this chapter I analysed Costello’s ‘corrective’ to Arthur Danto. 
Costello’s aim was to demonstrate that in so far as artists continue to make and exhibit 
material objects or entities, we must take the fact of artistic embodiment seriously. For 
Costello, the material element does not merely yield to the cognitive, through being 
perceptually ‘transfigured’ by it. Rather, the material provides substantiation for the 
cognitive, whilst also being recalcitrant to it. For Costello, the material qualities of the 
artwork are assigned greater significance in their capacity to shape meaning, yet also 
resist being rendered fully intelligible. This helps to explain why conceptual artists 
might continue to invest their time and artistic efforts in the presentation of materialised 
artworks, but also permits that the material itself is a source of significance. However, 
one problem was identified with Costello’s theory. Through his centralisation of the 
artistic labour of the artist-subject, Costello presents an account which cannot ultimately 
accommodate conceptual art in its unique character. 
At the end of this first chapter it had become clear that an adequate ontology of the 
conceptual artwork necessitated an account of the role of the material, not simply as a 
‘vehicle’ that transmits an idea, or a ‘prompt’ that leads one to an experience with an 
idea. Rather, Costello convincingly demonstrated that in so far as artworks are still 
embodied in material, there exists material recalcitrance to the artwork being rendered 
‘diaphanous’ to meaning. In the second chapter I tried to develop this idea of material 
recalcitrance further by examining Heidegger’s phenomenological account of the 
artwork. My question was whether or not Heidegger might be capable of aiding a 
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development of the issues raised in chapter one, whilst managing to avoid their distinct 
problems. The particular focus of examination was the manner in which Heidegger 
thematised the relation between the ideational and the material through his conceptual 
schema of World and Earth. Such a thematisation provided a way of conceptualising the 
phenomenological operations of the artwork more explicitly. Through an analysis of 
Heidegger’s notion of the artwork, ontology and ontological determination were 
brought to the fore as an active process in itself and at the same time the relation 
between phenomenology and ontology was emphasised. For Heidegger, the artwork is 
fundamentally ontological in that it reconstitutes what is. 
In the first part of this chapter I gave a detailed exposition of Heidegger’s 
‘deformalisation’ of phenomenology and his unique delineation of the ‘phenomenon’ as 
that which typically lays hidden but has the highest demand to be brought to light. As 
we saw, phenomenology for Heidegger was the ‘double play’ at work between the ‘self-
showing’ and the ‘self-concealing’. This ‘double play’ becomes increasingly 
emphasised in Heidegger’s later work, especially in relation to the ontology of the 
artwork. The ‘concealed’ aspect of Heidegger’s phenomenology becomes what he later 
refers to as Earth. In part two of this chapter I laid out Heidegger’s opposition to the 
conceptual schema through which artworks are typically conceived. This schema is 
‘symbolic’ in that it formulates the artwork as a material X with a ‘something other’, a 
Y. It is this ‘something other’ that is usually thought to constitute the proper character 
of art. For Heidegger, this schema only designates the artwork in so far as it is related to 
as an equipmental object. The artwork for Heidegger is ontologically prior; it is a site of 
ontological unfolding. 
In part three of this chapter I gave a detailed account of the way in which Heidegger 
attempts to overcome the dichotomy through which the artwork is typically conceived, 
i.e. the hylomorphic structure, through his introduction of the categories World and 
Earth. The artwork ‘sets up’ a World and ‘sets forth’ the Earth. These terms function 
both ontologically and ontically for Heidegger. In bringing into intelligibility a 
relational context of meaning and signification—something which could not be reduced 
to a single ‘idea’ as the cruder ‘art as idea’ formulations imply—and by insisting upon 
the material or Earth as having a more central role in the determination of the work, 
Heidegger is able to explain how the artwork is fundamentally ontological. In response 
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to what I anticipated to be a potential objection to discussing conceptual art along these 
lines, I gave a short analysis of a Readymade. My objective in doing so was to 
demonstrate that an artwork such as Fountain is not ontologically flat, so to speak. The 
point of such a work is not that we encounter it as a formerly functioning commonplace 
object transfigured into art, but that the artwork itself is constitutive of a whole 
phenomenological context of significance and meaning. 
In part four of this chapter I gave a further examination into the concept of Earth. For 
Heidegger, Earth—his term for materiality—is not simply the ‘work material’ of an 
artwork. Whilst Earth is an appropriate notion to apply to conceptual art in the sense 
that it can designate all manner of materials, including language, Earth does not merely 
designate that out of which the artwork is made. It is not simply the stone or canvas or 
pigment or, in the case of conceptual art, the text or the gas or the urinal. Rather, Earth 
has both an ontological and an ontic mode. Earth is that which substantiates all aspects 
of the relational whole. It is that which holds things within their bounds. Whilst 
Heidegger does seem to return us ultimately to the art-object as that in which this more 
phenomenological significance of material can appear, it was my contention that his 
account might be used to discuss those conceptual works which appear less 
conventionally object-based insofar as the material aspect of these works is something 
that is fundamentally at stake in them. 
I dedicated chapter three of this thesis to a lengthy examination of a range of conceptual 
artworks. Before I began with my analysis I drew attention to the difficulty that faces 
any theoretician whose aim is attentiveness to the concrete and the empirical. Artworks 
in particular are characteristically resistant to the application of any determinate 
theoretical framework. In an attempt to minimise as much as possible a too heavy 
framing of such works, I decided to employ Heidegger’s categories and terminology 
sparingly. In part one of this chapter I looked at Duchamp’s groundbreaking artwork 
Fountain. In doing so, I attempted to draw out that this work was responsible for 
opening up what I have argued was the tendency of conceptual art to investigate its own 
ontology and its ground or support. In distinction from Lamarque’s interpretation of 
Fountain—as a commonplace object that gets transfigured through a title—I interpret 
Fountain as having transfigured the entire gallery surroundings and context. Through a 
simple gesture of placing a urinal in a gallery, signed R.Mutt, placed on a plinth and 
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titled Fountain, Duchamp’s work opened up an intelligible and phenomenological 
context which brought to light its ground as artwork. 
In part two of this chapter I revisited Wiener’s A 36” Square Removal to the Lathing or 
Support Wall or Plaster or Wallboard from a Wall, 1969, (1969), as well as looking at 
his later work, An Accumulation of Sufficient Abrasion to Remove Enough of an Opaque 
Surface to Let Light Through with More Intensity, (1981). Whilst pointing out firstly 
that these text-centred works not only use a mixture of poetic and commonplace and 
banal language—which sit in tension in a manner that lifts the language out of the 
ordinary—but that they do so in a way which fully references the specifically material 
conditions of their own support—i.e. the wall of the gallery and the potential artwork 
which may be created with this text as a title. As a work that is text, imagined work and 
realised work, Wiener’s piece brings the relational whole of its own conditions to light. 
In part three I analysed Michael Asher’s two works, Untitled (1973) and Untitled 
(1964). Asher’s work involves a direct interrogation of the gallery space, and as such is 
representative of the ‘institutional critique’ tendency within conceptual art. Asher’s 
works are interventions into the gallery space which reveal its character as a space of 
presentation, which is itself a part of larger relational structures which include the 
institutional forms of the art world. These works involve a kind of turning inside-out of 
the art gallery, or what Paul Crowther might call a ‘poetic reversal’, in which the 
conventional ground of the art object itself which is tacitly understood but normally 
remains hidden, is brought to light. In this sense, Asher’s works could be seen as 
paradigmatic examples of Heideggerian artworks precisely because what is brought to 
light in them is the fact of institutional illumination itself. Interestingly, Asher typically 
figures this with rays of natural light which fall across his otherwise unlit installations. 
Whilst earthworks are not typically discussed as a central part of the conceptual 
project—perhaps due to the association of such works with such non-conceptual art 
themes as ‘nature’ or ‘spirituality’—to my mind they are best understood as continuous 
with the conceptual project. In particular, earthworks such as Dennis Oppenheim’s 
Oakland Wedge, as was brought out in our analysis of this piece, are best understood in 
similar terms to the other conceptual artworks we looked at, through their putting into 
play of the ontological limits of the artwork itself. Such earthworks, though they do not 
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so directly perform an interrogation of the conventional space of art viewing as the 
works by Asher and Weiner that we looked at, perform a radical escape attempt, and set 
up an experimental space beyond the containment of the gallery, thus putting at play 
what can legitimately be included within the bounds of the art work and, by extension, 
the art institution. 
Whilst these artworks were all very particular in character, they demonstrated a certain 
tendency. This tendency was the attempt to put under pressure the distinction between 
the artwork and its surroundings or relational context through a material investigation 
into its own ontological conditions and character. At the end of this chapter I qualified 
my interpretations of the artworks by pointing out a potential criticism. One might argue 
that what we are left with is conceptual art as an idea—i.e. conceptual art as the idea of 
ontological self-investigation into its own ground. It has not been the objective of this 
thesis to try to claim that the ideational component is not significant to conceptual art, 
simply to redress an imbalance in the philosophical reception of conceptual art. This 
means not denying the importance of an ideational or conceptual aspect to conceptual 
art, but seeing this aspect as one moment in the relational whole of a wider conceptual 
art practice and theory.  
Releasing the grip of the idea of conceptual art as mere idea, and allowing conceptual 
art’s wider contextual relations to come into focus would be the necessary starting point 
for understanding the particular character of artists’ writings as strategic and often 
ironic interventions into this context. As I indicated in the introduction, a fuller 
treatment would include a section on such artistic writings, but space constraints 
determine that such a treatment must remain beyond the bounds of the present thesis. 
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